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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates relationships scholars have with information and art associated 
with aesthetic and theoretical disruptions. Its governing metaphor is the surprise affect, 
figured as a rhetorical and aesthetic event. My purposes are to evaluate institutional and 
scholastic responses to both desirable and disastrous information-aesthetic liminalities, trial 
performative engagements with surprises, and propose viable ways of  engaging “innovation” 
for writing instruction. It is argued that aesthetic (i.e., relational in the sense that it is not 
immediate), performative, and temporal engagements with surprising objects of  study are 
relatively viable options when considered alongside the “critical” manuscript. While the 
aesthetic has sometimes occupied a minor and inferior position relative to codified and 
metricized intelligences, such relegation rests on false and pernicious but well known and 
persistent dichotomies including intelligibility v. sensibility, knowing v. feeling, thinking v. 
experiencing, and aesthetic v. epistemic. The intelligibility presupposed by the critical model, 
however, cannot achieve immediate engagement with its ostensible “object”; it therefore 
remains relational and aesthetic. Few would counter the claim, yet actual performances of  
relation are rare. To test its payoff, the dissertation performs two engagements with 
challenging objects associated with surprise: novelty or “the new” as such, and the currency 
of  idiosyncrasy in the timbre of  recent electronic music. While not incidental, novelty and 
timbre are examples in the project’s larger attempt to rethink not just any given surprise, but 
ways of  treating and dealing with the inevitability of  metaphysical shock and overhaul. 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This is Surprise. The period in the title of  the project is deliberate. It signifies the tendency, 
if  not primary function, of  scholarship to explain, control, and make known its putative 
objects of  study. While this is not a counterproductive arrangement, as the sole modality of  
inquiry it can reinforce the myth that we may finally know and control even the catastrophic 
and the unimaginable. If  such phenomena are “surprising” in the sense that their weight, 
trauma, effect, or affect are, at least temporarily, unintelligible or irreducible to articulation, 
explanations thereof  are belated reintegrations of  shock to the ordinary and manageable. 
Such accountancy cannot know a surprise. No one can. If  they did, no surprise. Yet it is 
precisely these coarse divisions between known and unknown that are complicated in the 
following pages. My way of  showing this is to maintain that relational modes of  academic 
discourse are relatively viable options for engaging “surprises” when considered alongside 
the critical manuscript. The idea is that since learning and teaching are inventive, ongoing, 
and non-immediate processes of  making legible worldly phenomena, I surmise that rhetoric 
should not only acknowledge this disjuncture, but perform it as well. 
Of  particular interest, then, is the question of  how, in distinction from what, to know, 
do, and make of  surprises. The project therefore hopes to surpass an account of  noteworthy 
breakdowns, liminalities, wonders, excitations, and devastations, or bringing to light some one 
new or neglected object to the discourse for consideration. I do all the above, inevitably and 
necessarily, but I do not stop there. The project’s principle offering, instead, is best construed 
as a mood or a mode—a sensibility—for discoursing that seeks viable ways of  bringing forth 
these phenomena into the domain of  intelligibility that preserve epiphanic potential and 
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meaningful intellectual growth. The argument therefore has less to do with surprises 
themselves than with handling or treating surprises in scholarship. 
The first chapter develops these prefatory remarks and then offers a selective review 
of  one of  the longest and most controversial dialectics in the history of  Western thought: 
intelligibility and sensibility. Traditionally, the former has been associated with intellect, 
reason, and codification; the latter, with phenomenal experience, mood, emotion, and so on. 
As a disorientation, surprise seems to fit better with the merely sensible, but, as I will argue, 
this convenient categorization is rash and premature. Twin registers of  experience, 
intelligibility and sensibility have since antiquity been contrasted against one another for 
ideological reasons and interests. While the project argues the value of  keeping the two 
separated severely limits inquiry into one’s relationship with information, these lines in the 
sands (and disciplines) are historical and persistent; a review is therefore appropriate and 
necessary. We check in with the Greeks and Germans, of  course, but also with 
trandisciplinary contemporary theorists to learn how the issue has appeared in different 
guises for different reasons in more recent conversations. The project then situates itself  
within rhetorical studies debates on “aesthetics of  rhetorics,” whose origins are in still earlier 
scholarship on whether and the extent to which rhetoric is “epistemic.” My move there is to 
position the aesthetic and the sensible not as alternatives to epistemic and “traditional” forms, 
but to see intelligibilities like the scholarly article as aesthetic or relational after all. 
Three attempts to do precisely this are developed across as many chapters. The first 
involves novelty or “the new” as such. Like surprise, the novel as a grammatical entity in this 
sentence cheats itself  out of  its own meaning. Most can relate to acquiring a new widget, 
traveling to a foreign place, or experiencing unfamiliar art works. But “the new” as referent 
seems to require and (or?) result in something recognizable, referential, and termed. It 
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thereby saws off  the branch on which it supposedly rests. In this way, the new is like surprise 
in that everybody  nows what “new” is,  but nobody knows what it is. Necessarily. For this 
reason, the new is a favorite dead horse. Scholarly treatments of  novelty typically resign 
themselves to bureaucratic accounts of  self-proclaimed progressive artists, writers, and 
thinkers, and read their rhetorics as empty, cheap, commercial—a vain and delusional 
egotism at best. Yet, the material, affective, temporal, and existential dimensions of  engaging 
art and information pose serious challenges for the rhetorical frame of  accountancy seen in 
critiques of  the new and, as the German philosopher Martin Heidegger has demonstrated, 
for metaphysics in general. Evaluated are Michael North’s Novelty: A History of  the New, Boris 
Groys’ recently translated On the New, and Jacques Rancière’s Aisthesis: Scenes from The Aesthetic 
Regime of  Art for their relative viability as means of  engaging the new. From there, the 
chapter comports itself  with an approach to aesthetics and rhetorics characterized by an 
“anxiety” (angst) with the “work of  art” according to Heidegger. 
The third movement lends an ear to renewed attentions for “sonic rhetorics,” taking 
experimental electronic music’s predilection for idiosyncratic texture and timbre as an 
opportunity to engage arts innovation. Chapter Three, “Drop.,” takes up the problematics 
and excitations of  relating to music in the media of  alphabetic writing. Writing about music 
is notoriously difficult, and the inadequacies of  transposition from one media to another are 
well known, but my suggestion here is that the problem is uniquely manifest in the aesthetics 
recent electronic dance music (EDM) and other experimental electronica. As a nod to the 
durational qualities of  engaging sonic information, the dissertation’s trajectory is organized 
by the logic of  a typical early 2010s electronic dance music production: meter, build, drop, 
interlude, and bridge. This music, known both for innovation in timbre and machinic 
regularity in meter, is an ideal candidate for inquiry into surprise because its effects are 
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temporal, transient, and affective. As it happens, a curious silence surrounds our relationship 
with sound. The terms “timbre” and “tone color” in music theory refer to the idiosyncratic 
character of  different instruments playing the same note, which at once makes the concepts 
both singular and relative. Felt and heard in this chapter are the aesthetics of  recent 
electronic dance music as well as experimental artists like Holly Herndon and Ryoji Ikeda. I 
argue the emphasis novel sonic and temporal affects in the work of  these and other artists 
creates both renewed and unique challenges for scholars, who are scrambling to account for 
new sensibilities pioneered by these producers as they report, invent, and anticipate (a)new 
relations with digital information infrastructures. Fair use of  audio clips are embedded right 
into the Portable Document Format file for the sonic experience of  the “reader.” 
The fourth act, an Interlude, slows the tempo and develops an aside on the case of  
Roland Barthes. This chapter compares the aesthetics and ethics of  writing in his work 
alongside more recent thought in rhetoric, composition, and feminist theory. Although often 
remembered for his aesthetic jubilations of  irrationality we might associate with surprise and 
the sensible, I work to recall another side of  Barthes involving a veritable floundering within 
what he understood as the violence of  structural, codified, and disciplinary ways of  relating 
with the text. Discussed are the separate works of  Lynn Worsham, Cynthia Haynes, and 
Gayatri Spivak, all of  whom the dissertation argues are particularly adept at navigating and 
“negotiating structures of  violence,” as Spivak would say. These writers along with Barthes 
are disciplinary “impostors” to their discourses; they work from within convention while at 
the same time revealing the inadequacy of  these very mechanisms for knowledge production 
specific to their areas. Intelligibility and sensibility meet, merge, and dissolve into one 
another. 
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Before the curtains close, the fifth chapter develops a pedagogy of  “information 
aesthetics” for writing instruction featuring not graphic or visual design per se, but rather the 
conceptual blur between phenomenal experience and reflective knowledge making. The 
focus is on the material, affective, and existential dimensions of  engaging apparently 
“nonaesthetic” informations and wisdoms. The proposed instructional technique there 
nourishes understanding of  the dynamic relationships between students and their supposed 
objects of  perception, reflection, and study. The idea is to acknowledge and meaningfully 
integrate into the curriculum the relational quality of  the interaction among writers and their 
so called “content,” data, or research. Too often the ideal academic writer is framed as a 
disaffected compiler or synthesizer, but arranging the already known in advantageous 
configurations is an apolitical proceduralism that downplays or erases aesthetic and 
inventional qualities of  composing. However, learning is an affective event and teaching is a 
performative act that exceeds content delivery. Investigation of  the manner and purposes 
with which arts practices can inform relational writing instruction is necessary to respond to 
well known issues in composition studies of  student affect and engagement. The argument 
there is that bridges between contemporary arts and the practice of  academic writing are 
untapped opportunities for developing meaningful relationships with information. 
Interestingly, however, teaching relationships with information requires neither experimental 
forms nor an emancipatory narrative for the a liberated student subject. Instead, arts 
integrated composition pedagogies encouraging alternative relations with even those forms 
dealing most steadfastly with “intelligibility” may well provide means by which to responsibly 
address the recent currency of  “innovation” in higher education. Advanced in this final 
chapter are seeds for curricula designs fostering healthy, flexible, resilient relationships with 




For if  existent things are visible and audible and 
generally perceptible, which means that they are 
external substances, and of  these things which are 
visible are perceived by the sight, those that are audible 
by the hearing, and not contrawise, how can these 
things be revealed to another person? For that by which 
we reveal is logos, but logos is not substances and existing 
things. —Gorgias  1
life’s not a paragraph —e e cummings  2
One of  the most basic assumptions of  Western cultures is that information is a good thing. 
Knowledge is power, a positive gain, or a desirable acquisition. Yet if   “a way of  seeing is 
also a way of  not seeing,”  and if  any given perspective “reveals dominations and 3
possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point[s],”  it is no stretch to say that 4
information un-informs while informing. Knowings, perspectives, and understandings are as 
dangerous as useful—and the issue is by no means a purely theoretical one. From sophistic 
relativism to deconstructionist play, from the hermeneutics of  suspicion to critiques of  
positivist Enlightenment mentalities—there is no shortage of  lessons that information is 
only as good as the interpretation, reflection, and implementation it receives. The scholastic 
enterprise, endowed with its system of  checks and balances, standards of  rigor, and patient 
discipline in the treatment of  its objects, might seem like the best bet when it comes to 
interacting with information. With its rubrics of  clarity, comprehensiveness, replicability, or 
 The first epigraph is recollected and attributed to Gorgias by Sextus in Against the Schoolmasters, 1
excerpt trans. George Kennedy in The Older Sophists, ed. Rosamond Kent Sprague (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 
DK82B3.
 e e cummings, “since feeling is first,” Complete Poems: 1904-1962, ed. George J. Firmage (New York: 2
Liveright, 1991), 291.
 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1984), 49.3
 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (New York: Routledge, 1991), 154.4
1
accountancy for the historical contingency of  its claims, scholarly discourse is thought to be 
the highest caliber information available. I commence, however, with what might appear as a 
surprising claim: our relationship with information is dysfunctional. 
 The dissertation takes up an issue that is often bypassed or summarily dismissed. The 
topic is an experience or condition that has been historically construed as beyond, prior to, 
or in excess of  knowledge that is knowable because it is codified or replicable. We live and 
communicate in discursive networks that rely on systematic operations, of  course, but we 
also relate to discursive networks and their commonplaces, assumptions, and givens. This 
project explores the capacity of  scholars and scholarship to relate to information in ways 
that exceed endorsement, rejection, and mixtures of  these two frames in the forms of  
compromise or paradox. 
 The instability of  relationality is ever present and indeed inescapable as a sort of  
analog constant when subjects approach objects. Yet it need not be consciously 
acknowledged, and is easily ignored or trivialized as wasteful, unlikely, temporary, or 
impossible to wield. Known only by belated translation, this “sensibility” nevertheless forms 
and is prerequisite for articulable rhetorical experience. This latency undeniably arises, 
however, in the experience of  surprise—and especially surprises made manifest not only by 
the failure of  expectations, but the rupture and dissolution of  expectation and perspective 
altogether. The topic of  the present writing is such a breakage figured as a rhetorical and 
aesthetic event. As an unforeseeable interjection, surprise seems to stand in a negative 
relationship with information. Yet it is only informational stimuli that surprises. 
 There are long and diverse tendencies of  thinkers in a wide variety of  discourses to 
seek out and push toward interpretive thresholds, aesthetic limits, margins of  
(in)comprehensibility, and affective boundaries. Surprises transcend disciplinary borders and 
show up as uninvited guests, paradigmatic breakthroughs, terrifying doomsdays, and 
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aesthetic ecstasies. The present text will treat surprise as a necessarily ephemeral, lived 
experience of  novelty, wonder, awe, shock, or epiphany as events in reading, listening, 
writing, thinking, and living rhetorically. Such experiences, while they can be traumatic and 
debilitating, can also bear immense potentialities for alternative modes of  existence. 
Surprises can be annoying, inconvenient, and even terrifying. They can also deliver 
heretofore unknown nectars in rhetoric and learning. 
 To the extent an inevitably inadequate operationalization of  surprise is useful, the 
invention and reception of  knowledge may be construed as something grander than mere 
data, mere content to be compiled, synthesized, and arranged advantageously. Alternatively, 
this project attempts to articulate a relational mode of  scholastic inquiry: an epistemological 
project that would be an aesthetic project and vice versa. To get there, I will tour histories of  
related impulses and inklings heard in discourses of  rhetoric, philosophy, aesthetics, art, 
music, and more with a certain attitude or state of  mind that does not desire the closing of  a 
circle, the cellophane wrapped ontological proposition, or advanced noticed of  the precise 
trajectory between cause and effect. 
Consider the Following. 
 The term “sensibility” is used in the following pages alongside “intelligibility” to 
indicate two modalities of  relating to information. Although these terms are sometimes 
pitted against each other for polemic effect, the simple truth of  the matter is that they are 
not contraries. The point is not to have the former negate the latter and win out in 
fulfillment of  some grand emancipatory narrative. In fact, one of  the purposes of  the 
project is to demonstrate the inextricability of  each contestant in this false and overrated 
dialectic. The terms are intertwined not simply because each depends upon its negative for 
conceptual identity, but because both experiential registers are simultaneously and ceaselessly 
3
active in the continuity of  being. But the pairing does indeed make what I hope will be a 
productive and provocative juxtaposition from which to begin a project that springs from an 
obsession with the ways humans and scholars in particular perceive and live their 
relationships with information and knowledge—including but, as we will see, not limited to 
surprises. 
 Related and similarly problematic dualisms include experiencing vs. knowing or 
feeling vs. meaning. Such negative differences are useful only insofar as they recall a too 
often neglected mode of  relation to the world, art, argument, or information. In using these 
terministic pairs, this project does not pretend to toggle from one from side to the other at 
will. But if  surprise is (im)precisely constituted or made manifest by an utter lack of  relation, 
the failure of  interpretation to assimilate experience to what made sense earlier, then it must 
be distinguished from an intelligible phenomenon.  
 Surprises in this sense exhibit a sort of  violence unto the interpreting subject, and it 
is precisely this trauma that warrants attention to the phenomena. Dauntingly inaccessible, 
impossible lines of  inquiry are worth pursuing, ironically, for exactly this reason. Immense 
and radically incomprehensible topics such as The Holocaust, the complex emergence of  
pathogenic outbreaks, and school violence demand thought and discourse precisely because 
they cannot be adequately apprehended. In perhaps all knowings, but especially engagements 
with topics such as these, we must agree with Gorgias: experience and knowing, while not 
mutually exclusive, are not the same. On the other hand, this dissertation maintains that 
knowing is an experiential event and never fully rid of  this vulnerability. If  the material 
encounter or mere register of  signals by the perceptual organs (including the brain) is 
something different than the assignment of  linguistic operators to these signals, knowing is 
temporal, lived, embodied—an essentially creative act. We would seem to need a mode of  
inquiry broad enough to attend and respond to that which falls outside the purview of  
4
rhetoric and communication as intentional, transmissive enterprises of  transference and 
accounting. It is worth recalling that aisthesis from the Greek simply means “perceive” and 
carries no denotation of  beauty, pleasure, or taste; the derivative “aesthetic” is a relatively 
recent invention more closely associated with formal recognition and identification of  
perception.   5
 “Aesthetic” is thus sometimes used interchangeably with “sensibility” in the 
following pages, and the term framed as such is to be distinguished from its canonical 
associations that persist in some contemporary usages. Instead, “aesthetic” is deployed in the 
Nietzschean sense for the sake of  highlighting the material, embodied, and artistic 
dimensions of  meaning making lurking in even the most stringently regulated and 
hyperinstitutionalized venues: “only by forgetting that he himself  is an artistically creating 
subject . . . does man live with any repose, security and consistency.”  His idea that 6
perception itself—all cognition prior to, during, and (therefore) conscious recognition itself
—is an artistic act jives with Gorgias’ proposition that “nothing can be known.” The 
connection is that retrospectively knowing an experience does not duplicate the experience. 
If  this is true, “‘the adequate representation of  an object in the subject’—is a contradictory 
impossibility. . . . [T]here is, at most, an aesthetic relation: I mean, a suggestive transference, a 
stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue.”  Bypassing relation for 7
 Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of  Art, trans. Zakir Paul (London: Verso, 5
2013), x.
 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” trans. Daniel Breazeale in The 6
Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Boston: 
Bedford, 2001), 1176 (emphasis in the translation). Hayden White makes the related point that not only 
language but perhaps conscious apprehension itself  is inherently tropological: “[r]endering of  the unfamiliar 
into the familiar is a troping that is generally figurative.” Tropics of  Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 5.
 Nietzsche, “Truth and Lies,” 1176. The Breazeale translation cited here includes the following note 7
on the phrase “aesthetic relation”: “ein ästhetisches Verhalten. A more literal translation of  Verhalten is ‘behavior,’ 
‘attitude,’ or perhaps ‘disposition’” (Ibid., 1176n18). Less a deliberate approach than a physical, physiological, 
and existential situation, this “relation” in distinction (yet not opposition) to the security of  stable, routinized 
engagements with objects is relatively open to surprises or alternative engagements with objects, arts, 
information, and so on.
5
identification is therefore an unacknowledged struggle of  coercion, a forgotten erasure of  
envelopment. 
 Still, the challenge for the present writing is a double-bind of  contending with 
surprises in scholarly writing. I think it can be claimed without much controversy that the 
general tone of  the relations between scholars and their studies is basically regulatory. But 
the “characteristic” feature of  surprises, if  I may hazard a generalization, is being caught off  
guard: losing one’s head, composure, marbles, shit. It happens. Sometimes for the better; other 
times: catastrophe. Regardless, rupture, breakdown, and liminality have long and diverse 
genealogies in which these and related terms are valorized for any number of  reasons: desire, 
engagement with Being, avant-garde potentiality—take your pick. One senses the problem. 
How to approach disruptive thinkers and artists who turn up, unleash, and dilate perceptual 
limits in a way that doesn’t amount to stamp collecting and lip service that would reduce the 
radical to anecdote? Can rhetorics somehow do a greater service to its noisy “objects”? How 
might one attempt to perform the aesthetic or affective dimensions of  experiencing such 
disruptions? 
 Perhaps the trick is in the relations and relationships scholars have with information and 
art more so than information and art themselves. The focus is not on an ontology or even a 
genealogy of  surprise (though both of  these appear below). This project cannot help 
wondering how, in distinction from what—to know, do, and make of  surprises. It therefore 
hopes to exceed a simple account of  noteworthy breakdowns, liminalities, wonders, 
excitations, traumas, and so on. The project also attempts something grander than bringing 
some new or neglected object to the discourse for consideration. I will do all the above, 
inevitably and necessarily, but I won’t stop there. The project’s principle offering is best 
construed as a mood or a mode—a sensibility—for discoursing that seeks to engage with its 
texts and artworks as mutually- and co-productive constituents along with the subject in the 
6
experiential event; the focus is neither content nor form, but precisely our approach or 
relationship with each of  these variables in our scholastic-artistic activities. The claim therefore 
has less to do with surprises themselves than with handling or treating surprises in 
scholarship. My sense is that a composition on surprise ought to perform its approach, and 
that such a performance should strive for an aesthetic relation with its phenomena.  
Tick Tock: Sensibility & Intelligibility. 
 Like meter, dialectical thinking and knowing function rhythmically, grounding our 
conceptual relation to that about which we discourse. Negative difference furnishes an 
apparent stability, but the web of  negations implied in any identification suggests that polar 
thinking is not enough to engage the breadth and multiplicity of  any one concept. Still, by 
invoking a distinction between intelligibility and sensibility, I make reference to one of  the 
longest, most contentious, and vertiginous dialectics in the history of  Western thought. 
While the sensible has been exalted as uniquely human, ethical, and aesthetically maximal, it 
has also been framed as dangerous, naively utopian, wasteful, bourgeois, solipsistic—even 
imaginary. As antinomies, these terms beget sweeping generalizations, careless dismissals, 
and blithe mis/understandings. 
 I use the term “sensibility” to signify a processual relation with an object, idea, text, 
or art work. Others have used different words for both related and unrelated purposes in 
accordance with their specific contexts, hopes, and desires. While an exhaustive treatment of  
relations between aesthetic thinkers and their epistemologies would require a dozen volumes, 
the following sections review aesthetics and sensibilities associated with surprise affects in 
the sense of  rendering habits of  understanding inapplicable, untenable, or inadequate. 
Reasonable and productive engagement with this pair of  alleged antitheses is possible by 
focusing the analysis on those variations that concern surprise affects: loss of  control, 
7
grounding—even breath. I proceed thusly with the presumption that to engage surprise is to 
engage sensibility and the aesthetic relation. 
Greek and German Origins: The Inferior Faculty. 
 Besides Gorgias, other Presocratics questioned the relationship between knowledge 
and the senses. Heraclitus, for instance, observes that humans “are at odds with the logos, 
with which above all they are in continuous contact, and the things they meet every day 
appear strange to them.”  Heraclitus refers not to logos “the word” or language, of  course, 8
but rather a cosmological order. I am deliberately conflating logos as language and logos as a 
natural superstructure of  the universe, however, to highlight their similarity in the sense of  
concealing themselves precisely at the point of  their revelation. Meanwhile in Abdera, 
Protagoras is cooking up his infamous “man-measure” doctrine, which is thought to be the 
first instantiation of  relative meaning. “He used to say that soul was nothing apart from the 
senses”—that the only conceivable reality was in perception—and in this way “everything is 
true,”  new, and changing. More than a shortsighted anthropocentrism, it is Protagoras’ idea 9
that all things are processually becoming rather than statically being that informs this 
apparently radical subjectivity. The human itself  is in such a “flux” of  becoming, a 
statelessness which coincides with the salient feature of  sense impressions: change as a 
 Attributed to Heraclitus by Marcus Aurelius. Mediations, in A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and 8
Testimonia, trans. Richard D. McKirahan and Patricia Curd, ed. Patricia Curd, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2001), 27(B72). Fittingly, the Aurelius passage goes on to recall that Heraclitus rebuked and overreliance on 
received wisdoms: “we ought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and speak as we 
have been taught.” Meditations, trans. George Long (London: The Chesterfield Society, 1890), IV xlvi.
 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of  Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 9
University Press, 1972), IX viii. Socrates can hardly believe it. Let me get this straight, he asks,“‘[t]hings appear, 
or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them? . . . . Perception is always of  existence, and 
being the same as knowledge is unerring?’” Plato, Theaetetus, in The Dialogs of  Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 3rd 
ed., vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 152a-153a.
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constant.  In each case—Gorgias, Heraclitus, and Protagoras—what is involved is making 10
articulable the experience of  phenomena, a slippery activity of  rendering sensate 
information conceptual that occupies many Presocratics.  11
 Although Plato’s banishment of  the poets from his ideal society  is the commonly 12
cited emblem of  the rift between a truth seeking philosophy and a merely imitative poetry, 
the closing scene of  the Symposium better enacts the issue because the dialog involves an 
essential fusion of  beauty and wisdom. Late into the night, Alcibiades stumbles into the 
gathering in honor of  Agathon’s poetic successes. Sloppy, the party crasher professes his 
sexual frustration with Socrates, who seduces his students in “philosophic frenzy” with 
words alone but never shows lust himself.  The contrast between Socrates’ claim to “mere 13
truth,” the means to an impersonal, unceasing, and essential beauty atop the ladder of  love,  14
and the stupor of  Alcibiades is gratuitous. Plato takes great pains to figure ideal beauty in 
distinction from worldly, material, and bodily pleasures; the former is “pure and unalloyed; 
not infected with the flesh and color of  humanity,” whereas the latter is epitomized by the 
naivety and animality of  the drunken guest. Elsewhere, as we know, Plato indicates that 
sensuous experience is not even to be trusted precisely because they report a perpetual flux 
while the realm of  ideas is unchanging.  15
 Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), 10
46.
 James Porter, Origins of  Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece: Matter, Sensation, and Experience (Cambridge, 11
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 47-48. On other early thought concerning the intelligible and sensible, 
see also Catherine Osborn, “Reality and Appearance: More Adventures in Metaphysics,” in Presocratic Philosophy: 
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 61-79.
 Plato associates poetry with pleasure, the body, and charm—all threats to reason, habit, and 12
composure. Republic, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), 606a-608a.
 Plato, Symposium, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), 218b. 13
Alcibiades likens the words of  Socrates to music, which Plato memorably frowns upon because of  its affective 
indeterminacies. Thomas Rickert, “Language’s Duality and the Rhetorical Problem of  Music,” in Rhetorical 
Agendas: Political, Ethical, Spiritual, ed. Patricia Bizzell (New York: Routledge, 2010), 158.
 Plato, Symposium, 199b; 210c-212d.14
 Michael North, Novelty: A History of  the New (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2013), 23.15
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 One way of  reading the Symposium is to conclude that Alcibiades is a bad student like 
the antihero Max Fischer in Wes Anderson’s film Rushmore. An enthusiastic but 
underperforming student at a prestigious prep school, the brace faced Fischer is enamored 
with the aesthetics of  academic life, but shuns the labor of  study. His résumé features a 
goofy array of  extracurricular padding—to wit: Stamp & Coin Club Veep, Kite Flying 
Society, Model United Nations (Russian delegate), President of  Rushmore Bee Keepers, and 
so on—but he is ultimately kicked out for poor marks. Tears fall on his blazer embroidered 
with Rushmore’s seal during the expulsion proceedings.  This kind of  hankering to be a part 16
of  the team, the institution, or the elite duplicates Alcibiades’ immaturity, stuck as he is in the 
excitation of  worldly experience. But one could also say that Socrates’ cerebral resignation is 
itself  an aesthetic relation to the ideas about which he seems to discourse so cooly. Let us be 
reminded: there is pathos in logos. Hence, while one could read the memory of  Socrates 
frozen in place for an entire day contemplating an especially challenging problem as an 
indication of  his godlike intellectual dexterity,  one could just as easily read the episode as a 17
“hysterical seizure” or “traumatic intrusion of  something New”  prior to apprehension. 18
Learning is surprising. 
 Aristotle’s remarks in the opening pages of  Metaphysics are also telling in this regard. 
The sensory apparatus of  the body can be appreciated for its own sake, he says, but without 
memory these senses are “mere experience” and cannot produce knowledge.  The function 19
of  memory here is to equalize the multitude of  recurring experiences in our days, 
professions, and lives: to “produce the effect of  a single experience,”  thereby eliminating 20
 Rushmore, directed by Wes Anderson (1998; New York: The Criterion Collection, 2011), Blu-ray.16
 Plato, Symposium, 220c-220d.17
 Slavoj Žižek, Event: A Philosophical Journey through a Concept (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2014), 70-71 18
(original capitalization).




surprise. Causality, of  course, is the currency backing Aristotle’s metaphysics, and, lest there 
remain any confusion, “sense-perception . . . has nothing to do with Wisdom” precisely 
because it does not involve contemplation or explanation for sensed phenomena.  It’s true 21
that the third installment in his epistemic triad—knowing, doing, and making—requires 
improvisation as a sort of  craft or art (techne). However, for Aristotle there is no relationality 
to universals or particulars, and he frames techne as an activity essentially driven by reasoning 
based on past experience.  22
 Plotinus, too, pits “the Intellectual against the sensible,” and declares it “better for 
the Soul to dwell in the Intellectual, but, given its proper nature, it is under compulsion to 
participate in the sense-realm also.”  Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten cites precisely this 23
passage in his attempt to legitimate the sensate faculties as a veritable area for inquiry for a 
context of  rationalism, yet in Reflections on Poetry he nevertheless works with the tired 
hierarchy and identifies the sensible as “lower” relative to the intellectual: “things known are 
to be known by the superior faculty as the object of  logic; things perceived [are to be known 
by the inferior faculty, as the object] of  the science of  perception, or aesthetic.”  Immanuel 24
Kant, for his part, famously asserts a radical subjectivity that would seem compatible with 
sensibility, but the fierce criticism he inspired with what sounds like a universal beautiful 
 Ibid., 982a.21
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 1140a.22
 Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna, 2nd rev. ed. by B. S. Page (London: Faber and 23
Faber, 1956), 363.
 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. 24
Holther (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1954), 78 (brackets in the translation).
11
makes recouping his project tricky.  However, it is worth noting this supposed universality is 25
only so if  communicated successfully, which tempers at least to some degree the typical 
tsk-tsking Kant receives. Judgments might be radically subjective, but expression of  
judgments implies such assessments can (and should) be shared.   26
 In any case, the real surprise for Kant is the sublime. Unlike the charming beautiful, 
the sublime “arises only indirectly” and evokes both “limitlessness” and “totality,”  which at 27
once approximates the sublime with everything and nothing in particular. A series of  
overwhelming spatial qualities—greatness, vastness, and magnitude—are tossed out as 
characteristics of  the sublime, but the common theme is a resistance to the subject’s 
apprehensive faculties. Given its associations with “displeasure,” “incapacity,” 
“astonishment,” and even “terror,”  one might reasonably conclude the sublime scares Kant 28
precisely because its impenetrable wall grinds his analytic to a halt. Sections twenty-three 
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of  the Power of  Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, 25
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 75; cf. 89. Hayden White is relentless in his critique of  what he calls 
Kant’s extremist “ideology of  aestheticism,” which promulgated “the difference, apprehended as an opposition, 
between literacy and literature” thusly:  
literacy is considered as consisting of  basic writing skills to be used primarily for the efficient communication of  
practical information, a certain kind of  thought, and commands; . . . literature is considered as the product of  a 
writing practice, the creativity of  which is thought to consist of  its capacity to permit the expression of  
intuitions, feelings, and thoughts of  a certain impractical nature by virtue of  their individuality, subjectivity, or 
idiosyncrasy [surprise!], on the one side, and their status as products of  a rare, inborn talent, even genius, on the 
other. 
In short, “a sensibility wholly imaginative (neither rational nor practical) in nature.” White, “The Suppression 
of  Rhetoric in the Nineteenth Century,” in The Fiction of  Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory, 
1957-2007, ed. Robert Doran (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 296. The consonances 
among rhetorics, sensibility, innovation, and the teaching of  writing here are fortississimo: fff. The notion of  a 
rhetorical literacy as somehow non-aesthetic is not only illusory, but a detriment to the progress of  both arts 
and sciences. Education policy trumpeting the humanities as the university’s “creative” province in 
contradistinction to “vocational” departments and majors is consistent with this ideology. Ironically, such 
attitudes coupled with department-specific budget cuts in higher education today actually inhibit innovations 
beyond those of  a narrowly defined variety—read: “monetizeable”—take energy and credit hours away from 
the pursuit of  invention so desperately needed in undergraduate curricula. See my fifth chapter below for an 
elaboration of  this point.
 Sensibility and intelligibility meet. Sensibility by itself, in Kant’s terms, is at best “good” or merely 26
“agreeable.” Thomas Hove, “Communicative Implications of  Kant’s Aesthetic Theory,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 
42, no. 2 (2009): 103-114.
 Kant, Judgment, 128.27
 Ibid., 142-143; 152.28
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through twenty-nine on the sublime in the third Critique fall to the floor like darts without 
tips—and this is exactly the point. It’s a discourse that talks about precisely not talking about 
the sublime. In this way, the notion has a funny correspondence with Hegel’s “symbolic” 
form of  art characterized by an undeveloped and fumbling relation between the subject and 
its object that is “rather a mere search for portrayal than a capacity for true presentation”; 
consequently, in symbolic art “the relation of  the Idea [reason] to the objective world 
therefore becomes a negative one.”  Although symbolic art’s attempt to shape its concepts are 29
thereby “fantastic and monstrous,”  this first form is probably the most honest of  the three30
—that is, most reflective of  the situation when human animals convert the sensible to the 
intelligible. 
Danger as Life Enhancing. 
 In the second chapter of  Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud gets frightened. 
“Anxiety” describes a particular state of  expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may 
be an unknown one. “Fear” requires a definite object of  which to be afraid. “Fright,” however, is the 
name we give to the state a person gets into when he has run into danger without being prepared for 
it; it emphasizes the factor of  surprise.  31
Note this definition’s lack of  criteria. Freud is writing about psychoanalysis and trauma, of  
course, but I am inclined to stretch and repurpose his distinctions for an inquiry into 
surprise as such. Given the “danger” is aesthetic, “fright” starts to sound like a desirable 
rhetorical experience for a study of  sensibility. This is not an argument, however, for a no 
holds barred aesthetics. Car crashes, ebola outbreaks, crimes against humanity, and snuff  
 The symbolic is first and least mature relative to what Hegel calls the “classical” (presentation 29
perfected) and “romantic” (pursuit of  an unrealizable human spirit) forms. G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on 
Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, vol. 1 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 76-77 (emphasis in the 
translation; brackets mine); cf. 75-81.
 Ibid., 76n1 (translator’s note).30
 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. and ed. James Stachey (New York: Norton, 1990), 31
11.
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film, for example, are surprises this dissertation would not endorse. It is an argument, 
however, that we give the utterly catastrophic its due—precisely by resisting the impulse to bring 
surprise as such to intelligibility. It cannot be done. Such a resolve would require not merely 
announcing one’s being open to new experiences, but actually seeking out a kind of  
interpretive vulnerability. Foolish as it seems, willingness to lean into the unknown has utility. 
The value of  liminal states is not unrelated to the rule that “a building is earthquake proof  
when it has built-in fissures and intentional crevices. Normed solidity, or, rather, rigidity is a 
sure killer,”  by definition unprepared for the supposed impossibility of  otherwise, caught off  32
guard—unable to stand tall—when the inconceivable nevertheless arrives. 
 Deleuze and Guattari speak of  a denegative “schizophrenic experience of  intensive 
quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable—a celibate misery and 
glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended between life and death, and intense 
feeling of  transition, states of  pure, naked intensity stripped of  all shape and form.”  This 33
dissertation will make much of  such cognitive dissonances, philosophical suspensions, and 
transitional experiences. Deleuze and Guattari identify the origin of  such uncanny 
encounters as exposure to a simultaneous register of  “attraction and repulsion”—not as 
oppositional or even balancing forces, but coincidental affectations. The poet William Blake 
was also interested in attraction and repulsion. He not only uses these same two words, he 
says that “without contraries is no progression.”  Apparent negatives of  each other, he 34
nevertheless maintains that “Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, 
 Avital Ronell, “Stormy Weather: Blues in Winter,” New York Times, February 2, 2013, http://32
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/stormy-weather-blues-in-winter/.
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, 33
Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Penguin, 2009), 18.
 William Blake, “The Marriage of  Heaven and Hell,” in The Norton Anthology of  English Literature, ed. 34
Stephen Greenblatt, 8th ed. (New York: Norton, 2006), 1432.
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are [all!] necessary to Human existence,”  though we are remarkably efficient at privileging 35
one term in these (only) apparently dialectical pairs under the rubrics of  logic and reason. 
 Artists associated with the Situationists and those involved in Happenings 
deliberately pursued an aesthetic or affect we might associate with sensibility. Allan Kaprow 
described Happenings as cultivating “risk and fear” or perhaps a “fine nervousness”—an 
energy that catalyzes something like a schizophrenic experience, comparable not in content 
or form, but in spirit: “you giggle because you’re afraid.”  Guy Debord, best known for his 36
unnerving critique of  the spectacle, strikes a different and more productive tone in his other 
writings on the Situationist International, whose modest goal was “to generate previously 
non-existent feelings.”  Additional avant-garde movements and their relations with surprises 37
are considered below in the second chapter on novelty. 
 Anthropologically, I would understand the experience of  such gestures as “liminal,” a 
term I borrow, stretch, and repurpose from Victor Turner’s work on transitional experiences 
in rites of  passage rituals. Working with Arnold van Gennep’s three stages in rites of  
passage, “separation, transition, and incorporation,” Turner explores the interpretive 
ambiguity in these experiences of social evolution. He treats each period of  the tripartiate 
sequence in turn, but it is the middle period which primarily interests him in light of  
inventional opportunities therein. He writes: “[i]n this intervening phase of  transition, called 
by Van Gennep ‘margin’ or ‘limen’ (meaning ‘threshold’ in Latin), the ritual subjects pass 
through a period of  and area of  ambiguity, a sort of  social limbo” in which subjectivities and 
therefore confident interpretive capabilities are unavailable.  I also recall Luce Irigaray’s 38
 Ibid.35
 Allan Kaprow, Essays on the Blurring of  Art and Life, ed. Jeff  Kelley, exp. ed. (Berkeley: University of  36
California Press, 2003), 19; 16.
  Guy Debord, “Towards a Situationist International,” trans. Tom McDonough in Participation, ed. 37
Claire Bishop (London: Whitechapel Gallery; Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 99.
 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of  Play (New York: PAJ Publications, 38
1982), 24.
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rereading of  Plato’s Allegory of  the Cave with attention to the “forgotten path” of  transition 
between the shadowy underground and the blinding exteriority: 
the “go-between” path that links two “worlds,” two modes, two methods, two measures of  
replicating, representing, viewing . . . . Between truth and shadow, between truth and fantasy, between 
“truth” and whatever “veils” the truth. Between reality and ream. Between. . . . Between. . . . Between 
the intelligible and the sensible.  39
Other liminalities are desired in the baroque aesthetics of  Jorge Luis Borges and suspensions 
in the cinema of  Alfred Hitchcock, whose rule of  thumb was “always make the audience 
suffer as much as possible.”  The latter’s Vertigo in particular is useful here. The film shows 40
James Stewart as the acrophobic Scottie Ferguson dreams he is floating in air over a coastal 
Californian church which bears significance in the plot. But scenery fades to white, leaving 
only Stewart’s body, which free falls into white. 
  
Figure 1.1: Scottie, held out in nothing. Still from Vertigo (1958)  41
A climatic chase scene later, in waking life, forces him to climb a windy staircase to the 
church’s bell tower, which he does in haste, inadvertently conquering his fear in the heat of  
the moment. The character’s aversion to heights, of  course, is relevant and available as a 
means of  interpreting the scene. But, if  for only a moment, not only the character but the 
audience is denied orientation and grounding. There is simply blankness—not only an utter 
 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of  the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 39
1985), 246-247 (first ellipsis mine; the second and third appear in the translation).
 Quotation from the supplementary material for Alfred Hitchcock: The Masterpiece Collection, ltd. ed. 40
(Los Angeles: Universal Studios, 2012), Blu-ray (box set).
 Vertigo, directed by Alfred Hitchcock (1958; Los Angeles: Universal Studios, 2012), Blu-ray.41
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lack of  bearing in which the poor man’s body twitches like an upended cockroach, but 
precisely a positive representation of  that struggle. Stewart is simply held out, dangling. A 
related aesthetic appears in Borges’ “The Garden of  Forking Paths,” which tells the riddle of  
one Ts’ui Pên who was supposed to have created “a labyrinth of  labyrinths . . . . in which all 
men would become lost.”  Decades after the Pên’s murder, however, no maze is to be 42
found. With no small amount of  detective work, his descendent Yu Tsun realizes the puzzle 
is not an actual garden, but an apparently incomprehensible manuscript left behind by the 
dead relative and thought by all who read it to be unfinished, contradictory, and incoherent. 
As it turns out, the labyrinth is a sort of  infinite text—“forking in time, not in space” —43
warping and twisting the narrative into plural and incommensurable sequences. “‘I examined 
it once,’” Yu Tsun recalls. “[I]n the third chapter the hero dies, in the fourth he is alive.”  44
Bluntly: a denial of  resolution, a sustained shock, an “infinite execution of  a rhetorical 
experiment.”  Paradoxically, such a condition is inherent to the enterprises of  learning and 45
education, if  only temporarily.  
Simultaneities. 
 Schiller made the point simply: “[o]ur psyche passes, then, from sensation to thought 
via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the same time. Precisely 
for this reason, however, they cancel each other out as determining forces, and bring about a 
 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of  Forking Paths,” in Labyrinths: Selected Stories & Other Writings, 42
trans. Donald A. Yates, eds. James E. Irby and Donald A. Yates (New York: New Directions, 1962), 23; 22.
 Borges, “Forking Paths,” 26. Gilles Deleuze cites the story in his discussion of  “incompossible” or 43
“many” worlds. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (London: Athlone, 1993), 62-63. Dozens of  
commentators have located in both Borges and Deleuze anticipations of  the internet’s architecture, which is 
precisely a series of  effectively endless linkages. Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s figure of  the “rhizome” has also 
been deployed for related reasons. “Introduction: Rhizome,” in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of  Minneapolis Press, 2005), 3-25.
 Borges, “Forking Paths,” 24.44
 Ibid., 27.45
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negation by means of  an opposition.”  Although the notion of  an opposition is 46
problematic for reasons I hope are clear by now, Schiller’s conception of  sensate and rational 
faculties of  the human as mutually involved reminds us that intelligible is firstly sensible. 
Indeed, this “middle disposition” between physical sensation and rational apprehension—as 
well as our ability to make this distinction at all—creates the possibility for a notion of  
sensibility: “if  we are to call the condition of  sensuous determination the physical, and the 
condition of  rational determination the logical or moral, then we must call this condition of  
real and active determinability the a e s t h e t i c .”  Recalling that Schiller asserts a productive 47
role for the aesthetic in politics, we might recall Kenneth Burke’s related suggestion that “the 
service of  the aesthetic [is] in keeping the practical from becoming too hopelessly itself.”  48
Instead, each becomes a kind of  strategy for dealing with the inevitability of  the other in 
deliberative, forensic, and epideictic contexts—from the quotidian to the extraordinary. This 
constant simultaneity of  both the sensible and the intelligible highlights the co-productive 
relationship between thinker and thought, spectator and art, scholar and discourse. 
Specifically, routinized habits of  communal interpretive practice (such as those of  an 
academic discipline) are probably better understood as contingent, accidental—discursive 
modalities susceptible to Rancière’s “redistribution of  the sensible,” an appearance or 
disappearance of  that which is possible or available for sense experience, perception, 
 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of  Man: In a Series of  Letters, trans. Elizabeth M. 46
Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 141.
 Ibid., 141-143 (widened kerning in the translation).47
 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1968), 112. Recall that 48
the Letters open with scorn for “Utility[,] . . . the great idol of  our age.” Schiller, Aesthetic, 7. As a reminder, and 
for good measure: “[i]t is not true that the aesthetic and the practical are necessarily opposed. . . . [T]o ask that 
the aesthetic set itself  in opposition to the practical is to ask that the aesthetic be one specific brand of  the 
aesthetic.” Burke, Counter-Statement, 111. This strategy can only result in a betrayal of  the aesthetic’s dynamism. I 
think of  the anarchy circle-a, Ⓐ, pressed on t-shirts in the mall as an example of  such failed strategies. As 
Thomas Frank has demonstrated, counterculture itself  has been throughly co-opted as one flavor among many 
and nobody seems to care. Aestheticized politics indeed. See Frank, “Why Johnny Can’t Dissent,” in Commodify 
Your Dissent: Salvos from The Baffler, eds. Thomas Frank and Matt Weiland (New York: Norton, 1997), 31-45.
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hearing, viewing, utterance, or performance.  Socioeconomic and material circumstances 49
along cultural and technological innovation condition the possibility of  things like novels, 
theatre stages, performance art, internet video, microphones, and typography. Rancière is 
particularly interested in “redistribution” or appearances of  new sensible possibilities. In a 
word, s u r p r i s e s . His work on such innovations is engaged in the second chapter below. 
The key for both Schiller and Rancière is an approach to sensibility that understands the 
political as aesthetic and the aesthetic as political—and not by any act of  will. The point is 
that it is impossible to talk about one from a context cleansed of  its partner term because 
intelligibilities shade off  into one another. 
Body’s Languages. 
 Although I will not engage the issue directly, my project is in many ways indebted to 
the body’s sensory apparatus and work on essentially embodied nature of  interpretation. As 
Brian Massumi reminds us, “the skin is faster than the word.”  His daring endowment of  50
affect with a certain “autonomy” ventures into a “virtual” zone of  conceptual indeterminacy 
between the body’s register of  phenomena and the subsequent event of  re-cognition. A 
fleeting moment, to be sure, but one where cognitive apprehension is temporarily 
unavailable prior to the application of  intelligible conceptuality. Add unconsciousness to the 
mix, and you’ve got yourself  a mind-body-hand-eye-mouth-ear-nose machine that is a 
stranger to both itself  and its world while having convinced itself  it knows better.  Others 51
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of  Aesthetics, ed. and trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Bloomsbury, 49
2014), 7-8. The translator describes the sensible as simply “what is visible and audible as well as what can be 
said, thought, made, or done.” Ibid., 89.
 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 50
2002), 27.
 “What are recognized object attributes and owned emotions if  not old surprises to which we have 51
been more or less accustomed? . . . . Is recognition anything more than the habit of  no longer see what’s new?” 
Ibid., 221.
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have established a depth to the apparent superficiality of  the lived and the affective. The 
sensorimotor capacities of  infants, for whom everything is new, has interested the arts and 
sciences alike. For prelinguistic babies, perceiving and manipulating objects is not a 
metaphysical activity because they “learn about our world not with conceptual and 
propositional knowledge, but more fundamentally, via bodily interactions and feelings” they 
cannot even identify. The connection is not excessive. This is a situation from which we 
never fully depart, a lifetime of  conceptual schemata notwithstanding, because even returns 
to things remembered—physical and metaphysical
—are mediated by the body’s apparatus. Human 
animals making legible the sensible world are “big 
babies.”  As Anna Munster has demonstrated, the 52
rule applies even to the apparent cleanliness and 
order of  binary code. Far from a “reduction or 
erasure of  the organic body’s relation to the 
cybernetic,” digitality is better conceived not as a 
control mechanism, but rather a genesis of  a new 
“universe constituted primarily out of  
information”  that is inherently aesthetic. No glitzy 53
visualization required.  
 For the sake of  acknowledging and 
performing such a relation, this dissertation 
considers scholarly approaches to “the new” and 
 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of  the Body: Aesthetics of  Human Understanding (Chicago: The University of  52
Chicago Press, 2008), 51. Upon revisitations,“[t]he same ‘object’ can . . . present different affordances to 
different organisms, or even to the same organism at different times.” Ibid., 47.
 Anna Munster, Materializing New Media: Embodiment in Information Aesthetics, Hanover: Dartmouth 53
College Press, 2006), 65; 64.
Figure 1.2: “Snake Oil? Scientific Evidence 
for Popular Health Supplements,” by  
from the Information is Beautiful series by 
David McCandless and Andy Perkins. 
Image by david [McCandless]. Licensed 
under CC BY-NC 2.0.
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sound with particular attention to electronic music in the second and third chapters, 
respectively. As we will see, these two discourses are uniquely positioned to help us think and 
live both surprise and sensibility for academic writing. The goal will be to actually enact and 
perform such a relation temporally across the duration of  the text. “What shall we call such 
discourse?,” asks Barthes. “[E]rotic, no doubt, for it has to do with pleasure; or even perhaps: 
aesthetic, if  we foresee subjecting this old category to a gradual torsion which will alienate it 
from its regressive, idealist background and bring it closer to the body.”  54
Existential Registers 
 Martin Heidegger asserts that a mood receptive to sensibility is necessary to 
undertake and more so experience his attempt in Being and Time. His “analysis” required a 
posture not typically associated with academic thinking: “as a state-of-mind which will satisfy 
the methodological requirements, the phenomenon of  anxiety will be made basic for our 
analysis.”  This analysis would be no mere narrative, no mere explication of  Being that 55
could only betray its dynamism. Instead, Heidegger dared to imagine an engagement with 
Being that was somehow outside of  negation. A fascinating passage on this point appears in 
the lecture “What is Metaphysics?,” delivered two years after the treatise: 
Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein, only slightly in 
those who are jittery, imperceptible in the “Oh, yes” and the “Oh, no” of  men of  affairs; but most 
readily in the reserved, and most assuredly in those who are basically daring. But those daring ones are 
sustained by that on which they expend themselves—in order thus to preserve the ultimate grandeur 
of  existence.  56
 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 84 54
(emphasis and lowercasing in the translation).
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 55
Harper, 2008) 227 (original emphasis).
 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The Task 56
of  Thinking (1964), ed. and trans. David Farell Krell (London: Harper, 2008), 106.
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This anxiety as latent in even the most familiar situations suggests an uncanny inability to 
comprehend the full extent of  its implications for our Being-there in the world. For me, 
what is most remarkable about the essay is that it actually performs its anxiety. Consider the 
opening tease: “‘What is metaphysics?’ The question awakens expectations of  a discussion 
of  metaphysics. This we will forgo.”  There are no easy ways out in Heidegger’s critique of  57
Western metaphysics and its reliance on empiricism, rationality, and faith in its own 
observations. World and Being can be much more surprising than the prevalence of  
intelligible accounting would indicate. And yet, for all this, he proceeds in the essay with his 
characteristic, early Heideggerian analytical rigor and a necessarily sequential plan: first x, 
then y, then we will be prepared to z. Intelligible and sensible registers blur.  
 In any case, the combination of  “reserved” and “daring” attributes in those inclined 
toward anxiety suggests a kind contradictory synthesis of  active and passive states. Hence 
Cynthia Haynes, taking a cue from Heidegger, points out that “things do not depend on 
human reason, they emerge before us on their own.”  What does this mean? We can come 58
up with an infinite array of  methods in a kind of  imperial conquest to know the world and 
our relation to it, stacking the latest iterations of  this incessant chattering of  discourse upon 
one another, and still be so far removed from any understanding of  our ontological 
condition. Heidegger is key on the issue, not only because of  his propositional ideas, but 
because of  the manner in which he presented or performed them in his writing. 
 Sociologist Marvin Zuckerman’s research with his “Sensation Seeking Scale” is still 
further work on this issue as I am construing it across disciplines. The instrument is a series 
of  tests he and some colleagues developed in the late 1960s to gauge one’s propensity for “a 
trait defined by the need for varied, novel, and complex sensations and experiences and the 
 Ibid., 93.57
 Cynthia Haynes, “Writing Offshore: The Disappearing Coastline of  Composition Theory,” Journal 58
of  Advanced Composition 23, no. 4 (2003): 679.
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willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of  such experience.”  This work 59
when fused with rhetoric reveals interesting relationships between risk taking and other, less 
so called “behavioral” and more epistemic and/or aesthetic tendencies. One such disposition 
of  import for my project involves a tolerance on the part of  sensation seekers for ambiguity, 
where “intolerance for ambiguity represents a tendency to react to ambiguous ideas or 
situations as a threat rather than a challenge.”  Aporia and paradox pose a relatively low 60
“threat” to the sensation seeker, who delights in murky questions such as those posed by a 
discourse of  “sensibility” as construed by this dissertation. 
Rhetorics of  Possibilities, Possible Rhetorics. 
 A sensibility for aesthetic and epistemological variation is a readily identifiable 
Sophistic emphasis on novelty. John Poulakos, for example, associates the Sophists with “the 
novel, the unusual, that prior to which we have no awareness, the unprecedented.”  His 61
favorite example is Hippias, who is reported to have boasted in conversation with Socrates 
his standard of  discourse: “‘I always try and say something new.’”  But, for the present 62
writing, this isn’t a new for its own sake. As already indicated, aesthetics are political and vice 
versa. Victor Vitanza’s perpetual reinclusion of  “some more” in The canonized History of  
Rhetoric as well as the affective experience of  “denegation” he attempts in his writing are 
hysterical efforts to recoup the sensible downplayed in the accountancy of  the archive. 
Instead: improbabilities, possibilities, potentialities, and “incompossibilities”—that is, plural 
conditions of  possibility that cannot be reconciled but nevertheless occur alongside each 
 Marvin Zuckerman, Sensation Seeking: Beyond the Optimal Level of  Arousal (Hillsdale: Lawrence 59
Erlbaum, 1979), 10.
 Ibid., 264.60
 John Poulakos, “Toward a Sophistic Definition of  Rhetoric,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 16, no. 1 (1983): 61
41.
 Recollected by Xenophon, Memorabilia, trans. David Gallop in The Older Sophists, ed. Rosamond 62
Kent Sprague (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), DK86A14 (6) (quoted in Poulakos, “Toward,” 41).
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other simultaneously. Entertaining such ideas helps safeguard against our tendency to 
eliminate surprise, outlier, and error with instruments of  regularity and salience such as bell 
curves.  Such tendencies are what Burke calls a “trained incapacities,” a term he borrowed 63
from Thorstein Veblen and refigured for criticism as a “state of  affairs whereby one’s very 
abilities can function as blindnesses,” where one’s “training would work against them.”   64
 Poulakos’ formulation of  the Sophists as being interested in “the possible” or “the 
world as it is not” since such a rhetoric of  possibility “opens new horizons and advocates 
their pursuit, thus giving man the chance to venture finding what he lacks.”  Vitanza goes 65
even further, beyond lack, in a trajectory from “One (homogeneity) to Two [possible/actual] 
(heterogeneity homogenized) to Some More (i.e., to Radical Heterogeneity)”  to allow for the 66
perpetual inclusion for alternative, marginalized, and oppressed notions of  rhetorical 
possibility in the first place. The result is an ongoing, baroque aestheticization of  




 “Surprise” for this project, then, is not something new under the sun.  Instead, 67
these pages will investigate a necessarily transient experience of  unassimilable phenomena or 
information and accountancy for such experiences in scholarly venues. It is my belief  that 
 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “The Bell Curve, that Great Intellectual Fraud,” in The Black Swan: The 63
Impact of  the Highly Improbable, (New York: Random House, 2007), 229-252.
  Burke, Permanence and Change, 7.64
  John Poulakos, “Rhetoric, the Sophists, and the Possible,” Communication Monographs 51 (1984): 218; 65
224.
 Victor J. Vitanza, “‘Some More’ Notes Toward a ‘Third’ Sophistic,” Argumentation 5 (1991): 131 66
(brackets mine, original parentheses).
 “What is it that hath been? The same thing that shall be. What is it that hath been done? The same 67
that shall be done. Nothing under the sun is new, neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new; for it hath 
already gone before in the ages that were before us.” Ecclesiastes 1:9-10, New Catholic Edition of  the Holy Bible 
(New York: Catholic Book Publishing Company, 1952), 712.
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such an experience is only ever identified retrospectively, after trauma subsides and the 
comfort of  composure returns. In drawing these writers, thinkers, and artists together, I 
hardly intend to conflate their obvious differences. But I would like to highlight a 
commonality of  a desire to engage in creative processes of  exploration “without criteria,” to 
borrow a term and a phrase from Lyotard.  Insofar as such is possible. 68
 The problem, of  course, is that as soon as one attempts to articulate sensibility, one 
mediates the experience not merely in the envelope of  representative language, but, more 
importantly, in proposition, in grammar, thereby engaging in a kind of  betrayal by forcing a 
“stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue.”  While I deal with subjects and 69
objects, I am more so interested in postures, attitudes, and moods we might assume during 
necessarily transient experience of  objects and events that confuse, disrupt, and unsettle. I am 
less interested in a critique of  the binary (although that is certainly an important issue) than I 
am in augmentations, alterations, and enhancements of  the subject so that the object might 
be experienced anew. And I will need an object, after all, if  I am to advance past the stasis of  
conjecture. In light of  Heidegger’s argument that basically all methodologies are avoidance 
mechanisms against alternative understandings—the most powerful assumptions being those 
about which we are totally unaware—I am most interested in novel conditions of  
possibilities for academic work. Specifically, I would acknowledge and embrace our aesthetic 
relation with our discourse. Intelligibility as intervention underscores a relegation of  mental 
and experiential activity prior to the arrival of  communicable knowledge. 
 The dissertation is “about” precisely this tension between a would-be inventive 
writer and their discourse conventions that rely on intelligibility and code—yet are also 
capable of  “registering” on the level of  the sensible. The separate works of  Julia Kristeva 
 Jean-François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. Ian Hamilton Grant (Bloomington: Indiana 68
University Press, 1993), 31.
 Nietzsche, “Truth and Lies,” 1176.69
25
and Roland Barthes are immensely helpful on this point. Kristeva’s distinction between 
symbolic and semiotic analysis reclaims aesthetic or affective dimensions of  what could very 
well otherwise be mere decryption. Similarly, Barthes speaks “a discomfort [he] had always 
suffered from: the uneasiness of  being a subject torn between two languages, one expressive, 
the other critical.”  What comes out in reading Kristeva and Barthes is a realization that we 70
are always already both within and without structural analysis. This duality and the anxiety it 
creates is my “object.” In addition to Kristeva and Barthes, I also plan to revisit the outsider-
on-the-inside performances in Spivak’s “negotiating with structures of  violence,” Lynn 
Worsham’s implosion of  hermeneutics, and Haynes’ attempt to “draw us away from the 
shoreline of  philosophical reason and its alluring beacon of  argumentation,” pointing our 
sterns, instead, toward “abstraction”; she continues: “In casting off  from ground metaphysics 
(a difficult and dissuasive move), we occupy a paradoxical position; we must stand with one 
foot on land and one foot on our vessel.”  I see these writers as brushing against the limits 71
of  a discursive apparatus by means of  stretching from the inside out. This trio of  
“impostors” to their discourses, along with Kristeva and Barthes, are the focus of  the fourth 
chapter below. 
 But there is a potential for misdirection here, as the famous dualism arises. As I’ve 
stressed, the difference between sensibility and intelligibly is not negative, but positive. In 
light of  the literature, I propose “sensibility” as an open-ended capacity to undergo a 
necessarily ephemeral experience of  discovery, surprise, novelty, shock, wonder, awe, eureka!, 
epiphany, and the transitional experience of  ex-stasis itself  during the activities of  thinking, 
reading, writing, and, especially for this dissertation, listening. Surprise is a strange and 
 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and 70
Wang, 1981), 8.
 Haynes, “Offshore,” 671.71
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visceral rendition on the Socratic paradox in which one claims to know that they do not 
know. 
The Finest Quality. 
 Surprises can be catastrophic and/or invaluable. Scholarship as explanation—a 
search for causalities amounting to a challenging-forth of  the so called “content”—seems to 
stand in direct contrast with surprise. Here, then: “the paradox of  wonder: it is the beginning 
of  inquiry, . . . but the end of  inquiry also puts an end to wonder.”  Rather than seek to iron 72
out interpretive wrinkles, I have presented a discourse of  texts, thinkers, art works, and more 
that embrace and hope for surprising, “sensible” events to serve as reminders that our world 
and our rhetoric could be otherwise—for better or worse. Rickert puts it particularly well in 
saying that “when we tether intent to self-consciousness, we cut off  large swaths of  human 
activity from rhetorical practice in our rhetorical theory.”  Let’s face it: cogent ideas simply 73
do not comprise the full breadth and scope of  the rhetorical subject’s experiential and 
interpretive capacities. Scholarship should reflect this situation and benefit from this 
productive ambiguity besides. 
Ought: Aesthetics of  Rhetorics. 
 Such interpretive stretching, of  course, will only ever take place from inside the very 
constraints we identify as limiting—which is to say that such stretching will take place 
casuistically, whereby “one introduces new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to 
 Lorraine Daston, “Wonder and the Ends of  Inquiry,” The Point, 2014, http://thepointmag.com/72
2014/examined-life/wonder-ends-inquiry.
  Thomas Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of  Rhetorical Being (Pittsburgh: University of  73
Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 36.
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old principles.”  Deterritorializations have territorialized origins. The trick and the challenge, 74
then, will be to enact or perform a sensible writing that incites dissonant affects while 
nevertheless operating within the protocols of  academic writing.  
 My argument is that what is needed is not novel objects of  study or new vocabularies 
with which to undertake rhetorical study of  sensibility, not another reading that will settle, 
once and for all, the matter of  reading the bibliographies below—but entirely new moods 
and modes of  discoursing that are not merely content to be self  conscious of  and apologetic 
for the fixation inherent to the scholarly apparatus, but attempt to wobble that paradigm 
through the introduction of  not only novel propositional content but novel ways of  talking 
about sensibility that minimize the undesirable calcifications promoted by the typical goals 
of  critical discourse: fixation, operationalization, control, capitalization. All of  which seems 
especially important if  your “object” of  study is the affective experience of  surprise brought 
on by the limits of  a paradigm or a discursive apparatus. 
 Steve Whitson and John Poulakos certainly surprised rhetorical studies with their 
1993 essay “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of  Rhetoric.” Aligning themselves with the 
philosopher, they claimed that rhetoric is essentially artistic and not, as virtually all 
composition textbooks and pedagogies would have it, an activity of  constructing 
knowledge.  As foils to Robert Scott and his memorable claim that “rhetoric is a way of  75
knowing” and is thus “epistemic,”  Whitson and Poulakos provoked an aesthetic disruption 76
  Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1984), 74
229.
 Steve Whitson and John Poulakos, “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of  Rhetoric,” The Quarterly Journal 75
of  Speech 79, no. 2 (1993): 132.
 Robert L. Scott, “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” Central States Speech Journal 18 (1967): 17. To 76
be fair, Scott’s position was not that rhetoric yields or uncovers eternal truth, but rather that cooperative 
argumentation carries the potential for creating contingent truth “fixed only in a relative sense” (Ibid.). But such 
a concession was not enough for Whitson and Poulakos, who follow Nietzsche in their doubt of  useful 
knowledge itself. In any case, Scott’s essay prompted a series of  hairsplitting debates on the relationship 
between rhetoric and knowledge, perspectivism, intersubjectivity, objectivism, and other related concepts. As 
Barry Brummett remarked, interlocutors in such debates had eventually “grown hoarse in this futile effort.” 
Brummett, “A Eulogy for the Death of  Epistemic Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of  Speech 9 (1990): 70.
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in the tireless accumulation of  knowledge through propositional logic. Picking up 
Nietzsche’s declaration that the subject’s intellectual and reflective capacities are not capable 
of  reproducing objects because we stand in a basically aesthetic relation to the world, 
Whitson and Poulakos import Nietzsche for rhetoric to stress that knowledge is itself  
aesthetic because our relationship with the world is sensuous; encounters with objects, arts, 
others, and especially important for me, discourses are firstly sensate or sensible. Notably, 
aesthetic rhetoric is associated with the body and the senses: “because we have nothing to go 
on except nerve stimuli from our senses, linguistic signs intervene to expand the stimuli and 
forge them into concepts”  during a process neuroscience reminds us is entirely physical. 77
Probing these issues drops us right on the meta/physical threshold between intelligibility and 
sensibility. 
 While I am empathetic with Nietzsche and largely in agreement with Whitson and 
Poulakos, the line drawn between aesthetic and so called epistemic rhetorics replays the 
ancient divide even as it proclaims the primacy of  the aesthetic. It’s not hard to see why the 
essay drew a blistering critique from James Hikins, who, like an epistemic playground bully, 
makes a series of  layup arguments against the duo of  aestheticians. The critique is that 
aesthetic rhetoric is actually “eristic,” a playful technique Hikins describes as gaming systems 
and lacking actual, propositional argument.  Like a modern day Isocrates, who charged the 78
sophists with eristic and bashed their flashy discursive tricks because they could not found or 
facilitate political affairs, Hikins makes a similar dismissal. In line with the practicality his 
teachings prioritized, Isocrates equated the practices of  the sophist’s. “Jugglers’ tricks,” he 
 Whitson and Poulakos, “Aesthetics of  Rhetoric,” 137.77
 “[N]otably absent is the requirement that Eristic engage in conventional philosophical argument.” 78
James W. Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and The Rhetoric of  the Possible: A Commentary of  the Whitson and 
Poulakos ‘Aesthetic View’ of  Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of  Speech 81, no. 3 (1995): 360.
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called them, which “do not profit anyone yet attract great crowds of  the empty-minded.”  79
While Whitson and Poulakos claim to be attacking the epistemic tradition from “within,” 
Hikins maintains they are in fact “without” because they lack an argument beyond the claim 
that aesthetics is prior to rhetorics. And yet, there it is: Whitson and Poulakos’ article in the 
pages of  The Quarterly Journal of  Speech.  The lesson we might learn from these exchanges is 80
that there exist alternative intelligences in addition to intelligibilities, and that these are 
worthy of  acknowledgement and inclusion in everyday academic practices. 
 Both parties maintain some essential divide between aesthetics and epistemology that 
results in an interesting but ultimately circular conversation. And to varying degrees, the 
responses continued this circularity. Douglas Thomas tries to broker a deal between the two 
“competing” approaches, but winds up reaffirming the binary in a “risk/reward” cost-
benefit analysis where neither side has anything to offer the other.  Chief  among the 81
Nietzschean platform’s risks is “allowing aesthetics to overwhelm our sense of  critical 
purpose,”  a sentiment that replays an earlier concern that “the contemporary age does not 82
demand merely ‘charm and impact,’ but sober consideration of  the complex problems 
confronting it and effectual solutions.”  The notion that aesthetics has nothing to offer so 83
 Isocrates, Antidosis, trans. George Norlin, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928), §269. 79
The classist motives driving his dismissal of  eristic are well documented. As M. I. Finley observes, the 
pedagogy of  Isocrates was “designed for members of  the ruling elite, a socially and culturally homogeneous 
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shared experience.” The Use and Abuse of  History (New York: Penguin, 1975), 208.
 This in distinction from Richard A. Cherwitz and Robert J. Darwin, who argue the performance of  80
discourse is paradoxical in that in cannot avoid the propositional form: “the epistemic is an inevitable part of  
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Poulakos).
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called real world policy making—higher educational, geopolitical, economic, etc.—is an 
exceptionally unfortunate and deep misunderstanding.  Whitson and Poulakos’ fantastical 84
approach notwithstanding, the aesthetic as superfluous or inhibiting incorrectly presupposes 
we can bypass form for content as if  each did not bleed into each other. Furthermore, the 
ability of  the arts to anticipate, reflect, or catalyze social and economic developments is well 
known.  85
 With the benefit of  hindsight, we can easily sense it is not a question of  whether 
rhetoric is or is not aesthetic or epistemic, but that the question makes it possible to engage 
our relationship with knowledge beget by rhetorical work. For me, the question is not an 
ontology of  rhetoric, but a sensible relationship with rhetorical action and potential surprise 
with regard to the discursive capacities we thought we knew as primarily or exclusively 
epistemic. Because Whitson and Poulakos continue the commonplace of  pitting epistemic 
rhetoric against aesthetics, they all too quickly concede their essay is of  the former tradition: 
Is this essay written in the aesthetic tradition of  rhetoric? No—the conventions of  academic writing 
militate against the kinds of  prose Nietzsche would have endorsed. As written, this essay 
acknowledges that academic writing generally privileges the epistemic tradition; at the same time, it 
suggests that the epistemic tradition is not altogether impervious to a critique from within.  86
While the tongue is in the cheek, the authors conspicuously stop short of  a full embrace of  
an aestheticism they themselves frame as somehow antithetical to an epistemic tradition. 
Two decades later, with multimodal scholarship and alt presentations up to and including art 
 Greene begins to displace the impasse by arguing that ethics does not simply go out the window 84
when aesthetics or the sensible is recognized as anterior. Ronald Walter Green, “The Aesthetic Turn and the 
Rhetorical Perspective on Argumentation,” Argumentation and Advocacy 35, no. 1 (1998): 19-29. Instead, ethics is 
highlighted in a way Richard Vatz might have liked because emphasis is placed on the constitutive nature of  
rhetorical. Rhetoric determines situations, not the other way around. Richard E. Vatz, “The Myth of  the 
Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 6, no. 3 (1973): 154-161.
 See Benjamin Winterhalter, “The Morbid Fascination With the Death of  the Humanities: Why 85
Professors, Librarians, and Politicians are Shunning Liberal Arts in the Name of  STEM,” The Atlantic, June 6, 
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humanities/372216/. See also Scott Jaschik, “Marco Rubio vs. Aristotle,” Inside Higher Ed, August 20, 2015, 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/08/20/marco-rubio-vs-aristotle. 
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installations seen at conferences in rhetoric and composition, we might begin to think the 
aesthetic tradition has been assimilated. Yet a more viable way of  reading Whitson and 
Poulakos —one more consistent with Nietzsche, really—would be to suggest they were 
always already aesthetic. 
 Might it be possible to integrate meaningfully such faculties or capacities into 
academic writing? Which is mythical, that we have something like a “sensibility,” or the idea 





Bow on my package tied up with string: these are a few 
of  my choice idiosyncrasies. Concept commodity 
fetishes. I’m drooling. Oh: now this, this is something 
different, something new. Say it and it’s no longer true.  1
What is originality? To see something that has no name 
as yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it 
stares us all in the face. The way men usually are, it 
takes a name to make something visible for them.  
—Nietzsche  2
I could not see my way to dispute the transience of  all 
things, nor could I insist upon an exception in favour 
of  what is beautiful and perfect. But I did dispute the 
pessimistic poet’s view that the transience of  what is 
beautiful involves any loss in its worth. On the 
contrary, an increase! Transience value is scarcity value 
in time. Limitation in the possibility of  an enjoyment 
raises the value of  the enjoyment. —Freud  3
Introduction 
To begin: novelty. Itself  associated with beginnings, the novel as a semantic entity in this 
sentence cheats itself  out its own meaning. Most can relate to a new acquisition, travel to a 
foreign place, the experience of  unfamiliar art works. But “the new” as referent seems to 
require and (or?) result in a something recognizable, referential, and termed. When signified, 
the new saws off  the branch on which it sits. In this way, the new is like surprise in that 
 Excepting the allusion to the film The Sound of  Music, these words are my own.1
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: with a Prelude and an Appendix of  Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann 2
(New York: Vintage, 1974), 218 (original emphasis). Both the author’s subtitle and my third chapter below 
indicate this matter is not limited to visuality.
 Sigmund Freud, “On Transience,” in The Standard Edition of  the Complete Psychological Works of  Sigmund 3
Freud, trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud, vol. 14, 1914-1916 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), 305. 
According to Strachey, the “poet” interlocutor is unknown. See Ibid., n. 1. 
Lastly: Figure 2.1: The bow vector on this page is by OpenClipartVectors and is in the Public Domain 
under CC0 1.0. 
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everyone can relate to having a new experience, but nobody knows what it is. If  “it” had 
qualities or attributes, it wouldn’t be new. The new is thus a floating signification. Its value 
and punch abounds in business, marketing, engineering, the sciences—and even humanities 
scholarship in pursuit of  “fresh” and “distinctive” approaches to textual analysis. But the 
new is a literal nothing and must be. Round and round the mulberry bush. 
 For this reason and others, the new is a favorite dead horse. As I will demonstrate, 
scholarly treatments of  novelty frequently take form as bureaucratic accounts of  self-
proclaimed progressives, and read their rhetorics as empty, cheap, or commercial—egotism 
at best. After all, innumerable critics wail, if  something were really new, it would bear the 
mark of  no antecedent whatsoever. Hence the new cannot be re-cognized or even identified. 
If  such were possible, the referent would not be new.  4
 While these are important lessons with real consequences that ought to inform a 
study of  the new, my sense is these gripes emerge from a false conundrum attributable to a 
relationship with information and intelligibility characterized by control, regulation, and 
order that masquerade as somehow non-relational. Moreover, such dismissals obscure the 
bigger issue: what is our relationship with the novel, to surprise? To simplify and reduce the 
claim, the reliance of  scholarly discourse on a “critical” relation with its content seems to 
secure the fate of  the new to the laughing stock. Interpretive in/security, if  you like. 
Critiques of  disembodied Cartesianism and its subject-object relationship are a dime for two 
baker’s dozens, yet mainstream forms and attitudes of  scholarship buck at the vulnerability 
the collapse of  this divide entails. It’s worth remembering Descartes himself  ranked “wonder 
as the first of  all passions” with a use value, reasoning that the novel instigates and inspires 
 As the epigraph from Freud alludes, an aesthetics of  transience permeates the chapter. It is a minor 4
sensibility generally inadequate for producing the hallmarks of  compelling arguments: stoppage, exhaustiveness, 
completion, and so on.
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the work of  thought, learning, and knowledge.  Careful not to overdo it, however, because 5
“surprise” in excess can result in paralysis of  “astonishment” and freeze the inquiry.  Tracing 6
the genealogy of  wonder through episodes in the history of  science starring phenomena 
unassimilable and irreducible to contemporary intelligibilities, Lorraine Daston remarks that 
a general distaste for such affects has crossed disciplinary borders: “humanists are even more 
chary [than scientists] of  expressing wonder in their scholarly publications or even their 
popular ones. To do so flirts with vulgarity, even kitsch.”  Indeed, it is easy (and perhaps 7
lazy) to write the new off  as fad—that which cannot and does not aim to sustain interest, 
engagement, or thought. Even aesthete Edmund Burke admits it: “[c]uriosity, from its 
nature, is a very active principle; it quickly runs over the greatest part of  its objects, and soon 
exhausts the variety which is commonly to be met with in nature,”  a view that situates 8
novelty squarely in the realm of  the superficial and unsophisticated.  Kenneth Burke remarks 9
that “surprise is the least complex form of  fulfillment.”  Read literally, he’s right. One can 10
hardly experience fulfillment of  an expectation one does not hold, and it makes no sense to 
anticipate surprise. Yet surprise hath wrought a proliferation of  scholarship in which I 
intervene with attention to the presumed relationship between relevant writers and the 
 René Descartes, The Passions of  the Soul, trans. Stephen H. Voss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 52.5
 Ibid., 58.6
 Lorraine Daston, “Wonder and the Ends of  Inquiry,” The Point, 2014, http://thepointmag.com/7
2014/examined-life/wonder-ends-inquiry.
 Edmund Burke, Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of  Our Ideas of  the Sublime and Beautiful (Basil: J. J. 8
Tourneisen, 1792), 34.
 Importantly, however, Burke goes on to reclaim a strange utility for curiosity with a switch-up two 9
lines below: “[b]ut whatever these powers are, or upon what principle soever [sic] they affect the mind, it is 
absolutely necessary that they should not be exerted in those things which a daily and vulgar use have brought 
into a stale unaffecting familiarity. Some degree of  novelty must be one of  the materials in every instrument 
which works upon the mind; and curiosity blends itself  more or less with all our passions.” Burke, Sublime and 
Beautiful, 34-35.
 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1968), 36, n. 4.10
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information they engage and produce. So long as the relationship is basically “critical,” 
engagements with “the new” (as if  it were singular) set themselves up for disappointment 
precisely because criticism’s job is to know, secure, and establish foothold—period. However, 
my sense is that this relationship is more formal than essential, actual, or based on the 
epistemological capacity of  the manuscript-tool.  
 To be sure, one encounters great difficulty in trying to address a sensible new 
without subsuming it under an intelligible category. Rather than “talk about not talking 
about,” however, this chapter drives at top speed into the discursive wall dictating the 
untouchability of  the new. Rather than stake an ontological flag in the new and charter its 
generic criteria, however, my approach will differ in its exploration of  the aesthetics of  rhetorics 
of  the new.  Stacking prepositional phrases such as these (“about”; “of  . . . of  . . .”) may 11
appear to be critical distancing.  While grammatically manifest, such distance cannot achieve 12
deaestheticized intelligibility. A good example of  this impossibility is the common 
Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion format seen in scientific articles (IMRAD), 
which I have used to organize the present chapter. The purpose is two-fold. First, it 
demonstrates the extent to which appetites for humanities scholarship are not so unlike 
those for sciences, which expect controlled analytic sequences and the dissection of  
 “Aesthetic(s)” is used in the sense established during the Introduction, having to do with a 11
“sensibility” in an ongoing relation among experiencing interpreting subjects and their so called objects.
 In a certain sense, this is true and could probably be extended to other grammatical features and the 12
proposition itself. After all, “[s]ubject-object was in grammar before it structured metaphysics.” Gregory L. 
Ulmer, Avatar Emergency (Anderson: Parlor Press, 2012), 140. In this text and elsewhere, Ulmer suggests the 
subject-object relation is an inherent and endemic feature of  a strict conception of  the “apparatus” of  literacy. 
Alternative apparatuses include orality and “electracy,” a primarily image-based and yet multimedia 
communications Ulmer characterizes as that which “is to digital media what literacy is to alphabetic writing.” 
Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy (New York: Longman, 2003), xvii. The idea follows not only the 
technologies of  orality and literacy, but also their assumptions, epistemologies, metaphors, institutions, and so 
on. The term thus refers not simply to computers or digital compositions, but a paradigmatic shift in moods 
and modes of  thinking that are in fact performable in alphabetic writing, which comprises the vast majority of  
Ulmer’s vitae. Electracy is discussed further during the final chapter below.
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phenomena.  Additionally and vice versa (sciences as humanities) it shows how the IMRAD 13
instrument is product of  creative choices, decisions, operationalizations, best guesses, and 
results more in precisely defined ambiguities than certainties. Second, use of  the structure is 
presented here as performance—a glitch of  contexts inspired by dada and conceptual artists 
who put the readymade, the unadorned painting, the basic geometric shape, and the body in 
the museum. 
  
Figure 2.2: The romantic beyond. “Flammarion Engraving” first appeared in 
Camille Flammarion’s L’atmosphère: météorologie populaire (1888). Image is in 
the Public Domain under PD-1923. 
 To be clear, it is not necessary to go beyond some firmament of  “conceptuality” or 
reflective knowledge to make the point that intelligibility is itself  aesthetic in the sense of  
being relational unto its object. Again: let us recall Nietzsche’s “stammering translation.” Or 
we might amend Wilde’s maxim that “[t]he mystery of  the world is the visible, not the 
 The etymology of  “analysis” includes the ancient Greek ἀνάλυσις, meaning to unravel, loosen, or 13
reduce to parts.
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invisible”  and fit it for our present purposes, where the mystery turns out to be precisely 14
what is known as intelligible. As we saw in the opening chapter, the distinction between 
intelligible and sensible is untenable; each runs far too easily into the other. Here, I propose 
not only acknowledgment but performance of  an aestheticized relationship with 
intelligibility. I assume that nothing comes from nothing, that all perceptible phenomena are 
casually produced, and that works have histories—acknowledged or not. Prior knowledges 
may very well intervene during a reflective process—and at varying degrees of  
consciousness—but category and identification are themselves lived and temporal; there is 
no white room of  conceptuality divorced from the sensibility of  time, place, body, or 
existential condition.   15
Methods 
 Trajectory. First, I review generalized doubt, disgust, and dismissal of  claims to the 
new and original the work of  Peter Bürger, Rosalind Krauss, Michael North, and Boris 
Groys with particular attention to critiques of  various and sundry avant-garde movements. 
Such aversion is compared for resemblance in particular and peculiar ways those familiar 
dismissals of  spectacle, kitsch, and commodity in general. While accurate, such critiques have 
 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of  Dorian Gray (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1908), 34.14
 A necessary acknowledgement here involves relations and decisions embedded in algorithmic 15
actants, particularly those of  cloud computing proliferating in our cultural moment. We not only have driverless 
cars and pedometers, but also cloud-tethered refrigerators, thermostats, and deadbolts. Adding automation and 
stirring such an “internet of  things” delegates “decision” processes to nonhuman objects that act 
independently of  wetware. One particularly astute theorist has called this practice “algorithmic perception,” an 
arrangement that presents major societal promises and cultural pitfalls. Two such dangers, the scholar 
maintains, are “pedestrian optimization” for commercial and governance purposes on the one hand, and 
inflationary pushback amounting to “the fetishization of  the human experience of  human experience” on the 
other. See Benjamin H. Bratton, “On A.I. and Cities: Platform Design, Algorithmic Perception, and Urban 
Geopolitics,” Het Nieuwe Instituut, 2015, http://bennopremselalezing2015.hetnieuweinstituut.nl/en.
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limited our understanding of  novelty to gimmick and reduced our relationship with 
innovation and rhetorical invention itself. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is 
perhaps a consequence of  information systems and infrastructures regulating critical 
discourse.  16
 Three current texts on novelty in art, literature, theory, and science are then explored. 
Evaluated are Michael North’s Novelty: A History of  the New, Boris Groys’ recently translated 
On the New, and Jacques Rancière’s Aisthesis: Scenes from The Aesthetic Regime of  Art for their 
relative viability as means of  engaging the new. Texts are assessed for the ability of  their 
respective formal approaches to actually exceed form by engaging the new temporally and 
performatively. 
 Between the second and third analysis, an interruption of  “anxiety” (angst) according 
to Martin Heidegger appears. While he reserved these privileged modes of  engagement for 
an ultimate and supreme analytic for Being, there is great promise in the adaptation of  these 
moods for rhetoric I will sketch over the course of  the chapter. In temporalizing essence and 
endowing the work with an existential capacity to “set up a world,” Heidegger introduces an 
anxiety during which familiar relations, givens, and for-granted relations with objects, world, 
self, and art works are no longer tenable. In a particular and peculiar way, everything can be 
new or anew. This chapter asks: Is novelty impossible or inevitable? 
Results 
 Cheap thrill abounds, of  course. From American Idol commercial break cliffhangers, 
to clickbait, to the “reboot” film—that nostalgic replay of  some bygone blockbuster with 
 *Not* surprisingly, consequences spillover into pedagogy too. See my fifth chapter, below.16
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updated casting—there is no shortage of  the empty old masquerading as sparkly new. 
Recycling cardboard cutout forms as they do, it’s easy and necessary to acknowledge these 
media cheat audiences out of  originality in the strict sense of  something new under the sun. 
Perhaps the pinnacle of  the form is the novelty item or the gag —the hand buzzer, the 
whoopee cushion, the projectile snake from the can of  “peanuts.” Such accouterments seem 
to equip the prankster with the means to dupe the unsuspecting, but it turns out that the 
joke’s on the jokester. Such items fetishize a short-lived and superficial escapism, 
choreographed faux pas, and a feigned, safety-netted rupture of  the everyday and routine. 
Worse for surprise, the affective force of  the novelty item is about as twist-ended as a Jack-
in-the-box appearing right on time, every time. Nothing new here. 
  
Figure 2.3: Cheap laughs, or none at all: Eddy 
Goldfarb signature “Yakity Yak Talking 
Teeth.” Photograph mine. 
 Surprise Stock 
 It was Clement Greenberg who famously described the phenomenon of  “kitsch” or 
lowbrow art as “simulacra of  genuine culture . . . . Kitsch is mechanical and operates by 
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formulas. Kitsch is vicarious experience and faked sensations,”  driven primarily or even 17
exclusively by profit motive. Although he would later attenuate his hardline dichotomy, kitsch 
as such could not rise to the self-criticism Greenberg considered essential to modernist art  18
given its chief  audience of  birds and bottom feeders. These “surprises” come in Cracker 
Jack boxes, but also Netflix recommendation lists, emoji updates, or the latest and greatest 
chemical remix at Starbucks. Do they also come on the pages of  academic journals, or in 
syllabi? Are they sold three credit hours at a time? Yes and no. 
 One affirmative response comes from Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s 
blistering critique of  “the culture industry” and its subsummation or coerced submission of  
art to business ideologies. While the relationship between art and labor is fraught with 
contradictions and paradoxes, one thing that is clear is that it’s nearly impossible to separate 
the two. If  only as a conditioning possibility, political-economic circumstance makes art 
conceivable in the first place and complicates the cult of  art as pure labor for its own sake. 
The notion of  a contemporary artistic enterprise somehow unbeholden to time, place, or 
material situation is probably a myth of  bourgeois origin. All this is well known. For 
Horkheimer and Adorno, however, the culture industries of  film, television, music, and so 
on monetize art’s supposed fall from its own self-direction and does so specifically with 
regard to eccentricity and idiosyncrasy: “[T]hat art renounces its own autonomy and proudly 
takes its place among consumption goods constitutes the charm of  novelty.”  Singularity 19
 Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan Review 5, no. 9 (1939): 39-40.17
 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” in The Collected Essays and Criticism, ed. John O’Brien, vol. 18
4, Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969 (Chicago: University Of  Chicago Press, 1995), 85-87. Further, even 
high modernist art for Greenberg did not constitute any rupture in the historical trajectory of  art: “[m]odernist 
art continues the past without gap or break, and wherever it may end up it will never cease being intelligible in 
terms of  the past.” Ibid., 92.
 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of  Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New 19
York: Continuum, 1991), 157.
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becomes just another flavor among several choices, all of  which are meticulously catalogued, 
tabulated, and prescribed for particular demographics by the culture industry. Elimination of  
surprise is the name of  the game. Such control is epitomized by “predictive” mechanisms 
like the “focus group,” which reduce aesthetic experience to quantity by means of  the yay or 
nay, the Likert scale, or the seemingly innocuous query. “How likely are you to recommend X to a 
friend?” Products, political candidates, and pop media pilots are trialled on sample 
populations, whose feedback is then used to determine whether newbies fly, die, or perhaps 
how they might be modified to increase palatability and chances of  commercial success. 
Give the people what they want, but beware confirmation bias and the comfortable. 
 One particularly distressing example is the case of  Shazam, a free application for 
mobile smartphones capable of  identifying music within reach of  the device’s microphone. 
In what amounts to a  streamlined and crowdsourced focus group, users with internet access 
or cell service all over the world can “discover” music they hear at the coffeeshop, the bar, or 
a party by putting a name to the beat. Labels and radio stations purchase the resultant data 
from Shazam to learn not only which songs are most popular, but also which vocal patterns, 
tonic progressions, keys, and other stylistic features generate the most interest a given 
moment or particular geographic region. Financial allocations for promotion and creation of  
new artists follow. Knowingly or not, users give away their behavioral data in exchange for 
the service of  the app, which provides convenient links to purchase the song electronically 
on Apple iTunes once the music is matched (resulting in yet another sales data set). One 
might think this puts content control in the hands of  the “consumer” and for the better, 
giving the public a say in what comes next. But numerous metrics such as Billboard report a 
negative feedback loop wherein today’s most popular songs tend to get played more 
frequently and stick around on the charts longer than they did in the past, when interest and 
42
sales data came from honor system reporting by radio stations and record shops.  The 20
arrangement boasts all the progress and efficiency of  Taylorism, and preference for the 
comfort of  familiarity puts us right back in the closed and regulated system where pleasure 
has no pioneering mission, but only “moves rigorously in the worn grooves of  association. 
No independent thinking must be expected from the audience.”  Hence what we might call 21
placebo surprises: the trusty twist ending wherein the guilty party is the one whom everyone 
least suspects, the sudden foley shriek in horror, and the incessant updates for planned 
obsolescence in fashion or the cellular telephone industry, each made to manufacture lack 
and false consciousness. “What’s new for fall by spring means nothing.”  22
 The repetition in these basically farcical novelties is why Roland Barthes’ well known 
study of  the image mocks “the whole gamut of  ‘surprises’” that falls flat precisely because it 
can be accounted for as an effects stockpile: the appeal to a photographed subject’s rarity for 
its own sake, the superimposition and other exploitations of  technique, “the trouvaille or 
lucky find,” and so on.  23
 Conflicts of  interest in such reports, the thinking goes, skewed data and fabricated a false-positive 20
preference for new music. See Derek Thompson, “The Shazam Effect,” The Atlantic, December 2014, http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/the-shazam-effect/382237. A video supplement embedded 
in the piece includes an interview with Shazam CEO Rich Riley, who appeals to the sensible when he claims 
the company “can really help show when an artist is connecting with an audience.” Related company Next Big 
Sound, also profiled in the video, tracks the self-promotional activity of  up and coming artists to glean how, for 
example, Instagram “likes” correlate with download sales in specified timeframes. A banner hanging over a 
whiteboard in Next Big Sound’s office space reads, “Making Data Useful” in big, black letters.
 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic, 137.21
 Desaparecidos, “What’s New for Fall,” from The Happiest Place On Earth (Omaha: Saddle Creek 22
Records, 2001).
 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 32-34.23
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Figure 2.4: Double rainbow over Clemson, South Carolina. 
Photograph mine. 
For Barthes, a surprise is inexplicable and must be, puzzling for an utter and radical lack of  
why.  Contrast this ideal figuration against an early scene in Willy Wonka and the Chocolate 24
Factory. Shortly after the lucky Golden Ticket holders arrive and enter the topsy-turvy candy 
works, the children and their parents are checking their coats when gilded “hooks” in the 
shape of  human hands spring to life, seizing the outerwear from unsuspecting guests who 
cry out in shock. Wonka zips onscreen: “[l]ittle surprises around every corner—but nothing 
dangerous!”  But surprise and the new for the present writing are dangerous in the specific 25
sense of  instigating vulnerability, exposure, and anxiety. As Avital Ronell in an interview 
suggests, information and intelligibility can function as kind of  naive fortification or an all 
too thin security blanket for the psychoanalytic condition instigated by a world that includes, 
for examples, the trauma of  tsunamis and political turmoil: “we try to defend against 
 “The photograph becomes ‘surprising’ when we do not know why it has been taken.” Ibid., 34.24
 Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory, directed by Mel Stuart (1971; Burbank: Warner Brothers, 2010), 25
Blu-ray. The original poster for the film at once generalizes, sanitizes, satiates, and consoles the would-be 
surprised—all while feigning subversion: “It’s everybody’s non-pollutionary, anti-instituionary, pro-
confectionery factory of  fun!” By the way, Wonka lied. Children in the film nearly drown and burst from the 
inside-out, and though such hardships are brought on by their own conceits, viewers eventually learn Wonka 
planned from the beginning to eliminate all but one visitor in perverse survival quest of  sorts.
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[helplessness] by building up all sorts of  machinery, apparatuses, [and] cognitive systems that 
pretend and claim to understand what’s happening. And then when disaster strikes—if  it’s 
truly a disaster—all our systems have to be destroyed, because that’s what disaster means.”  26
Such a relationship with intelligibility and the violence of  shock is a far cry from the “[b]anal 
though elaborate surprise”  of  the culture industry, mere and momentary simulations of  27
anxiety for disaffected audiences. Bumper car hiccups immediately after which homeostasis 
is reestablished. 
 Freak Control 
 The cliché of  “new” as simulacra is readily admitted, but just to what extent are such 
dismissals the result of  one’s relationship with the new defined provisionally as that which is 
merely yet unknown—perceptible but not identifiable? As a way of  responding, let us 
position the wunderkammer or “cabinet of  curiosities” as a conflict avoidance mechanism. 
Chests of  hodgepodge specimens from the natural world, distant travels, and foreign 
cultures, these encyclopedic display cases most popular from the sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries were typically populated with exotic items for the pleasure and entertainment of  
what were almost exclusively European owners. 
 Avital Ronell, interviewed by Elza Gonçalves, Euronews, video, April 5, 2011, https://youtu.be/26
yMXPRCdGRqk.
 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic, 137.27
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Figure 2.5: Novelty found and/or lost? Domenico Remps’ “Cabinet of  Curiosities” 
(1690s). Image is in the Public Domain under PD-1923. 
Notable for me is not what the cabinet features or makes visible, but what is obfuscated by 
the attitudinal frame of  collection. While wunderkammern as microcosms were vehicles for 
education, marvel, and awe, they were also social indicators of  power and mastery  that 28
enabled a sort of  dime-store tourism. We might say the cabinet betrays a telling relationship 
with novelty indeed, one characterized by spectacle, safety found through distance, 
voyeurism, and domestication. The original curiosity cabinets were a highly varied and 
flexible phenomenon, and some functioned as honest inquiry into anthropology, medicine, 
and botany. Today, however, a similar relationship with novelty takes the form of  Ripley’s 
Believe it or Not!, that great institution of  counterfeit orientalist plunder. Please exit through the 
gift shop. Different and yet similar controls and regulations in and of  rhetorics have been 
 Barbara Maria Safford and Frances Terpak, Devices of  Wonder: From the World in a Box to Images on a 28
Screen (Los Angeles: Getty, 2001), 6-7; 153-156.
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acknowledged and roasted by Victor J. Vitanza. Questioning the desirability of  a disciplined 
or disciplinary rhetoric sought, for example, in the Aristotelian dream for an exhaustive 
account of  persuasion in this and that situation, Vitanza exposes the relational drive behind 
such an effort: “[l]et us not be fooled: What they—these crypto-philosophers clothed in 
sheepish rhetorical garb—are really talking about is control, these efficiency experts, these 
Young Bureaucrats of  Language and of  Creativity and of  the Imagination.”  Systemic 29
management of  the means of  persuasion may come at the cost of  closure and rhetorical 
stagnation, depending upon the tonality of  our relationship with intelligibility. The too likely 
result is an algorithmic and, as Vitanza shows in performance, an exclusionary rhetoric 
typically maintained to serve elite, privileged, or already dominant interests. It has all the 
friends it needs, and newcomers are perceived as unruly threats to stability and authority of  
knowledge. 
     Figure 2.6: Catalog. A stamp collection.                Figure 2.7: Fixation. Entomology case.  30 31
   
 Victor J. Vitanza, “Critical Sub/Versions of  the History of  Philosophical Rhetoric,” Rhetoric Review 29
6, no. 1 (1987): 50 (original emphasis).
 “My Stamp Collection” by J’ram DJ is licensed under CC BY 2.0.30
 “Lepidoptera Americana” is in the Public Domain under CC0 1.0. From the collection of  31
nineteenth century naturalist Ludolph Heiligbrodt housed at the University of  Texas at Austin. Photograph by 
Alex Wild.
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 I am reminded of  the not so different (and yet) scientific accounting for natural 
phenomena described by Bruno Latour. As an ethnographer tagalong with a team of  
scientists studying Amazon forestry in Boa Vista, Brazil, Latour notes with near-
condescending delight how the team’s confidence in relation to the studied trees multiplies 
when the group returns to the lab with specimens in hand. There, prior knowledges, 
instruments, and most notably language can be applied to phenomena more precisely and 
systematically. Distance is key: “[i]n losing the forest, we win knowledge of  it.”  While the 32
wunderkammer brings unfamiliar objects near, it also sets up a not so dissimilar distancing, 
given that its contents are, like the Brazilian trees, “detached, separated, preserved, classified, 
and tagged.”  33
 In light of  the earlier discussion, it might seem that novelty is about as useful as a 
kaleidoscope. Yet there once was a time when that device could “create, in a single hour, 
what a thousand artists could not invent in the course of  a year; and while it works with such 
unexampled rapidity, it works also with corresponding beauty and precision.”  Lest the 34
argument be misunderstood, this is no apology for trinket. What I am against and alongside, 
however, are irresponsible broad brush paintings and critical-opportunistic relations with 
“novelty” as a conceptual entity,  and, to repeat, intelligibility in general. 35
 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of  Science Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 32
University Press, 1999), 38; 39; cf. 36-39.
 Ibid., 39.33
 Sir David Brewster, The Kaleidoscope: its History, Theory, and Construction, with its Application to the Fine 34
and Useful Arts, 2nd ed., “Greatly Enlarged” (London: John Murray, 1858), 151.
 Let’s remember, it is precisely the “questionable quality, taste, originality, and necessity” of  35
knickknacks that makes them easier to compare than contrast alongside some of  the most significant art works 
of  the twentieth century. Mark Newgarden and Picturebox, Inc., Cheap Laffs: The Art of  the Novelty Item (New 
York: Abrams, 2004), 7.
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No Wonder 
 “Avant-Garde” and its relations to novelty are always contested issues. Given the 
multitude of  names, movements, and localities associated with the concept at different times 
and places, the term itself  is imprecise and probably used in excess.  Whereas some 36
deployments of  the term refer simply to experimental, ambitious, or progressivist arts 
practices, in other cases the term ought to be associated with specific political-ideological 
agendas, as in the case of  the Situationist International. These artist-thinker-performers 
certainly expanded the possibilities of  art in hopes of  a limitlessness, but did so in response 
to issues like alienated labor, architectural grammaticization of  the city life, and the the 
society of  the spectacle, image, and detachment propagated by media industries. The term’s 
genealogy is further complicated by various neo-avant-gardes, which, again hazarding a 
generalization, refers to relatively institutionalized or (in some cases, unabashedly) 
commodified arts practices that are to be distinguished, at least in certain ways, from the 
earlier nostalgias for autonomous art that could transcend historical circumstance or instigate 
the injection of  something alien. 
 Yet for all this messiness, scholarly engagements with whatever novelty something 
like “the avant-garde” might offer turns out to be rotten with the perfection  of  the 37
categorical approach. Peter Bürger’s seminal Theory of  the Avant-Garde, for instance, 
recognizes the inadequacy of  this impulse and sets out to recoup “the relationship between 
 I am indebted to Beth Lauritis, whose conversation and thinking influences the discussion of  36
“avant-garde” in this paragraph and throughout.
 I invoke the final clause of  Kenneth Burke’s in/famous definition of  man: “the symbol using 37
(symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor of  the negative . . . separated from his natural condition by 
instruments of  his own making . . . goaded by the spirit of  hierarchy (or moved by the sense of  order)[,] and 
rotten with perfection.” Language and Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: The 
University of  California Press, 1996), 16. 
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interpreter and literary work,” i.e., the historical or embedded quality of  the aesthetic 
category itself.  While the intention is admirable, given the ultimately critical relation the 38
author assumes with its object, “the avant-garde,” eventually the study cannot help but insist 
on the very stasis of  category for “the avant-gardiste work” it set out to surpass. In fact, 
Bürger presents a five-point plan of  generic criteria: 1) attempted dissolution of  the “work” 
as unitary and singular entity, 2) newness understood as a (naive) claim of  complete break 
with tradition (total unprecedence), 3) chance operations, 4) emphasis on the fragmentary 
and allegorical (according to Walter Benjamin), and 5) montage and collage techniques.  39
When such recognizable themes began to take salience and replay themselves in institutional 
contexts like the museum and consumer culture, stable motifs emerged, generic criteria were 
formed, and it became difficult to see -ist and -ism arts practices as genuinely innovative. 
Hence, “the neo-avant-garde institutionalizes the avant-garde as art and thus negates genuinely 
avant-gardieste intentions.”  This critique is corollary to the assessment that the mission of  40
integrating art and the praxis of  life was unsuccessful.  While there certainly is a sense of  41
the artist as arcane, obscure, and remote, the critique lacks the same subtlety missing in 
“ivory tower” caricatures of  the academy (what profession isn’t specialized, what worth of  
any given knowledge set is self-evident to those not materially invested in its applications?). 
 Peter Bürger, Theory of  the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota 38
Press, 1984), 4; 15.
 Ibid., 55-82.39
 Ibid., 58.40
 “[A]rt as an institution continues to survive as something separate from the praxis of  life.” Ibid., 57; 41
cf. 58.
50
Needless to say, the response rests on a distinction between art and life in the first place, and 
assumes such activities can be neatly sectioned off  without overlap.  42
 Still, the impossibility of  originality in the strict sense is a tough argument to counter. 
The allures of  creative genius, authenticity, origination, birth, and avant-garde mystique itself, 
as Rosalind Krauss has argued, are probably better construed as “function[s] of  the 
discourse on originality” than actual qualities or accomplishments of  associated artists.  43
Rhetorical strategies. The figures are so cliché they hardly require example: the distant 
prodigy, the tortured soul, the struggled labor of  the all nighter that alone grants a proximity 
to something never before seen, undone—new. From the postmodern vantage, these 
modernist overtones seem preposterous and without basis since the results so frequently 
turn out to resemble unacknowledged forebears; for Krauss, then, honesty is the best policy, 
taking form here an open embrace of  “endless replication.”  Is it so bad? There is even the 44
(good) argument that copyright law stands in the way of  new creative works.  But the real 45
strength of  her assessment is, again, predicated on accounting and tracing, against which 
modernist tropes parading themselves as new stand no chance. 
 Remember: “[O]nly by forgetting that he himself  is an artistically creating subject . . . does man live 42
with any repose, security and consistency.” Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 
trans. Daniel Breazeale in The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and 
Bruce Herzberg (Boston: Bedford, 2001), 1176 (emphasis in the translation).
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Just the Same: and/or, the Same, but Different 
 Far easier to posit is another, perhaps scare quoted “novelty” associated less with an 
immaculate conception than with something anew, familiar but different, or somehow 
revived. Michael North’s remarkably interdisciplinary Novelty: A History of  the New (2013) 
traces such patterns across an impressive range of  discourses including that of  the pre-
Socratics, atomism, cybernetics, evolutionary biology, aesthetics, and more. Allowing for the 
notable exception in creationisms like Christianity, this history operates under two models of  
recurrence and recombination, whose “basic shapes” the writer claims “were established before 
Plato and have not varied much since.”  Recurrence takes the form of  the much 46
romanticized revolution, whose very term North is fond of  reminding the reader carries 
cyclical and circular connotations from the get go. His second frame, recombination, is to be 
found in the play of  letter and language, Darwin, the collage, and so on. In each case, what is 
new is (merely?) the already given in different form, configuration, or guise. As he 
demonstrates, however, this situation hardly affects the persistent cultural interest in the new, 
nor does it turn down the volume on discourses fetishizing an ontologically new already 
discussed above. To begin, North has to demonstrate just why these relatively conservative 
models of  novelty are the only tenable ones. Working primarily with Parmenidian 
“invariance” of  that which is, the reader is shown how this ancient cosmology crossed over 
into science and philosophy: “Parmenides’ foundational premises, that what is, is and what is 
not cannot come to be, were apparently so impressive that they established the essential 
conditions for Plato’s ontology,”  which is concomitant with love of  wisdom as a situation 47
of  lack in need of  cure by means of  pursuit and acquisition. North goes on to demonstrate 
 North, Novelty: A History of  the New (Chicago, The University of  Chicago Press, 2013), 7.46
 Ibid., 22; 23.47
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how this basic unchanging ceaselessness of  the natural and material world is also to be found in 
Zeno, atomists like Lucretius and Epicurus, and Aristotle. 
 I argue that North’s attention to these two models of  repetition and recurrence, 
originating in the Presocratics and coming to influence “most” models of  novelty,  48
overlooks a veritable interest in rhetoric of  the Sophistic tradition. As is well known, the 
Sophists were generally associated with “the novel,” but also the merely “unusual” and 
discursive maneuvers “prior to which we have no awareness” in the historical record.  49
Specifically, it should be acknowledged that the “irrationality” of  Gorgias punctures a 
loophole in the closed systems of  the recurrent and the recombinatory. Crucially, however, 
this model does not posit the appearance of  something new without material origin, but 
rests on a basically “irrational” relationship with logos understood here both as language 
(speech, word) and our necessarily murky relationship with the material order of  the world 
and universe. The Gorgian alternative to the generally humanist and anthropocentric subject 
has been the topic of  much commentary in rhetorical studies, whose first major secondary 
touchstone is the work of  Italian classicist Mario Untersteiner. Again, Gorgias’ in/famous 
fragment “On the Nonexistent” or “On Nature” quite clearly states the issue is not the 
world of  substance as it is, but rather our ability to know it in the first place. It is not an 
exaltation or valorization of  the sensible, but rather a qualitative analysis of  the intelligible. 
As already established in the previous chapter, Gorgias’ triple trouble-making—nothing 
exists; even if  so, can’t be known; even if  known, can’t be communicated—is based on the 
raw disjuncture among signifying practices and the material (or immaterial) substances to 
 Ibid., 35.48
 John Poulakos, “Toward a Definition of  Sophistic Rhetoric,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 16, no. 1 (1983): 49
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which logos refer. According to the Sophist, what does exist is “heterogeneity . . . between the 
spoken logos, which is bound to be the vehicle of  knowledge, and the possible experiences 
[both] sensible and intellectual.”  Even the sensible (in this context, the bodily register of  50
stimuli in worldly experience) cannot help because of  this utter gulf  between substances and 
logos. Yet we are forced to act on such mismatches at every turn. In the simplest act of  mere 
recognition turns out to be an imposition, an inessential pairing which therefore amounts to 
“creating something new, irrational.”  This is a frequently cited phrase in rhetoric by those 51
like myself  who wish to establish an alternative relationship with intelligibility. I sense a 
codependence with such instruments we use “[n]ot to know, but to schematize—to impose 
upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the formation of  
reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need, not to ‘know,’ but to 
subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of  intelligibility and calculation.”  The intelligible is 52
thus irrational in the sense of  being a rather blunt creation. 
 Sophistic Stress Test 
As is well known, the Sophists offered expensive lessons in oratory which only the 
elite could afford. These practices no doubt contributed to an association of  the Sophists 
with nomos, or human/cultural law, alongside physis, or the natural laws of  the physical world 
 Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), 50
141.
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or universe. Such categorization invokes the stale nature/culture distinction whose moment 
has passed long ago. However, along with Untersteiner, Bernard Miller’s discussion of  kairos 
as it appears differently in Plato and Gorgias further complicates this issue for the better. 
Typical conceptions of  kairos are often understood “quite simply [as] a recognition on the 
part of  the rhetor of  a situation that he appropriately responds to or masters through . . . 
propriety or expediency.”  This is the notion of  saying the right thing at just the right time 53
in a sort of  rhetorical slam dunk commonly portrayed in composition textbooks. In Gorgias, 
however, things appear differently: “kairos . . . here is not the application of  language 
rhetorically selected and suited to fit the occasion or proper time, but through the aegis of  
the irrational logos it deals most significantly in the creative generation of  language itself.”  54
Importantly, then, “kairos is not a concept only. It is an experience or encounter as well.”  55
As Vitanza phrases it, the Gorgian kairos proffers “a view of  the ‘subject’ as a function of  
Logos/Kairos” rather than the other way around.  So much for nomos. What is your 56
relationship with information? 
In this sense “[a] world of  dissonance is depicted here, tragic in the sense that the 
faith in the order and rationality of  the world is dashed. On this level Gorgias’ idea of  the 
tragic is akin to the more basic claims of  the Sophists concerning reality and appearance,” 
the irresolution of  the two,  the worth of  arguing both sides of  a case,  and exercise of  57 58
 Bernard A. Miller, “Heidegger and the Gorgian Kairos,” in Visions of  Rhetoric: History, Theory, and 53
Criticism, ed. Charles W. Kneupper (Arlington: Rhetoric Society of  America, 1987), 156.
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“‘mak[ing] the weaker seem the better cause’”  Far from the silly caricature sometimes 59
projected onto the Sophists and their supposed preference for play, pun, and satire, these so 
called games turn out to function as a sort of  de-anthropomorphizing “reality” checking 
before, one hopes, wrecking.  Again, the trauma of  surprise is correlate to the arrogance or 60
naivety of  security and the avoidance mechanism represented here by a classical intelligibility 
and the critical manuscript. Stay humble. (This is also one of  innumerable reasons why what 
I would call the aesthetic dimensions of  rhetoric Gorgias describes in the Encomium of  Helen 
as “seduction” are not simply fun formal experiments, but deeply serious demonstrations of  
how high fives among all too human, enlightened subjects can go wrong). With regard to the 
new, Thomas Rickert’s reading of  this discourse is that the “novelty, unpredictability, and 
situated rationality in which their [Gorgias’, Untersteiner’s, Miller’s, Vitanza’s, et al.’s] versions 
of  kairos are better conceived less as categorical pronouncements than as descriptions 
working against modernist understandings of  creativity”  someone like North demonstrates 61
are, after all, indebted to the recurrence and recombination models. His History of  the New is 
thus incomplete not so much because it fails to account for this or that Sophist per se, but 
because of  its identificatory frame Gorgias’ relationship with logos would surprise. 
 Associated with Protagoras in Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of  Civic Discourse, trans. George A. 59
Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1402a.
 “We conceal . . . that we, human beings, are not masters of  this situation. Anthropos is not in charge 60
here or elsewhere.” Victor J. Vitanza, Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of  Rhetoric (Albany: The State University 
of  New York Press, 1997), 292.
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Invaluables 
 Boris Groys’ On the New is an exceptionally knotty text whose coy insight is as 
intricate as its pivots and reversals. His basic thesis, predicated on a selective Nietzschean 
perspective, states the new springs from revaluation of  values, and specifically crossovers 
between sacred and profane realms.  Duchamp’s Fountain is a strategic glitch of  context, 62
inserting as it does the utterly mundane, industrial, and readymade into the museum; 
elsewhere, the profanity of  joke and pun deface the sanctity of  Mona Lisa—if  only a cheap 
reproduction thereof. Two points are necessary here for the present analysis. First, the new 
thusly figured depends upon its apparent opposite for its conceptual identity,  resulting in a 63
new at least partially predicated on a “negative” knowledge functioning by means of  
contrast. A ≠ non-A; new ≠ old. Yet in the case of  the readymade, old does become (a)new in 
a sense about which Groys is well aware. What has changed is not the object, but our 
relationship with the object and the information it generates. Still, there persists for him a 
necessary link between conceptual relations with art and the cultural condition in which all 
material chips are already on the table, merely changing hands between scared and profane, 
appearing now and then in this or that configuration, accompanied by corresponding 
rhetorical charges to produce relational innovation. 
 The exchange of  the card table is an apt metaphor given that innovation for Groys is 
an activity whose possibility and, inevitably, ends are conditioned by a “cultural-economic 
logic,” which is the second point that interests me here. Unlike Nietzsche, Groys does not 
find the transvaluation of  all values possible or desirable. His analysis replays the familiar 
 Boris Groys, On the New, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (1992; London: Verso, 2014), 64.62
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dismissal of  “extra-cultural” or “hidden” realities often featured in modernist mythologies.  64
On a related point, it is often thought that avant-garde movements revere meaninglessness 
and the nonsensical in its effort to subvert ideology and defer the inevitable installation of  a 
new order. Yet according to the author, the “avant-garde does not ‘empty’ lower practices ‘of  
their meaning’” in celebration of  pure materiality, “but, rather, endows them with meaning 
by bringing them into meaningful relation with the cultural tradition.”  Hence it is cultural-65
economic logics all the way down for Groys. In a clever move, however, he acknowledges 
the economy is far from an “intelligible” phenomenon, primarily because analyses of  the 
cultural-economy are themselves embedded within it, which makes critical distance 
unavailable.  Like weather, even the most learned cannot pick it apart or make accurate 66
forecasts with consistency. Still, this study On the New operates on a literal currency, especially 
in prioritizing the issues of  archival perseverance and impact: “[i]t is not the meaning of  
innovation which is relevant to culture, but, rather, its value” in a cultural-economic system.  67
 Can valuation of  the new thusly surprise? No. It is in fact a retrospective abacus 
analysis whose purpose is to “close the writing,” as Barthes would say.  Economic tremors 68
are by no means cozy for those who weather the storm, but the framework of  valorization/
devalorization alone is a comfortable intelligibility whose relational potential is limited to the 
materiality of  capital. Obviously, capital creates relations and conditions the possibility of  art 
in the first place; however, the claim that aesthetic and existential effects-and-affects may 
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exceed and surprise the most exacting economic tabulations is not incommensurable with 
this first, conditioning principle. 
Anxiety Inaction 
 Please pardon the interruption of  the analysis for a reminder that Martin Heidegger’s 
Being and Time resurrects a foreclosed anxiety. The Question of  Being—What does it mean 
to be?—has been conveniently forgotten after having been relegated to universality, 
indefinability, or self-evidence. That which “the ancient philosophers found continually 
disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such 
that if  anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of  method.”  The 69
treatise thus opens with insistence and provocation in the renewal of  a troublesome inquiry. 
Later, Heidegger introduces the mood of  “anxiety,” from the German angst,  with which he 70
designates a peculiar shade of  contemplation prompted by radical openness; it is the terror 
and/or freedom of  having no orientation, no direction, no guide. In fact, “contemplation” is 
probably too involved a term, since what is meant is precisely an elementary perplexity and a 
lack of  conceptual grounding. The trauma of  such a “state of  mind” or “mood”  in 71
Heidegger is prompted by nothing more than blank absurdity of  one’s existential situation, 
i.e., Dasein or the condition of  Being-there (in-the-world), asking the question, How does it 
mean to be? How and why does the human contemplate the possibility of  its own existence? 
Of  course, we never get a certifiable answer because the inquiry is itself  radically open in 
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 69
1962), 21.
 Translators Macquarrie and Robinson follow precedent with “anxiety,” but indicate “‘uneasiness’ or 70
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2; n. 3.
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just this way—without reliable guidance. As we saw in Nietzsche, empirical evidence cannot 
help because evidence merely reflects our desires.  The invention of  specialized knowledges 72
along with the comforts of  everyday social experience, small talk, and entertainment—all 
these are distractions, suppressions, or even deliberate avoidances of  anxiety brought on by 
the stupefaction of  human calculation in the face of  its indifferent natural environment, and 
even morality. But don’t forget: “[a]nxiety is there. It is only sleeping.”  The important point 73
is that “[a]nxiety can arise in the most innocuous situations. Nor does it have any need for 
darkness, in which it is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny,”  because it is precisely 74
inauthentic tumult which inspires such terror in its very vacuity and inessentiality. Surprise: 
“[e]veryday familiarity collapses.”  According to Mary-Jane Rubinstein, “[a]nxiety thus 75
ruptures all of  Dasein’s usual relations to itself  and other beings (namely, subjectivity and 
objectivity) and confronts Dasein with bare thatness in the face of  ‘the nothing’” left after 
everything breaks and there’s nowhere to hide.  All frameworks dissolve, become untenable, 76
and appear for what they are: desperate attempts to control and account for the default 
estrangement of  being-there. 
Sweet Nothings 
 In the “What is Metaphysics?” lecture delivered two years after the disruption that 
was Being and Time, anxiety is introduced with a conspicuously poetic tone relative to its role 
 Boris Groys, “History after the End of  Historicism” (lecture, European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, 72
Switzerland, June 2014).
 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The Task 73
of  Thinking (1964), ed. and trans. David Farell Krell (London: Harper, 2008), 106.
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in the earlier treatise as a methodological necessity. Yet ironically, the mystique is logical. 
After all, “what about this nothing?”  How can nothing be? 77
In our asking we posit the nothing as something that “is” such and such; we posit it as a being. But 
that is exactly what it is distinguished from. Interrogating the nothing—asking what and how it, the 
nothing, is—turns what is interrogated into its opposite. The question deprives itself  of  its own 
object.  78
The problem is analogous to the situation articulated at the beginning of  this chapter: how 
can novelty or surprise, as that without properties, be known or objectified? Answer: they 
cannot; they become so only formally-and-irrationally, as we saw with Gorgias and 
Nietzsche. In different ways, both the nothing in Dasein’s anxiety and surprise only 
“become” objects when situated in something like a proposition or a critical manuscript. For 
Heidegger, it is only during the experiential, existential, and temporal suspension of  anxiety 
that his so called “object” is engaged. Hence the devastating collapse of  a cleansed 
metaphysics alone “discloses . . . beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as 
what is radically other. . . . Da-sein means: being held out in to the nothing.”  Everyday 79
appearances, commonplaces, and routines are unmasked and revealed as merely provisional. 
The simplest recognition of  an object “ready-to-hand” is thus a blockage, and “the structure 
of  the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of  the framework of  the sentence”; even prior to 
grammar, the blithe, authoritative presumption in the “assault” of  recognition does not 
make objects any more accessible.  The gigantic leap here from Heidegger to surprise, can 80
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in fact be made by working through the related distinction from “thing” to “work.” Let us 
see what a work can do. 
Work to World 
 Though there’s no question on the philosopher’s vitriol for aesthetics of  neophilia 
and the distraction of  the curio,  Heidegger maintains a relationship with art that he 81
himself  argues is capable of  preserving surprise and instigating existential epiphany. 
Although it is common to interact with art works as mere objects, commodities, and so on,  82
such practices downplay the transformative potential in both creation and engagement. 
Works for Heidegger are quite different, a position encapsulated in the phrase, “[t]o be a 
work means to set up a world.”  The work is thus posited as something exceeding both 83
physis and nomos, as something endowed with the capacity to actually create or intervene in a 
world instead of  merely reflecting, representing, or responding to the world. What appears 
to be nostalgic if  not baldly anthropocentric turns out to have implications even more 
radical than Gorgias. 
 The essay’s famous interpretation of  the Van Gogh painting argues the “depiction” 
is greater than shoes, but more importantly the owner’s relation with the world. Heidegger 
waxes poetic in these sections, some lines of  which are basically pastoral: “[i]n the shoes 
 Though he uses different language, he laments, for example, the superficiality of  kitsch aesthetics 81
described earlier in this chapter while at the same he recognizes art’s power: “[f]or us today, the beautiful is the 
relaxing, what is restful and thus intended for enjoyment. Art then belongs in the domain of  the pastry 
chef. . . . And yet art is the opening up of  the Being of  beings.” Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. 
Gregory Fried and Richard Holt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 140 (emphasis added). See also 
Heidegger, Being in Time, 214-217 on “curiosity.” 
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“The Origin of  the Work of  Art,” 145.
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vibrates the silent call of  the earth, its quiet gift of  the ripening grain and its unexplained 
self-refusal in the fallow desolation of  the wintry field.”  What appears in such passages is 84
another work of  art inspired by the first which instigates an encounter anew.  The scene 85
might be pretty, but it has nothing to do with visual or even aesthetic pleasure in the wide 
sense. The issue, rather, is existential: “[t]he world is the self-opening openness of  the broad 
pathos of  the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of  a historical people.”  The 86
quotation oozes Nazism, though Heidegger’s vision was ultimately more radical—and 
dangerous—than any political program could actuate. This is why his official engagement 
with the party was short-lived, blatant anti-Semitism and persistent failure to repudiate the 
party notwithstanding.  The connection between the “open” relation to the work and the 87
irrationality of  interpretation can hardly be missed: “[e]very decision . . . bases itself  on 
something not mastered, something concealed, confusion; else it would never be a 
decision”  but obvious, machinic, procedural. Hence we have a work whose consequence is 88
limited neither to its material base nor its cultural-economic operationalization. Both these 
dimensions are in play, of  course, but the Heideggarian work is relatively speculative and 
daring in terms of  what might be possible for its work. 
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Showtime 
 In contrast to North and Groys, Jacques Rancière’s Aisthesis performs an alternative 
response to shifts in aesthetic thought. The trick, as always, is one of  relation with innovation, 
of  which he presents in fourteen “scenes” deliberately selected for their relatively minor 
roles as tangential asides. The chapter-episodes comprise a string of  vignettes not on art 
proper, but on criticism and theories of  arts introducing in different ways alternative 
relations with a particular work or aesthetics writ large. He opens, for example, with Johann 
Joachim Winckelmann’s commentary on the damaged Belvedere Torso, the limbless, turn-of-
the-millennium nude in whose image we cannot be sure, though one common presumption 
is Hercules: “[i]nstead of  compensating for the lack, he transformed it into a virtue: . . . . 
[t]he mutilated statue that represents the greatest active hero miscast in the total inactivity of  
thought.”  Though the attrition of  extremities took place centuries after the work was 89
sculpted, as a relic from its context of  Platonic mimesis and Vitruvian ideal, Torso is for today’s 
spectator disfigured, asymmetrical, and belatedly anachronistic. 
  
Figure 2.8: Triumph of  imperfection. Photograph of  
the Belvedere Toroso. Photo by Stefano Costantini is 
licensed under CC BY 2.0. 
 Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of  Art, trans. Zakir Paul (London: Verso, 89
2013), 2-3. It ought to be mentioned that Rancière cites Heidegger nowhere in this text.
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Yet it is precisely in its decapitation and amputation that the figure takes on a new posture: 
through with labor and motion,“‘purified from the dross of  humanity . . . . absorbed in lofty 
reflections,’” as Winckelmann put it.  Is this something from nothing? From lack, from 90
absence as presence? The broken statue receives something grander than its status as 
anecdote or exhibit during this shift from deficit to merit. 
 Another chapter recalls an attempted shift in conception of  so called “decorative” 
arts in the work of  Parisian critic Roger Marx and the architectural thought of  John Ruskin. 
The scene begins with citation to a 1910 lecture by Marx, during which the speaker exalts a 
work he claims is endowed with a “‘sensibility and intelligence directed towards nature’s 
spectacle and passing time’” so subtle it “‘partakes in modern anxiety and curiosity.’”  The 91
piece? A glass vase by Émile Gallé, son of  a furniture manufacturer. This scene works to 
undermine the demarcation between functional crafts and works of  pure aesthetic pleasure 
by reorienting the discussion to terms of  building and making—decoration included. The 
implied hierarchy here constitutes a topdown “subordination of  the builder’s hands” and a 
“division between the work of  the artist and the artisan” Ruskin “would brutally 
overthrow.”  According to Rancière, the Englishman believed the built environment was not 92
only functional, but existential too; “the conjunction of  these two functions is essential 
because it allows one to reject the simplistic opposition between the useful object and the 
object of  disinterested contemplation.”  It’s not as if  these categories are mutually exclusive, 93
and, like the kaleidoscope those works highly involved with both of  these allegedly separate 
 Johann Joachim Winckelmann, The History of  Ancient Art, trans. G. Henry Lodge, vol. 2 (1764; 90
Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1880), 264-265, quoted in Rancière, Aisthesis, 1.
 Roger Marx, L’Art social (Paris: E. Fasquelle, 1913), 112-113, quoted in Rancière, Aisthesis, 133.91
 Rancière, Aisthesis, 138.92
 Ibid., 139.93
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domains may not amount to compromised kitsch at all, but rather a clear expression of  the 
human’s attempt to arrange and configure the materials of  the world in some intervention. 
  
Gallé vase (1896). Photograph released to 
the Public Domain by the copyright 
holder. 
 And so on. While these scenes are not incidental, the larger issue for the present 
writing is the construal of  novelty and surprise relationally. The material supplies (North) 
and capital bases (Groys) are inadequate means by which to analyze novelties—however 
genuine or inauthentic they might be. As these examples show, the making of  the new can 
be an existential and temporal enterprise that need not import something never before under 
the sun. The point is rather to open and refract what is already before us, staring us in the 
face and apparently usual, everyday. Holistically, Aisthesis is a collection of  what Barthes 
might call “neutrals,” a term which does not refer to an object with generic properties, but 
functions as an open-ended designation for that which “baffles the paradigm,” past, present, 
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and futures.  Its gestures are predicated on what Rancière elsewhere names the 94
“redistribution of  the sensible,” a contentious notion that refers to the making possible or 
available sensible experience in a given context. This “distribution” is a sort of  allocation 
governing “who can have a share” in that which is perceptible and thereby “defin[ing] what 
is visible or not in a common space” populated by spectators.  Unlike North and Groys, 95
Rancière maintains for art the capacity to “intervene in a general distribution of  ways of  
doing and making as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of  being and forms 
of  visibility,”  or, more broadly, perceptibility. His “aesthetic regime of  arts,” a sort of  96
pioneering desire driven by “thought which has become foreign to itself,” enables what the 
writer boldly calls a “transformation of  the forms of  sensible experience, of  ways of  
perceiving and being affected.”  The passive voice in this last bit is a clue that such pursuits 97
are not wholly rational efforts, and that such pursuits necessitate an open, interpretive 
anxiety. Works that set up worlds—whether or not they set out to do so. 
Discussion 
 These findings suggest Rancière’s performative approach is a relatively viable means 
of  engaging innovation in art and theory—not because he maintains the allure of  the new as 
somehow alien or extra-cultural, but because he demonstrates the existential quality of  
knowing innovation across time, as well as the simultaneous ease and difficulty such an 
 Roland Barthes, The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977-1978), trans. Rosalind E. 94
Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 6. The relation here is a basic paradox: 
“the Neutral means suspension of  violence; as a desire, it means violence.” Ibid., 13.
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of  Aesthetics, ed. and trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Bloomsbury, 95
2014), 8.
 Ibid.96
 Ibid., 18; Rancière, Aisthesis, ix.97
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activity entails. Rather than categorical (Bürger), ontological (North), or cultural-economic 
(Groys) approaches, Rancière begins to perform some of  the anxiety which presents itself  
when we admit we do not know where art is going or the full extent of  its capacities, 
accidental and otherwise. The results also indicate that hardline intelligible scholarship 
embodied by the critical manuscript cannot admit its aesthetic dimensions, though it 
nevertheless bears a striking resembles to cultural industry kitsch in its search for easy 
explanation, cliché, and stasis. In response to this situation, future inquiry into the new might 
seek alternative modalities of  engagement, perhaps those that stretch and make temporal 
their engagements with such phenomena.
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CHAPTER THREE 
DROP: AESTHETICS OF RHETORICS DURING TIMBRE 
Sound only exists as it is going out of  existence.  
—Reverend Walter J. Ong  1
You walk into the room with your pencil in your hand. 
You see somebody naked and you say, “Who is that 
man?” You try so hard, but you don’t understand 
just what you will say you when you get home. . . . . 
You walk into the room like a camel and then you 
frown.You put your eyes in your pocket and your nose 
on the ground. There oughta be a law against you 
coming around. You should be made to wear 
earphones. —Bob Dylan  2
Note: This chapter makes fair use of  audio embedded 
into the PDF. The recommend viewer is Adobe 
Acrobat Reader DC (free). Please visit get.adobe.com/
reader to ensure media playback. Readers using Preview 
for Macintosh or other PDF viewers will not see or 
hear audio files.  3
Being situated in time, sound is transient: it departs as it arrives. Even when recorded, 
archived, and preserved for delivery on demand, it is perceptible only as a fleeting vibration. 
An aural encounter is thus qualitatively different from prevailing literate modes of  discourse 
in the academy not only in terms of  medium, but also in an aesthetic sense of  being 
uncontrollably temporal for the experiencing subject. While all experience is temporal and 
embodied, the sonic dimension is uniquely so because it concerns dissipating waves of  
energy. Even organized and meticulously arranged compositions of  sounds such as music 
function in this aesthetic sense, which accents the interpretive problematics of  sound 
brought about by its very ephemerality. In this sense, sonic energy—including but not 
limited to music—flees from epistemological tenets of  stasis and verification, revealing, for 
 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of  the Word (London: Routledge, 2002), 31;1
 Bob Dylan, “Ballad of  a Thin Man,” from Highway 61 Revisited (New York: Columbia Records, 1965).2
 See the appendix for notes on the fair use of  copyrighted materials in this chapter.3
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me, the inadequacy of  traditional modes of  analysis to engage its aesthetic dimensions. 
Reflecting and writing about sound poses unique challenges for the critic that make it a good 
metaphor for an inquiry into sensibility. While we can certainly know sound empirically 
through measures of  pitch, intensity, duration, and so on, it is interesting to note the absence 
of  familiarity with these modes of  analysis by no means precludes the potential to hear. Or 
create.  We can record and call up a sound at any given moment, we can modulate and edit 4
sound, but “there is no way to stop sound and have sound.”  Like surprise, sound is fugitive. 5
Transience is only one source of  the curious silence surrounding our relationship 
with sound. The terms “timbre” and “tone color” in music theory refer to the idiosyncratic 
character of  different instruments playing the same note, which at once associates the 
concepts with both the singular and relative. A trombone’s texture differs from a ukulele’s, 
of  course, and a sitar sounds different than a gong. Yet these deceptively simple 
differentiations pose virtually limitless opportunities and challenges for the very possibility 
of  knowing what and how a sound actually is. But for all this, timbre plays a relatively quiet 
and ambiguous role in music theory, which concentrates on relatively mathematized topics 
 The same could be said, of  course, for images and visuals in general. I also do not deny the obvious: 4
that structural systems of  information can be brought to bear on both sound and image to variously d/evolve 
understandings of  these phenomena. I simply note that, unlike literacy, specialized knowledges are not requisite 
for an aural or visual experience.
 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 32.5
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like tonality, harmony, pitch, meter, rhythm, and notation.  It is for these reasons that 6
rhetorical scholarship has something to learn about itself  from electronic music. 
Although much valuable work is available on authorship, sampling, and remixing in 
digital music, the aesthetic texture and affective experience of  experimental and dance genres 
in particular is also worth exploring in rhetorical terms. Specifically, attending to impulses in 
recent electronic dance music (EDM) known as “dubstep” alongside related sensibilities in 
rhetoric gives the field fresh ways to engage sonic experiences as objects of  study. Aesthetics 
and rhetorics of  recent EDM—music which for some critics is assaulting noise—can 
contribute to conversations in rhetoric increasingly concerned with the sonic dimension as a 
fruitful horizon for rhetorical effects and affects, the possibility of  writing as something 
beyond or other than representation, complications of  the split between subject and object, 
and performative argumentation. To establish such offerings, this chapter will provide and 
yet surpass a “rhetoric of  electronic dance music.” The primary contribution, however, is a 
performative exploration of  the music and the aesthetic interactions among fans and the 
 The only means of  quantitatively accounting for timbre is the presence of  “overtones” in the 6
“harmonic series” of  a sound. When a note sounds, what actually is emitted is not only the “fundamental” or 
specified note, but a relatively faint blend of  overtones at higher frequencies known as a harmonic series; 
patterns in harmonic series correlate to subjective differentiations in timbre—e.g., bright; muddy; raspy. Arthur 
Jacobs, A New Dictionary of  Music (Baltimore: Penguin, 1958), 160; 379. It’s somewhat awkward to suggest, 
however, that overtones causally produce timbre since the instrument produces the overtones. Even in the case 
of  early synthesizers, when the precise distribution of  overtones to be emitted were known (i.e., programmed) 
before anyone struck a key, the experience of  timbre by the body is only ever continuous and analog. Today, 
virtual instruments are typically sampled because, you guessed it, the singularity and quality of  overtone 
distribution is richer. The investigation here is of  textural aesthetics of  sound, which are to be Gorgianically 
distinguished from representations of  sounds achieved through signal processing and quantization. Logos ≠ 
substances or existing things represented. (I hasten to add, however, that encounters [relations] with logos are only 
ever material, lived, temporal, and so on)! In appealing to the phenomenological experience of  sound, I hardly 
intend to invoke a transhistorical subject as critiqued, for example, by Jonathan Sterne. The Audible Past: Cultural 
Origins of  Sound Reproduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 13-15. I simply note that the numeric and 
sampled representation of  sonic energy differs markedly from the bodily register of  such phenomena, 
historically situated though those bodies may be. This point seems overlooked or overtly dismissed in much of  
the literature on sound. One important exception, however, is Steph Cersao’s recent step forward in arguing 
that listening is “multisensory act” and hence its rhetorical weight should not be limited to translating the sonic 
into the semiotic. She critiques and moves beyond what she calls the “ear-centric” model of  listening, which 
privileges the decryption of  sounds as vehicles for semiotic meanings—and an overdose of  which she argues 
can diminish the bodily experience of  the sound. Ceraso, “(Re)Educating the Senses: Multimodal Listening, 
Bodily Learning, and the Composition of  Sonic Experiences,” College English 77, no. 2 (2014): 102-123.
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appeals of  the art. My title proposes neither a hierarchy nor an essential divide between 
aesthetics and rhetorics. Instead, it suggests a tentative distinction for the purpose of  
highlighting the differences between experiencing and identifying rhetorical action. The 
larger point involves the conception of  so called “objects” of  study in scholarly discourse 
and our relationship(s) with these objects. I surmise that rhetoric may not only acknowledge 
this disjuncture, but perform it as well. 
 The following pages perform a “glitching” of  the scholarly manuscript by enacting 
the aesthetics of  recent electronic dance music (commonly referred to as “EDM”) as well as 
other contemporary strains of  experimental electronic music. The initial emphasis is on 
idiosyncratic textures and timbres in electronic music known as “dubstep,” which is 
presented as a modality through and during which to perform academic thinking about the 
music. The discussion begins with a sampling of  dubstep and an introduction of  recent 
EDM cultures (along with their detractors), transitions to an outline of  the chapter’s 
paralogical and post-critical methods, and begins to sketch a rhetoric of  electronic dance 
music. We then rebegin by glitching into the sequence a pair of  excursions into musical 
rhetoric and strains of  experimental music that have been recognized as “noise,” “glitch,” 
and “failure.” The piece concludes by coming “full squiggle” in acknowledging the common 
critique of  dance music as mere product for popular audiences devoid of  artistic 
experimentation. The suggestion throughout is that EDM invites and promotes an 
engagement with the art that is both “sensible” and “intelligible,” and thus deserves an 
inquiry that is performative as well as critical. 
While I begin to trace a rhetoric of  EDM in a grammatical or generic sense below, 
the chapter also establishes the rewards (necessity, perhaps) of  engagements with rhetorics 
that go beyond identification and explore the relationship that rhetors and audiences have with 
the music. In other words, more than simply discoursing “about” EDM will be required in 
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order to engage the aesthetic and affective experience of  such auralities to do fitting service 
for this music and culture that, as we will hear, prioritizes innovative timbres and singularities 
of  textures over traditional generic attributes. EDM has no monopoly on artistic 
experimentation, of  course, and I hope the discussion of  timbre here may be extended or 
applied to other genres. But, as we will hear, EDM’s emphasis on idiosyncratic and novel 
textures make it a good case study for the aesthetic and affective experience of  music as 
sound in general. 
Electronic dance music has long, diverse, and international histories (not to mention 
futures). “Dubstep,” one particular strain in the expansive and cross-pollinated ecology of  
EDM writ large, has recently garnered near mainstream attention. Although this cross-
section of  EDM varies tremendously from artist to artist, dubstep might be loosely 
characterized by its relatively slow tempo of  approximately 140 beats per minute, generic 
structural patterns (e.g., “builds,” “drops,” “interludes”), digitally synthesized sounds, and 
recurring themes of  its occasional lyrical content. It can be uncharacterized by its disarray of  
baroque, modulated, and sometimes atonal combinations of  sounds. 
  
Clip 3.1: Datsik, “Hydraulic,” from Hydraulic / Overdose 
(Kelowna BC, Canada: Rottun Recordings, 2011). 
Reductive accounts of  dubstep music sometimes make reference to robots or aliens 
to describe the disjunctive and unusual aesthetics, timbres, and moods of  the genre. One 
reviewer for The New York Times describes a dubstep concert as “almost all tremor”: “That 
there’s no dance music less sensuous than this was not an obstacle. Dubstep can often sound 
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like the gears of  an industrial thrasher groaning from overuse, or the soundtrack to the 
construction of  a Richard Serra steel sculpture.”  Notable for me is the very notion that such 7
textuality (texturality?) is desirable in the first place, especially given that such arts are 
currently experiencing a windfall of  attention. While EDM and rave cultures are not new, 
their recent inclusion in mainstream media is. Artists like Skrillex, Dillon Francis, and Datsik 
have enjoyed a recent boom of  international listenership and achieved unprecedented 
commercial success in polymorphous genres like dubstep, drum and bass, and electro-
house.  I will be most interested in American, Canadian, Northern European, and Australian 8
varieties of  dubstep music produced from approximately 2010 to the present. The focus will 
be relatively new and noisy varieties of  dubstep whose roots are in artists like UK producers 
like Skream, Burial, and Rusko, who, in turn, are indebted to actual “dub” music, or “reggae 
dub.” Tracing this history in the detail it deserves is beyond the scope of  the present writing, 
but suffice it to say the focus here is a more recent wave of  artists like, sure, Skrillex, but also 
others such as SKisM, Kill the Noise, KOAN Sound, Adventure Club, Butch Clancy, and 
many more whose era is to be carefully distinguished as its own, polymorphous and evolving 
movement within the broader context and phenomenon of  EDM. The idea is to consider 
such genres as means or modalities through and during which to perform academic thinking on 
the music. 
Evidence that EDM has staked a claim in public consciousness includes the use of  
dubstep to score popular films and television commercials, the fact that Skrillex has won six 
 Jon Caramanica, “Waves of  Sound, Wobbles of  Bass,” New York Times, April 22, 2013, http://7
nyti.ms/1VOOVRM.
 My use of  the term “genre” and generic categories are in line with Carolyn Miller’s understanding of  8
the concept. Following Miller, my interest will not be in recurring substances (semantics) or forms (syntactics) 
of  music. Instead, the chapter will be oriented by a “an understanding of  how discourse works—that is, [how] 
it reflects the rhetorical experience of  the people who create and interpret the discourse” with certain actions or 
purposes in mind. Miller, “Genre as Social Action,” Quarterly Journal of  Speech 70 (1984): 152. While I will begin 
with recurring textual and textural attributes of  the music, my ultimate concern will be the affective experience 
of  the music and how audiences not only taxonomize, but relate with the art.
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Grammy Awards, and the massive commercialization for live performances of  associated 
artists. The buzz has been sufficient to send dozens of  producers on international tours and 
sustain colossal festivals like Electric Daisy Carnival and Ultra Festival, which are each 
attended by hundreds of  thousands of  people annually.  Once the pleasure of  underground 9
niches and clandestine warehouse raves, EDM has arrived in international mainstream 
cultures. Yet scholars have only begun to learn from the aesthetics of  the most successful 
producers of  the last decade. Rhetoric should tune in. 
Intentions, Intent, Performance 
In The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard uses a metaphor of  soapy water to 
illustrate an epistemological architecture that was stochastic in its inter- and trans-disciplinary 
and fusions, relations, and influences.  He describes the state of  knowledge as a 10
kaleidoscopic series of  generations and reorganizations, mapped as an incredible complexity 
of  geometry in flux at all times. Rather than the “performativity” Lyotard associates with 
mastery of  already established procedures, he suggests the new means by which knowledge 
is to be invented is “paralogy,” or the invention of  new knowledge making procedures.  The 11
Report on Knowledge he sketched was spastic, proffering a “postmodern science as a search for 
instabilities” that would yield “singularities and ‘incommensurabilities’” necessarily out of  
sync with the methods and procedures of  the day.  I notice strikingly dis/similar energies, 12
impulses, and aesthetics in recent electronic music and dubstep in particular. 
 Jesse Lawrence, “With Ultra Music Festival Two Weeks Away, EDM Poised For Biggest Summer 9
Yet,” Forbes, March 10, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jesselawrence/2014/03/10/with-ultra-music-
festival-two-weeks-away-edm-poised-for-biggest-summer-yet/.
 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff  Bennington and 10
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1984), 58.
 Ibid., 44 ff.11
 Ibid., 53; 60.12
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Clip 3.2: Skrillex, “Rock ‘n Roll (Will Take You to the 
Mountain),” from Scary Monsters and Nice Sprites (Tampa: 
Big Beat Records / Atlantic Records, 2012). 
The music suggests aesthetic liminality in its apparent sensibility for texture and 
timbre itself—not instead but in addition to the intelligibility of  meter, rhythm, melody, 
progression, and lyrical content typical of  popular Western music. We hear baroque 
arrangements of  flotsam and jetsam alongside cracks and pops fractions of  a second in 
duration. We hear flirtations with atonality and a primarily percussive experience. I submit an 
aesthetic pleasure in electronic dance music cultures comes partly from a forfeiture of  
control as listeners are awash in sounds for which they need not account as part of  a melody 
or progression. While some hear noise, others sense perceptual dilations and a renewed 
sense of  relation to music itself. Counting myself  among the latter group, I am in agreement 
with Jeff  Rice’s remix of  Lyotard for a theory of  digital aurality: “to listen is not to seek out 
a truth; it is to engage with the process of  knowing as opposed to just the known.”  To 13
suggest listening as an activity of  knowing is to underscore the processual, temporal, and 
even existential dimensions of  inquiry typically downplayed or unacknowledged when the 
scholarly text is limited to propositional content. 
I will therefore engage in both critical and “post-critical” discussions to discuss, 
perform, and engage electronic dance music. My attempt will be to take up what Gregory L. 
 Rice juxtaposes this theory of  “digital aurality” he dubs “ka-knowledge” with the historically “topos 13
based” model of  knowing in literate paradigms characterized by localized information and “a fixed place of  
meaning” Jeff  Rice, “The Making of  Ka-Knowledge: Digital Aurality,” Computers and Composition 23 (2006): 267 
(original emphasis); 276.
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Ulmer describes as a “relation of  the critical text to its object of  study to be conceived in 
terms no longer of  subject-object[,] but of  subject-predicate.”  It could be argued that 14
EDM cultivates an aesthetic of  surprise related in spirit to Ulmer’s discussions of  collage and 
montage, a stammering comparable to historiographical shifts in the discourse of  human arts 
and sciences as recollected by Michel Foucault, and a wobbling we might associate with 
recursive and self-reflexive discourse. Indeed, for starters, I will first make and support these 
very claims before demonstrating the ease with which these interpretations can and should 
be surpassed by an enactment of  the music—beyond an account of  their salient features. 
Hence, I move from subject-object to subject-predicate. 
The question of  how to approach music with alphabetic writing has been of  interest 
for rhetoricians in the past, most notably in the 1999 enculturation special issue, “Writing/
Music/Culture.” As editors Thomas Rickert and Byron Hawk noted, the disjuncture in 
medium makes writing about music is something like “Avowing the Unavowable.” There is a 
sense, they suggested, that “music composes us when we listen to it and when we write 
about it,”  and not the other way way around. Gregory Erikson’s piece in that issue deals 15
with some of  ways music criticism interacts sonic arts. In his terms, my intentions are not 
only to “describe” or identify elements in electronic dance music, “point” to its salient 
features, and thus “augment” my readers’ engagement with the art; my primary or holistic 
efforts will be to “emulat[e] . . . . the effect of  the music”  temporally across the duration of  16
the writing. Hence, I partially accept Erikson’s challenge to “write about music without 
definition or description, to see it not as an artifact, but as a mysterious and powerful 
 Gregory L. Ulmer, “The Object of  Post-Criticism,” in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, 14
ed. Hal Foster (New York: The New Press, 1983), 86.
  Thomas Rickert and Byron Hawk, “‘Avowing the Unavowable’: On the Music of  Composition,” 15
enculturation 2, no. 2 (1999): http://enculturation.net/2_2/intro.html.
 Gregory Erickson, “Speaking of  Music: Explorations in the Language of  Music Criticism,” 16
enculturation 2, no. 2 (1999): http://enculturation.net/2_2/erickson.html.
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cognitive process.”  For me, the issue is not whether we define and describe, but rather how 17
scholars relate to such definitions and descriptions. I am also in sync with Adam Koehler, 
who picks up the beat in this journal some years later to stress that when we imagine rhetoric 
as musical (i.e., flip the notion of  music as rhetorical), “we are asking rhetoric to grapple 
with the aesthetic” itself—“asking rhetoric, as a mode of  production (rather than a mode of  
interpretation), to seek aesthetic ways of  knowing.”  And so, as Matthew A. Levy might 18
suggest, I invite readers to take out their “earplugs,”  and (why not?) hear and feel the texts19
—both the aural works cited and my own—in addition to grounding the art with figures, 
meanings, and referents. I begin with such an activity, but I won’t stop there. 
In addition to dubstep, I will examine the moods, sensibilities, and aesthetics of  aural 
arts traditions that have gone under the scholarly headings of  “noise,” “glitch,” and “failure.” 
While not directly antecedent to the strains of  dubstep and other EDM approached here, 
they are related in spirit.  Because noise, glitch, and failure have firm groundings in 20
academic discourse that recent electronic music does not, this trio is a good place from 
which to begin the way toward dubstep and rhetoric. My attempts will be to establish 
important similarities and differences between these movements, and spell out what we can 
learn from more contemporary music about how to engages its practices. 
In linking (only) apparently discontinuous traditions, this chapter is itself  a glitch and 
may be related to Casey Boyle’s understanding of  the phenomenon as an error that makes a 
 Ibid.17
 Adam Koehler, “‘Frozen Music, Unthawed’: Ka-Knowledge, Creative Writing, and the 18
Electromagnetic Imaginary,” enculturation 7 (2010): http://enculturation.net/frozen-music-unthawed. 
 Matthew A. Levy, “Shhhh! Or, the Methodological Earplugs of  Cultural Studies in Popular Music,” 19
review of  Mapping the Beat by Thomas Swiss, John Sloop, and Andrew Herman, enculturation 2, vol. 2 (1999): 
http://enculturation.net/2_2/levy.html.
 Such a claim might irritate some readers because it conflates so called “popular” music with 20
“experimental” music. While there is certainly a sense in which arts and rhetorics might aim for mere 
“gratification and pleasure”—“flattery,” perhaps—this popular/experimental divide is rather coarse. I join 
many others in rejecting this false dichotomy. See Plato, Gorgias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1925), 462d-462e.
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forgotten because “transparent” system of  mediation opaque.  In my case, the mediator is 21
the explanatory academic manuscript. Productively, Boyle’s glitches provoke what he calls a 
“metastable” relationship between and among experiencing subjects and objects. Rather than 
looking “at” and “through” objects, texts, or mediators themselves (a “bi-stable” 
arrangement endorsed by Richard Lanham),  Boyle pursues an ongoing and mutually 22
involved engagement with objects. Emphasis here is on the preposition “with” and the 
relational action of  “being with” glitches by undergoing their manifest metastability; when an 
instrument of  mediation reveals itself  as mediator in error, it is not only the subject but also 
the instrument and the object that wield affective force.  Hence, explanation is simply not 23
enough, especially when the so called “object” in question is an evolving phenomenon such 
as a genre of  music. Then and always, relation is necessary to accompany identification. My 
attempt here is the performance such a metastable relationship with both music and the 
academic essay. Put differently, the argument I perform “with” glitching is that timbre can be 
engaged with writing that aims not so much to represent sound as predicate itself  upon it. 
Switch: Glitch; Listeners, Listening, and Meter 
Another way of  thinking about glitch is a jamming or crossing of  lines to instigate 
strange or unexpected hybridizations. And indeed, some varieties of  glitch music integrate 
sound samples that might be described as incomplete, interrupted, clipped, or “cut short.” 
Unlike a note played on a traditional instrument, glitchy sound samples burst onto the track 
with the sound apparently already in progress and conclude by abruptly slicing the sample in 
a way that seems a bit too early. In production terms, the “attack” and “decay” of  glitched 
 Casey Boyle, “The Rhetorical Question Concerning Glitch,” Computers and Composition 35 (2015): 12.21
 See Richard Lanham, The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (Chicago: The University 22
of  Chicago Press, 1993), 5-6; 80-82.
 Boyle, “Glitch,” 19-22.23
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samples, or how quickly the sound appears and disappears, is often instantaneous to the 
human ear. The arrival and departure time of  the glitched samples are so quick and 
disjointed that they resemble a skipping compact disc, and indeed, this is how some of  the 
early glitch music was created. Readers interested in experimental electronic music may recall 
the producer Oval, whose discography is commonly cited as pioneer work in glitch music 
(Clip 3.3). 
  
Clip 3.3: Oval’s glitches: “Shop in Store” from 94 Diskont 
(New York: Thrill Jockey Records, 1995). 
Recent producers such as KOAN Sound have adapted the aesthetic for dubstep and 
other EDM genres, weaving meticulously arranged and yet glitchy sonic tapestries (Clip 3.4). 
  
Clip 3.4: KOAN Sound, “Blue Stripes,” from Dubstep 
Onslaught (London: Z Audio, 2011) (various artists). 
The point here is that the integration of  glitch into meter is a simultaneous appeal to 
both experimental and popular sensibilities. Considered alongside the work of  producers 
associated with experimental music “proper,” these tracks sound relatively well behaved. 
Take, for instance, the arrhythmic auralities of  Ryoji Ikeda (Clip 3.5), whose stunning audio/
visual installations are internationally renowned. 
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Clip 3.5: Ryoji Ikeda, from Formula (London: Forma, 2005). 
Book + DVD release. 
All the above suggests a muddled “who’s who” with regard to insiders, outsiders, and 
mobile producers traversing both popular and experimental worlds. I posit dubstep as this 
third sort of  outsider art on the inside of  the mainstream. My intent is therefore to collapse 
the distinction altogether by suggesting the rhetorical strength of  the art is precisely in a 
collision of  these two supposedly distinct appeals: intelligibility of  metered rhythms and 
sensibility of  novel timbres.24
Electronic Dance Music, Error, Liminality 
In a word, I take electronic dance music and dubstep in particular to be liminal. I 
borrow, stretch, and repurpose the term from Victor Turner’s anthropological work on rites 
of  passage to signify a rhetorical encounter with a strange and transient moment 
necessitating improvisation. Any honest discussion of  a genre that relies on salient features 
immediately encounters outliers and exceptions. I am therefore less interested defining a 
genre or any subgenre of  electronic music than I am in exploring what does appear to be an 
effort in a diverse body of  dubstep to push toward (and exceed?) interpretive thresholds, 
aesthetic limits, intelligible margins, and affective boundaries. I claim this striving is manifest 
in the contents, forms, and purposes of  the art.  25
 My gesture here is inspired by Victor J. Vitanza’s attempt to be “an outsider while inside” when 24
accounting for histories of  rhetorics. His topographic model for such histories is the Klein jar, a non-orientable 
surface “which is all outside and no inside, or which is neither.” Negation, Subjectivity, and The History of  Rhetoric 
(Albany: State University of  New York Press, 1997), 19; 7.
25 See n. 8, above.
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Actually, a common criticism of  EDM is that it is not music at all because it does not 
continue longstanding traditions of  composition in the Western mainstream. While such 
reactionary criticisms echoing those historically lodged against experimental music are by no 
means unique, they are just as bitter and uncompromising. Negative reviews of  dubstep as 
somehow outside or other than music itself  abound in popular culture. Henry Rollins, 
former frontman of  the legendary punk band Black Flag, contributes to this discourse in a 
standup comedy routine by wondering “which came first, shitty rave music or the drugs?” 
So you make music this shitty, and everyone says, “God, this sucks!” 
[Rollins impersonating a particular discussant:] “No, no, take these drugs.” 
[Rollins as a second individual brings pantomimic narcotics to his tongue and convulses, 
imitating loss of  motor control. The music review is revised:] “Fuck, that’s so good!”  
[Laughter in the audience]. 
[Rollins as himself:] Or, were there just a bunch of  people sitting in warehouse with a bunch 
of  ketamine and ecstasy, and they took a bunch of  it, and they said, “Alright, now make 
some music!”  26
Self-satisfied punchline being that results in both cases would be comparable. He goes on to 
identify disc jockeys as “nonmusic fuckheads” and “record player players,”  trivializing 27
producers of  original content who are also necessarily DJs for the sake of  live performance. 
The artists, meanwhile, are aware of  this counter-discourse, and even use the criticism as 
source material for new productions. The audio from the Rollins gig, of  course, was itself  
remixed and sampled in EDM productions including SKisM’s “Rave Review” (Clip 3.6). 
  
Clip 3.6: Rollins remixed. SKisM, “Rave Review,” from 
Down with the Kids (London: Never Say Die Records, 
2010). 




Rollins represents an extreme responses, but the framing of  his complaints 
as exclusionary is telling and relevant for my argument because of  the emphasis on aesthetic 
discontinuity and radical invention in EDM. Some strains of  digital music have perceived 
themselves as liminal since their inception. Kim Cascone’s landmark article, “The Aesthetics 
of  Failure,” ushered in the work of  electronic artists who embraced, pursued, and exploited 
hiccups and errors in digital audio production. These artists reveled in the mutated audio 
emitted during the crashes and stalls of  editing software, understanding such errors as 
creations instead of  scraps. While it is a banality that digital technologies afford a wide range 
of  tools and opportunities for producers to stretch and pioneer the sonic arts, what might be 
less commonplace is that some artists actually appreciate and celebrate the failure of  the 
same hard and soft wares. As Cascone observes, the tools of  electronic music composition 
not only streamline production, but “digital technology [also] enables artists to explore new 
territories for content by capturing and examining the area beyond the boundary of  
‘normal’ functions and uses of  software.”  His essay calls attention to a deliberate 28
cultivation of  breakdown and deterioration as an inventional mood: “It is from the ‘failure’ 
of  digital technologies that this new work has emerged: glitches, bugs, application errors, 
system crashes, clipping, aliasing, distortion, quantization noise, and even the noise floor of  
computer sound cards are the raw materials composers seek to incorporate into their 
music.”  Importantly, the impetus for all this noise is a kind of  willed liminality on the part 29
of  the producers: “while technological failure is often controlled and suppressed—its effects 
buried beneath the threshold of  perception—most audio tools can zoom in on the errors, allowing 
 Kim Cascone, “The Aesthetics of  Failure: ‘Post-Digital Tendencies in Contemporary Computer 28
Music,” Computer Music Journal 24, no. 4 (2000): 14 (emphasis added).
 Ibid., 13.29
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composers to make them the focus of  their work.”  For Cascone, failure promised forking 30
pathways to new sonic aesthetics. 
Turner’s anthropology is also concerned with interpretive thresholds. I have in mind 
his work on “liminality,” a transitional period of  growth in which cultural subjects undergo 
what is often a jarring experience of  maturation and enculturation. Typical examples include 
fraternity pledging or, in so called “primitive” cultures, a youth’s passage into adulthood 
sometimes consummated with a test of  survival on one’s own for a period of  time while 
isolated from the tribe. Working with Arnold van Gennep’s three stages in rites of  passage, 
“separation, transition, and incorporation,” it is the middle period which primarily interests 
him; Turner writes that “[i]n this intervening phase of  transition, called by Van Gennep 
‘margin’ or ‘limen’ (meaning ‘threshold’ in Latin), the ritual subjects pass through a period 
and area of  ambiguity, a sort of  social limbo” in which subjectivities and therefore reliable 
interpretive capabilities are unavailable.  Those undergoing liminality may find themselves 31
endowed with more than they thought possible—capable of  previously unimaginable 
rhetorical, aesthetic, interpretive, and experiential capacities. 
Following Lyotard and Ulmer in search of  interpretive free play, I take note of  EDM 
as cultural texts that flirt with such bending, modulating, and repurposing symbols in atypical 
and improvisational ways. Texts that encourage and instigate feelings of  breakage, mutation, 
and experimentation as part of  their reading-listening-feeling experience seek out and 
promote innovative modes of  experiencing arts and rhetorics. As liminal, EDM seems 
deserving of  an engagement that resists the temptation to reduce the art to a list of  
recurring attributes, although this is perhaps the only place we can start. 
 Ibid., (emphasis added).30
 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of  Play (New York: PAJ Publications, 31
1982), 24.
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 Before we begin, however, acknowledgment of  a triple anxiety is necessary. First of  
all, “overwhelmingly, the intellectual tradition has considered music suspicious if  not 
dangerous” because of  its indeterminate affective force, especially when considered relative 
to the cognitive prowess language supposedly affords.  Second: according to Plato, the 32
music most threatening to the order of  the ideal state is im/precisely the novel and 
unfamiliar. 
When Plato said that “the overseers of  our state . . . must throughout be watchful against innovations 
in music . . . fearing when anyone says that the song is most regarded among men ‘which hovers 
newest on the singer’s lips,’” one may wonder whether he had in mind the boast of  . . . Timotheus [of  
Miletus] who said: “I do not sing what men have sung in time past. In novelty is power. . . . Far from 
us be the Muse of  the old days.”  33
The inconsistency of  the new necessarily implies deviance, abandonment, and renewal—all 
of  which Plato situates firmly in the realm distracting appearances: dancing shadows on the 
wall. Third, all the above is in and/or out of  line with Jacques Attali’s landmark study on 
noise and experimental music. His position is that disruptive musical arts can rock 
established paradigms and instigate social change in a way that necessarily entails overhauling 
 Thomas Rickert, “Language’s Duality and the Rhetorical Problem of  Music,” in Rhetorical Agendas: 32
Political, Ethical, Spiritual, ed. Patricia Bizzell (New York: Routledge, 2010), 157.
 Qtd. in Katharine Everett Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, A History of  Esthetics (New York: Dover, 33
1972), 30. The quoted passages, respectively, are Plato, Republic, 424b and Alfred Croiset and Maurice Croiset, 
Histoire de la Littérature Grecque, vol. III (Paris: Libraire des Ècoles Françaises, 1887), 34. No full text in English 
of  the latter exists to my knowledge, though spot translations are common in scholarship. Timotheus of  
Miletus is an amusing figure, dating liminal sonic aestheticism back as far as the third and fourth centuries, 
BCE. 
For Carlo Valgulio, Girolamo Mei, and other Renaissance humanists, the name Timotheus of  Miletus brought to 
mind the image of  a musician who flouted custom by enlarging the number of  strings of  the traditional kithara 
to accommodate his innovative style, and was humiliated by the authorities of  the city of  Sparta for doing so. . . . 
“Timotheus expanded his lyre to eleven strings, whereas up to Terpander and others like him it did not go 
beyond seven. For this alteration he was exiled by the Spartans as a spoiler and destroyer of  the ancient music,” 
Mei wrote to [Vincenzo] Galilei. 
Martha Maas, “Timotheus at Sparta: The Nature of  the Crime,” in Musical Humanism and Its Legacy: Essays in 
Honor of  Claude V. Palisca, eds. Nancy Kovaleff  Baker and Barbara Russian (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1992), 
38. The cited correspondence, dated May 8, 1572, appears in Claude V. Palisca, The Florentine Camerata: 
Documentary Studies and Translations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 71.
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the prevailing aesthetic infrastructures: “[f]or the code to undergo a mutation . . . and for the 
dominant network to change, a certain catastrophe must occur.”  34
A Rhetoric of  Electronic Dance Music? 
Surprise? 
If  “surprise is the least complex kind of  fulfillment,”  one can’t help but wonder 35
how an agenda for experimentation is handled by this model. What if  one’s hope is to enter 
the liminal, to tinker with the unfamiliar for the purposes of  invention? I neither wish to 
fight a straw man nor argue with Burke’s hierarchy of  complexity. My purpose in citing 
Burke is rather to propose that listeners of  dubstep, despite Rollins et al., are in fact less 
concerned “the creation of  an appetite . . . and the adequate satisfying of  that appetite,”  36
than with the discovery of  appetites they were not aware they held—or even knew existed. 
Producers of  dubstep and some other EDM genres seem to have an aesthetic preference 
“closer to invention than verification,” to repurpose Gregory Ulmer’s words from different 
but related context.  37
A liminal aesthetic, insofar as there is any such thing available for analysis, is one that 
calls to mind Ulmer’s discussion of  collage and montage as “post-critical.” Using 
heterogeneous elements “cut out and pasted into new, surprising, provoking 
juxtapositions,”  collage is recombinant composition in which the traditional function of  38
signification is altered to one not primarily concerned with referentiality. Ulmer’s linkage of  
 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of  Music, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of  34
Minnesota Press, 2011), 34.
 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1968), 36, n. 4.35
 Gregory L. Ulmer, Heuretics: The Logic of  Invention (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 36
1994), 31.
 Ibid., xii.37
 Ulmer, “Post-Criticism,” 85.38
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the form to Derridian “grammatology” suggests that collage “does not abandon or deny 
reference, but re-thinks reference in another way: ‘it complicates the boundary line that 
ought to run between the text and what seems to lie beyond its fringes, what is classed as the 
real.’”  Given that collage can rely on reference for the sake of  juxtaposition, referentiality is 39
not irrelevant; regardless, what we have here is an elevation of  texture and materiality to an 
equal if  not higher status than the conceptual realm “beyond” the work itself. For Ulmer, 
collage shifts away from “representation by the metaphysics of  ‘logocentrism,’ the era 
extending from Plato to Freud (and beyond) in which writing (all manner of  inscription) is 
reduced to a secondary status as ‘vehicle,’ [and] in which the signified or referent is always 
prior to the material sign, the purely intelligible prior to the merely sensible.”  The 40
connection to EDM here is that a grammatology transposed for music might dispense with 
tonality as a guiding parameter of  progressions melodies. Indeed, in dubstep sounds 
themselves are featured not as differential operators, but simply as textures in their own 
right. 
  
Clip 3.7: Dino Safari, “A Ghost Named Charlie” (I.Y.F.F.E., 
Au5, and Auratic Remix). Self-released. 
The aggressive remix of  the track “A Ghost Named Charlie” (originally produced by 
Dino Safari) and Downlink’s “Factory” are good examples of  such compositions (Clips 3.7 
and 3.8). These works seem to rely on something other than latent, relational significations in 
a tonal network (e.g., those of  a key signature) and signify the timbres themselves. 
 Ibid., 87. The cited passage is Derrida’s, from Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The 39




Clip 3.8: Downlink, “Factory,” from Factory / Yeah (Kelowna 
BC, Canada: Rottun Recordings, 2011). 
More specifically, these samples dispense with popular music’s tonal gold standard, 
which is loosely analogous to language as a static system of  differences prior to 
deconstruction. In music theory, the distance between notes on the staff  measured in 
“intervals” or “steps” determines consonance and dissonance among notes (and is also the 
basis of  scales and key signatures). Instead of  and/or alongside melodic phrases governed 
by tonality, these clips offer an aesthetic of  surprise by combining an eclectic array of  sound 
samples. And the compatibility of  Ulmer’s grammatology with Cascone’s aesthetics is 
striking, particularly when the latter describes the composing process of  early glitch music: in 
a sense, “[t]he ‘atomic’ parts, or samples, used in composing electronica from small modular 
pieces had become the whole.”  For Cascone, glitch music is “composed of  stratified layers 41
[of  samples] that intermingle and defer meaning until the listener takes an active role in the 
production of  meaning.”  Such a listening experience is a key change in the relationship 42
between knower and known characterized by a forfeiture of  expectation and an embrace of  
texture of  mere sound itself. 
Stammer? 
In The Archeology of  Knowledge, Michel Foucault describes a historiographical shift. 
“Attention has been turned,” he writes, “away from vast unities like ‘periods’ or ‘centuries’ to 
 Cascone, “Failure,” 17.41
  Ibid.42
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the phenomena of  rupture” and “discontinuity (threshold, rupture, break, mutation, 
transformation).”  For him, the task is no longer tracing stable lines in thought, politics, 43
philosophy, arts, and so on, but rather charting genealogical understandings of  how such 
discourses are paradoxically substantiated by disjunctives tossed out in favor of  these very 
stabilities. In so doing, he insists that scholars take up a different relationship with archive, 
which itself  must be reinvented in order to adequately engage rupture. The result is a strange 
imperative: “suspend the continuous accumulation of  knowledge, interrupt its slow 
development, and force it to enter a new time.”  In so doing, Foucault was perfectly aware, 44
researchers may stammer in attempt to register something heretofore inarticulable or 
disallowed precisely because it renders a field’s trajectory discontinuous. 
  
Clip 3.9: SKisM, “Elixir,” from Down with the Kids (London: 
Never Say Die Records, 2010). 
I hear dubstep stammering in songs like SKisM’s “Elixir” and Kill the Noise’s “Talk 
to Me” (Clips 3.9 and 3.10). As we hear in the latter sample, this effect is often accomplished 
by dicing vocal tracks and rearranging the bits in fragmented syncopation. 
 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of  Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith 43




Clip 3.10: Kill the Noise, “Talk to Me,” from Kill Kill Kill 
(Los Angeles: OWSLA, 2011). 
The result sounds like someone interrupting themselves—these two clips can hardly 
contain themselves! Notice the exact rhythm of  the stammer in both samples is rarely if  ever 
repeated; each bar of  the cited passages (un)usually offers a unique rhythmic phrase. 
Recalling the sequence from memory is, I think, deliberately made difficult, and as such a 
stammering aesthetic could be read attempt to brush up against limits of  articulability. 
Wobble? 
Hayden White conceives of  ideal argument as a “diatactic” movement. He prefers 
this term to dialectic, which “too often suggests a transcendental subject or narrative ego 
[that] stands above the contending interpretations of  reality and arbitrates between them.”  45
A diatactical orientation, on the other hand, 
does not suggest that discourses about reality can be classified as hypotactical (conceptually 
overdetermined), on the one side, and paratactical (conceptually underdetermined), on the 
other, with the discourse itself  occupying the middle ground that everyone is seeking [as in 
dialectics]. On the contrary, discourse, if  it is genuine discourse—that is to say, as self-critical 
as it is critical of  others—will radically challenge the notion of  the syntactical middle ground 
itself.  46
Such a middle ground, after all, cannot exist except as a reterritorialization. How might 
White’s “metadiscursive reflexiveness” sound? 
 Hayden White, Tropics of  Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: The University of  Johns 45




Clip 3.11: Butch Clancy, “Boogie Knights.” Self-released. 
Dubstep is known for its cultivation of  an aesthetic known as “wobble,” a 
tremololike modulation effect usually achieved by means of  oscillating the parameters of  an 
effect filter applied to a sound-sample in real time and rhythmically looping the output. 
“Boogie Knights” by Butch Clancy and a remix of  Diana Vickers’ “Sunlight” by Adventure 
Club may serve as examples of  especially wobbly tracks (Clips 3.11 and 3.12). Such wobbling 
is generated with technique called “low frequency oscillation,” which temporarily amplifies a 
select window of  low-end frequencies of  a sound as it is sampled. The procedure is roughly 
analogous to sweeping the “low” dial of  a stereo’s equalizer during playback for realtime 
modulation. The result is not a modulated sound, but a sound being recurrently modulated 
in the present. Although machinically rhythmic, the result feels precarious because the timbre 
is wavering in time. 
  
Clip 3.12: Diana Vickers, “Sunlight” (Adventure Club 
Remix). Self-released. 
These effects and consequent affects riding on these crests of  frequency recall 
Turner’s liminal “interval[s], however brief, of  margin or limen, when the past is 
momentarily negated, suspended, or abrogated, and the future has not yet begun, an instant 
of  pure potentiality when everything . . . trembles in the balance.”  If  we need and desire 47
 Turner, Ritual, 44.47
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rhetoric and rhetorical studies to transform our modes of  thinking, listening, reading, and 
writing, then suspension and trembling must be admitted to the discourse. 
Rebeginning: Glitch 
Experimental music is by no means a new phenomenon, and predates all three 
writers and EDM by a long shot. Here, then, I will switch and trip the flow of  the chapter by 
claiming that the cursory discussion of  attributes I outlined above does not in fact amount to 
a viable “rhetoric of  electronic dance music.” I surmise that what sustains audience interest 
in EDM is that each surprise, stammer, and wobble is something different—by which I hope 
to indicate something grander and yet subtle relative to the banal (though important) idea 
that individual texts from any one genre are each themselves different. Instead, the claims are 
that if  anything is “signified” or “represented” in electronic dance music, it is liminality itself  
in which all interpretive bets are off. The purpose, perhaps, is to “intervene in the world, not 
to reflect but to change reality.”  Hence, the questions: how, in light of  its surprising 48
“tendencies,” should we treat experimental music in scholarly discourse—and why would it 
matter for rhetoric? 
Prior to, beyond, or perhaps in excess of  our intelligible relationship with rhetorics as 
identifiable means of  persuasion, there also exists a relatively unwieldy dimension of  
engagement with rhetorics, less intelligible than merely sensible.  This qualitative distinction 49
becomes especially important if  the issue is liminal experiences in arts and rhetorics. Next, 
then, I pull the ground out from under my own argument thus far—I glitch it—for the 
purpose of  demonstrating that what is needed and wanted for experimental discourses on 
 Ulmer, “Object,” 86.48
 By invoking a distinction between sensibility and intelligibility, I make reference to one of  the 49
longest dialectics in the history of  Western thought. Related pairings include aesthetic/cognitive, feeling/
meaning, experiencing/knowing, and so on. As I established in the first chapter, it is unwise to posit these 
terms as antitheses or opposites.
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experimental rhetorics is to actually enact and perform these sorts experiences—in addition 
to simply discoursing about such experiences. The subject is now how to think and write notions, 
moods, attitudes, and affects associated with aural experimentalities. 
Sonic Aesthetics of  Rhetorics 
A number of  scholars have explored the rhetorical implications of  listening, sound, 
and music as modalities of  engagement. I am in tune with Steven B. Katz, for example, who 
highlights the fact that reading, like music, is temporal. His is “a temporal philosophy based 
on harmonic association and holistic synthesis of  thought and feeling rather than sequential 
extraction and hierarchical differentiation of  meaning”  we might get through referentiality. 50
Katz’s suggestion is not simply that music can be rhetorical, but that rhetoric could be 
musical. My attempt is to underscore the temporality of  the present argument by means of  
enacting a glitch. It is not that the typology of  dubstep attributes I outlined above is wrong or 
unhelpful. Indeed, such taxonomy is probably a necessary basis from which to begin 
discoursing. But such information as mere data diminishes, potentially or to a certain extent, 
the affective capacity of  electronic dance music by taking it out of  its lived, temporal 
dimension. 
Byron Hawk and, separately, Thomas Rickert and Michael Salvo have argued that 
music can have a “worlding” capacity to reflect, actuate, and propel not merely technological 
innovations, but also existential moods. From Wagner to Yes to Brian Eno, Rickert and Salvo 
suggest that evolutions in music not only reflect or parallel but also inspire transformations 
of  our relation to the art and the world. Specifically, they notice that accelerations in new 
media composition technologies can prompt both artists and audiences to ponder their 
 Steven B. Katz, The Epistemic Music of  Rhetoric: Toward the Temporal Dimension of  Affect in Reader 50
Response and Writing (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), xii.
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relationships with music, which is especially pronounced in “a culture that is less resonate with 
interpretation than with engagement.”  Relatedly, Hawk’s listening sessions with the 51
experimental punk band Refused leads him to suggest that pioneerings in music “se[t] the 
emergent ground for the rhetorical affects and future paths they make possible through their 
work of  art.”  What I take from these writers is a cumulative feeling that experimental 52
ventures in music may afford an opportunity not merely for persuasion in the usual sense of  
making appeals to existing paradigms and satisfying established formal appetites, but can 
also occasion a dramatic alteration of  aesthetic preferences or even reveal new “preferences” 
or desires not yet formulated or recognized by audiences. 
Rickert argues that ambient music is conducive less to intelligible analyses than to 
“attunements” or mood based engagements that I would associate with sensibility as an 
alternative to intelligibility. He notes, for example, that ambient music “eschews melody,” a 
major dimension of  grounding for popular Western music, “in favor of  slowly unfolding 
harmonic textures . . . designed to withdraw from direct attention and permeate one’s overall 
environment.”  Transposed for rhetorics, ambient music’s departure from the catchy, the 53
recognizable, the operationalizable, and melodic qualities of  popular music helps us think of  
an engagement with arts and rhetorics not limited to the intelligible relationship with 
information (textual, sonic, and otherwise) we tend to take for granted. On a grander and 
existential scale, this ambient dimension within which we always already dwell highlights the 
ever present sensible in the intelligible, the former functioning as the basis of  the latter, 
thereby dissolving the distinction between the poles: 
  Thomas Rickert and Michael Salvo, “The Distributed Gesamptkunstwerk: Sound, Worlding, and New 51
Media Culture,” Computers and Composition 23 (2006): 296.
 Byron Hawk, “The Shape of  Rhetoric to Come: Musical Worlding as Public Rhetoric,” Pre/Text 20, 52
no. 1-4 (2010): 17 (issues 1-4 reprinted, 2010).
 Thomas Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of  Rhetorical Being (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 53
University Press, 2013), 133.
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[Ambient rhetoric] deprivileges directly conscious experience and boosts the importance of  indirect, 
unconscious, auratic, osmotic, and ambient phenomena. Put differently, such rhetorical design 
organizes an experience, not so much to persuade in any direct sense, but to attune and inflect our 
sense of  bodily inhabitance and the cradle of  intelligibility within which we comport ourselves.  54
While the varieties of  EDM sampled here are scarcely comparable to ambient music in 
terms of  generic properties, stylized tropes, production techniques, or textural aesthetics, the 
relations among the experiencing subject, the art, and cultural attitudes toward electronic 
dance music are nevertheless compatible with Rickert’s rhetoric. It is argued throughout his 
book that an overreliance on deliberation and intentionality in rhetorical studies has 
necessarily resulted in a selective rendering of  the field and its affective capacities that 
privileges intelligible salience over less manipulable engagements with rhetorics and/or, here, 
the aesthetics of  rhetorics. I sense a related exigency available in, through, and during 
electronic music given its emphasis on idiosyncrasy in timbre that seems to invite 
engagement without a requisite of  “interpretation” in the sense of  recognizing familiar 
melodic patterns. For me, textural aesthetics of  progressivist electronic music cited in this 
chapter extend the frontier of  timbre less to comport listeners toward a worldly or bodily 
relation than to intervene and pioneer new sonic possibilities of  information exchange within 
that world. 
Experimentalities, Popularities; Surprises. 
Before closing, I would like to make a metadiscursive comment on the aesthetics of  
experimental electronic musics that have gone under the scholarly headings of  “noise,” 
“glitch,” and “failure.” Readers familiar with such aural arts will be quick to note that the 
samples of  popular EDM cited earlier differ enormously with this trio of  experimental 
strains. My claim is not for a similarity of  textural aesthetics, but a compatibility of  desires in 
 Ibid., 154-155.54
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the efforts of  recent EDM and dubstep in particular. It would be a mistake to class dubstep 
and other EDM alongside the latest flavor of  bubblegum pop for young masses—although 
it may (d)evolve into that someday not too distant. For now, I simply maintain that relatively 
popular electronic dance music and dubstep in particular, especially during its emergent 
phase in the early 2010s, performs a rhetorical tightrope act in mixing appeals to both stasis 
(in terms of  meter and rhythm) and fluctuation (in timbres and textures). I begin (again), 
however, with academic usages of  the terms “noise,” “glitch,” and “failure” that come from 
the separate works of  Douglas Kahn and Cascone. 
My particular interest is the special handling required in light of  the semantic ironies 
that arise when the objects of  scholarly discourse are artworks that would hope to be 
experimental or scramble existing aesthetic classifications. One of  the first issues that arises 
in defining any member in this trio of  noise, glitch, and failure as an aesthetic entity is 
whether any of  these can or should be considered “music.” Kahn approaches the issue with 
the subtly and care it requires in his 1999 book Noise Water Meat. The title is a nod to the 
unlikely materials and mediums with and in which the Italian Futurists, John Cage, William 
Burroughs, and others disrupted conventional music of  their days by integrating novel and, 
if  you like, raucous production techniques. These artists and thinkers brought noisy sounds 
like industrial machinery, teapots, and the body’s capacity to register and emanate nonvocal 
sound to bear on our understandings of  musical, aesthetic, and affective experience. Kahn 
therefore begins instead with “sound” as any “auditive phenomena”—real or imagined, 
audible or dreamed. Apropos of  experimental or avant-garde arts movements, then, the first 
step in conceiving noise as art is to consider this general sense of  sound as art, if  only 
because made “significant” or “musicalized” by the artists.  55
 Douglas Kahn, Noise Water Meat (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 3-4.55
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In terms of  noise, the historical texts most significant for Kahn are the separate 
compositions of  Italian Futurist musicians Francesco Balilla Pratella and Luigi Russolo. Each 
penning essays in the genre “Manifesto,” both Russolo and Pratella are polemic in 
bemoaning what they saw as complacency in the textural aesthetics of  Italian music in the 
early part of  the twentieth century. In The Art of  Noises, first published in 1913, Russolo 
proclaims “musical sound is too limited in its variety of  timbres” and urges his 
contemporaries to diversify the very notion of  music: “we must break out of  this limited circle of  
sounds and conquer the infinite variety of  noise-sounds.”  Russolo is remembered specifically for the 56
construction of  his “intonarumori” devices, which he used to create his sounds that 
generally resemble gas powered lawn equipment (Clip 3.13). 
  
Figure 3.1: Russolo (left), Ugo Piatti, and the Intonarumori 
(1913). Image is in the Public Domain. First published by 
Russolo in The Art of  Noises, 1913. See n. 56. 




Clip 3.13: Rusollo, “Risveglio Di Una Città,” (1913) is in the 
Public Domain. “UbuWeb Sound - Luigi Russolo,” 
UbuWeb, accessed January 25, 2015, http://
www.ubu.com/sound/russolo_l.html. 
Pratella’s “Manifesto for Futurist Musicians” is specifically addressed to “the young, 
who are necessarily athirst for things that are new, alive, and contemporary.”  The text 57
encourages readers to abandon schools of  music and create noise independently because 
such institutions promote tradition and conservatism in art.  While Pratella and Russolo 58
position themselves as loud and proud—virtuous because disruptive— Kahn points out a 
(not so?) subtle irony in their posturing: “with so much attendant on noise it quickly 
becomes evident that noises are too significant to be noises” in the common sense of  being 
unwanted—or, at least, too significant to be thought unwanted by all.  What seems like a 59
straight forward split between the noise and music is, for both the Futurists and Kahn, 
superfluous—but for different reasons. The conception of  noise in an antagonistic or 
contrarian relationship with music seems to position the former as somehow outside the 
latter. But one of  Kahn’s insights is that the phenomenon of  musical noise, especially as it 
developed from the early part of  the century to the experimental movements in America 
during the 1950s and 1960s, was and is always addressed in terms of  attention, salience, and 
reintegration. 
This line between sound and musical sound stood at the center of  the existence of  avant-garde music, 
supplying a heraldic moment of  transgression and its artistic raw material, a border that had to be 
 Franceso Balilla Pratella, “Manifesto for Futurist Musicians,” in Futurism: An Anthology, eds. 57
Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, and Laura Wittman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 75.
 Ibid., 79.58
 Kahn, Noise, 21.59
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crossed to bring back unexploited resources, restock the coffers of  musical materiality, and rejuvenate 
Western art music.  60
While zeitgeist among the Futurists and other progressives like John Cage, Fluxus, and 
Happenings in the mid-twentieth century called for an ambiguous and open ended venture 
into that which disoriented and unsettled audiences and creators themselves, Kahn suggests 
they always did so with the intent of  returning from the journey to exhibit and thus make 
salient newfound textures. Such a claim downplays, at least to some extent, the qualitative 
difference in experimentation of  recently popular EDM artists and those who do so for 
explicitly counter-cultural reasons. The idea of  Russolo and Pratella as subversive 
minoritarians is thus somewhat complicated here since, while cultures are not monoliths, 
subcultures are cultural. 
Yet avoiding the temptation to simply reintegrate the different, new, or experimental 
into the market, some inevitability, or the merely causal is crucial. All the above may very 
well apply in various ways and to varying degrees. But the categoricism at the heart of  the 
critical manuscript sells the work short, and this is not so naive and nostalgic an objection as 
it may seem. The argument is simply that such explanations (categorical and causal) do not 
account for the impact and affect of  the work—subjectively or historically. Liminal 
aesthetics can and do indeed trigger epiphanic thresholds, paradigmatic shifts, and other 
transformations in personal but also political and economic precincts as well. 
Experimental electronic music (EDM included), for example, seems especially well 
positioned to investigate relationships users have with technology, aesthetic possibility in the 
digital, and relations among others, community, and world. While this chapter’s choice to 
focus on electronic dance music is not incidental, those textures and timbres are metaphors 
for the project’s larger effort to rethink ways of  treating and dealing with the probable 
 Ibid., 69.60
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inevitability of  shock and overhaul of  aesthetic and rhetorical practices. For a recent 
example with an electronic but entirely different sound, consider the exceptional work of  
Holly Herndon. Her 2015 album Platform explicitly invites listeners to relate with the art by 
oscillating between popular and experimental tendencies before dissolving one into the 
other. 
  
Clip 3.14: Holly Herndon, “Home,” from Platform (London: 
4AD / Rvng Intl., 2015). 
Note the use of  timbre—not narrative, not tonal semiotics, not rhythm—but timbre to 
explore and relate to a contemporary situation characterized by ubiquitous computing, 
surveillance, and cloud feudalism. Tracks on this record are occasionally without meter at all, 
simply embarking on one excursus after another—yet somehow in a way that feels 
continuous, if  not unified. Samples are practically tactile: rich, wet, and prickly. 
  
Clip 3.15: Holly Herndon, “New Ways to Love,” from 
Platform (London: 4AD / Rvng Intl., 2015). 
Rhetorical criticism should lend an ear timbre itself. Such an approach allows us to be with 
the information “about” which we supposedly discourse from critical distance implied by the 
manuscript genre. Surprise: it’s not enough. 
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Perhaps an irony permeating the present text—positioning glitch and noise as “an 
aesthetic” to be recognized, held up, critiqued, and/or celebrated—has undermined their 
disruptive edges. Cascone himself  makes an interesting pivot a decade after the publication 
of  his perennial essay in a talk he titles “The Failure of  Aesthetics.” He laments what in 
retrospect seems like the inevitable appropriation of  glitch aesthetics by mainstream media: 
Today, glitch has become a permanent part of  the arsenal of  au courant stylistic sound and visual 
effects invoking edginess for many opening credits of  formulaic cyber sci-fi films. The tired 
“technology run amok,” “gone awry” trope was given a new varnish and retooled for the internet age. 
. . . As a result, glitch has become a fashion statement detoothed for our safety, commodified for our 
entertainment consumption.  61
What came about as a direct challenge to grammatical and overly familiar modes of  sonic 
production has itself  been grammaticized. Yet by the end of  the talk, he rebounds hope, 
challenging artists to once again move beyond trope and typification to engage in yet more 
stretching. The appetite for innovation cannot be satisfied by reliance on techniques or 
streamlined aesthetic tendencies already dominant in electronic music. After all, it’s not as if  
glitch as such is susceptible to cooptation. My attempt here has been to glitch the academic 
essay for the sake of  leaving open not only the aesthetic potentialities of  electronic music, 
but for the purposes of  imagining alternative approaches-to and relationships-with scholarly 
objects in academic writing. 
Full Squiggle 
I have oscillated between experimental music on the one hand and “popular” dance 
music on the other in an attempt to demonstrate this apparent dichotomy is false. Still, in 
light of  all the fanfare surrounding EDM cultures, the question remains: just how 
 Kim Cascone, “The Failure of  Aesthetics” (presentation, Share Festival at the Regional Museum of  61
Natural Science, Torin, Italy, November 3, 2010).
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experimental are these electronic dance music artists? To what extent are these artists simply 
catering to popular or general audiences with predefined, albeit freshly minted, expectations? 
With its emphasis on textural experience of  the art through exploration of  
idiosyncratic timbre, EDM attempts to satisfy appetites some listeners music might not 
know they possess. And yet, undeniably, these same fans crave and take comfort in the 
security of  certain tropes, most notably the common 4/4 time sustained in a highly 
structural fashion. Often the same rhythm is used throughout the entirety of  a song or even 
across whole albums. Hardly experimental(?). I would see this apparent juxtaposition of  
experimentation and regularity as an attempt to point outside from inside, an attempt to 
cater to an oscillation of  appetites for both stasis and divergence. Not one or the other, but 
each alternatively as a unified rhetorical gesture. 
The larger issue for rhetoricians is a possible shift in mood or approach to objects of  
study that would be novel or experimental. If  we simply reintegrate experimental arts, 
discourses, rhetorics, or modes of  existence into a categorical, intelligible frameworks of  
analysis we risk downplaying the very lived, affective, and sensible experiences of  those 
howls, yawps, and glitches.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERLUDE: VIOLENCES WITHIN, WITHOUT, AND WITH LOVE 
Imagine such a play. It has gone on for about forty 
minutes. You know the characters, you have become 
accustomed to their idiosyncrasies, and you are already 
tired of  their peculiar habits. Now they stand before 
you with their familiar gestures and it seems nothing 
interesting is ever going to happen—when suddenly, 
because of  a trick used by the writer, the ‘reality’ you 
perceived turns out to be a chimaera . . . . Looking back 
you can now say that things were not what they seemed 
to be, and looking forward with the experience in mind 
you will regard any clear and definite arrangement with 
suspicion, on the stage, and elsewhere. Also, your 
suspicion will be the greater the more solid the initial 
story seemed to be. This is why I have chosen a 
scholarly essay as my starting point. —Feyerabend  1
The track of  writing is straight and crooked.  
—Heraclitus  2
Anecdote on Anecdotes. A common technique used in opening academic essays is telling a 
story that serves as an emblem for some larger issue, argument, or theme. In this chapter, I 
have written a story about reading Roland Barthes’ work on the ethics and aesthetics of  
writing. What follows is not a full and true account, but, I must warn the reader, it can still be 
pretty bloody if  construed as the kind of  scholarly narrative that is, in the end, a series of  
notes on readings or an account of  accountings. I confess: what appears below is the Greatest 
Hits of  what was in actuality a series of  circlings, abandonments, temperings, erasures, and 
ugly distillations. I revised it obsessively, cutting what did not “make sense,” adding what 
seemed to be missing, and refining what some might find unclear. No surprises. Nothing 
unusual here. In this case, however, the so called “content” made revisions more like ethical 
stammerings and necessitated a sort of  stretching. For Barthes, there exists a disjuncture 
 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 2010), xvi.1
 Attributed to Heraclitus by Hippolytus in Refutation of  All Heresies, cited in A Presocratics Reader: 2
Selected Fragments and Testimonia, 2nd ed., ed. Patricia Curd, trans. Richard D. McKirahan and Patricia Curd 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2011), 48 (22B59).
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between the gradience in the aesthetic experience of  reading and what seemed to him the 
“violence” of  critical discourse. Although his understanding of  the situation is not limited to 
a simple dualism (aesthetics v. criticism; no blur), a struggle with the apparent double bind is 
everywhere in his writing, and appears as an ethical imperative. Barthes sought to stretch 
both our relationship with the critical apparatus and writing itself  for the sake of  bringing 
forth an aesthetics of  “critical” engagement. 
 For this reason, the present chapter hopes to do more than deliver an intelligible 
reading of  Barthes’ work. Not “instead,” but in addition to such a reading, I invite the reader 
to relate to the impossible proposition that propositional content—claims, coherent ideas, 
explanations—are only part of  a grander interpretive event. Prior to or beyond the 
intelligible content of  a piece of  scholarly literature, I gesture toward a relationship 
experienced among author, content, and audience. Hence “interpretation” itself  is at stake. 
 The relations among writers, writings, and readers might be romantic, constricting, 
maddening, effacing, and so on—and in each of  these different senses profoundly and even 
violently affective. While perhaps commonplace, Barthes’ endurance through the 
implications of  such violences are expansive and help us write and teach writing in uniquely 
ethical and aesthetic ways. His attempt was to reimagine a relationship with language itself  as 
not merely conflictual or paradoxical—enabling while also disabling—but multiple in the 
sense of  possessing capacities in excess of  representation and delivery of  information. 
Barthes’ idea of  language does not displace so much as surpass its everyday function as a 
communicative vehicle or transmissive medium for an exchange of  ideas by means of  
symbolic representation. In addition to these sorts of  transactional dimensions that help 
language users meet and explore each other’s ideas, language and writing for Barthes are also 
radically subjective in a way that makes grammatical arbitration a sort of  violent imposition. 
But it is critical to note that his position runs much deeper than the clichés that individual 
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subjects interpret objects differently and that our supposedly reliable means for attaining 
intersubjectivity through cultural codes and grammars are ultimately experienced subjectively 
(although that is certainly part of  it). The gesture is instead related to a practically 
indefensible hunch that the insecure posture or attitude with which critics sometimes 
approach proposition, code, and grammar betrays the inadequacy of  these means to 
“capture” to breadth and scope of  interpretive events so much as release their potentiality.  3
 One thread running throughout his work was a reconceptualization of  the function 
of  writing by stretching the relation between object and interpreting subject. 
We often hear it said that it is the task of  art to express the inexpressible; it is the contrary which must be 
said (with no intention of  paradox): the whole task of  art is to unexpress the expressible, to kidnap from 
the world’s language, which is the poor and powerful language of  the passions, another speech, an 
exact speech.  4
This is one of  Barthes’ many dizzying conjectures that is confusing because (only) 
apparently ironic (unexpress for exactitude?). Importantly, this writing that operates within 
the apparatus of  alphabetic literacy but does not take referentiality as its primary goal is 
more than simply paradoxical. Although often remembered for his aesthetic jubilations of  
irrationality associated with “punctums” and “third meanings,”  another side of  Barthes 5
involves a veritable floundering within what he understood as the violence of  structural, 
codified, and disciplinary ways of  writing. He surmised the existence of  unaccountable, even 
 I am reminded of  Kenneth Burke’s contention that “the aesthetic is defensible because it could 3
never triumph” over what he called “the practical,” epitomized by industrialization and, in later writings, the 
development of  nuclear weapons he witnessed in the mid-twentieth century. Counter-Statement (Berkeley: 
University of  California Press, 1968), 113. This hunch as an “indefensible” underdog in my essay is so because 
it is inadmissible to logic, codification, and perhaps even recognition.
 Roland Barthes, Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), xvii-xviii.4
 In Barthes’ Camera Lucida, “punctum” is famously juxtaposed with “studium,” an application or 5
mere “consequence of  knowledge” and “training.” Trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 
25; 26. The comparatively strange experience of  a “punctum” involves not interpretive mastery but an 
encounter that “shoots out . . . like an arrow, and pierces” the beholder of  an image (ibid., 26). “The Third 
Meaning” is introduced in an essay of  the same name and distinguished from “informational” and “symbolic” 
levels of  literal and figural meanings. Barthes, “The Third Meaning,” in Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), 52-68. At issue here is “the signifier” itself, “not the signified”; the event of  
“reading[,] . . . not intellection” (ibid., 53).
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unintelligible experiences brought on by reading and writing, and a conflictual anxiety on this 
point is manifest in nearly all his books, lurking here and there in even his most unbridled 
texts. It is specifically this struggling with violence apparently inherent in critical discourse 
that is the issue on which we should focus if  we want to find a writing, a rhetoric, an 
aesthetics, an inquiry that would temper itself  against its own calcification of  the movement 
that is reading, writing, and learning. And, self  conscious though he is—stammering in “a 
discomfort [he] had always suffered from: the uneasiness of  being a subject torn between 
two languages, one expressive, the other critical.”  And Barthes does struggle, “none the 6
less.”  7
 At issue is a subtle inkling, a barely identifiable sense that something huge about the 
experience of  the text is lost precisely in the instance we think we’re getting close. “In this 
article” and beyond it, I tell a story about Barthes as consciously within and yet anxiously 
desirous of  being without structure, code, and system. He lived this struggle everywhere in his 
writing, institutional life, and in his own mind against what he names this “violence.” As we 
will see, his response neither resignation nor retaliation, but instead a strange love for an 
inexhaustible potentiality of  readings. The primary means by which he pursues this kind of  
dwelling within structure involves an emphasis of  sensibility in addition to intelligibility. 
 Barthes, Camera, 8.6
 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and 7
Wang, 1994), 88. The citation is brought in here, out of  its context, where Barthes closes perhaps his most 
difficult text by acknowledging “Revolution must of  necessity borrow from what it wants to destroy” (ibid., 
87). As Michael North observes, revolution as a figure of  the new comes with a host of  ironies and other 
problems. Novelty: A History of  The New (Chicago: The University of  Chicago Press, 2013), 41-47. Yet while 
Barthes is perfectly aware of  such difficulties, his struggle is nevertheless far from over. In any case, my 
purpose here is to establish a stubbornness—even willful naivety.
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Reading and Writing Barthes 
 The Pleasure of  the Text and Writing Degree Zero offer some of  Barthes’ most explicit 
articulations on the matter of  violence, which he felt was, in some ways, inextricable from 
the proposition itself. Pleasure of  the Text associates the experience of  its title with the 
structural satisfactions of  meaning making in the usual sense of  decoding symbolic 
information. Something else, however, lies beyond this everyday mode of  reading; he names 
it “jouissance,” an essentially untranslatable affective experience in for which “bliss” stands 
throughout the Miller translation. Miller’s important prefatory note to the text alerts us that 
this bliss in French is not a state but an “action” that is explicitly erotic and with which we 
should associate orgasm.  Barthes’ appropriation is only partly metaphorical, as we come to 8
learn that his desired jouissance is not only an emotional mood and hence explicitly associated 
with the body as opposed to a supposedly distinct mind, but also suggestive of  a transient 
singularity we might juxtapose with the finality of  the proposition, a basic unit of  scholarly 
discourse: “the Sentence is hierarchical: it implies subjections, subordinations, internal 
reactions.”  For Barthes, such a sentence necessitates a tear from the kaleidoscopic motion  9 10
of  mental activity: an operationalization, a seizure from an analog constant. Barthes 
continues: “practice, here, is very different from theory. Theory (Chomsky) says that the 
sentence is potentially infinite (infinitely catalyzable), but practice always obliges the sentence 
to end.”  We are now beyond the question of  whether writing is an inadequate means of  11
 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of  the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), v-viii.8
 Ibid., 50.9
 In a coy interview, Barthes remarks that were he to write a novel, the effort would be less like a 10
departure from criticism than the movement of  the singular and yet amorphous toy: “I prefer the play of  the 
kaleidoscope: you give it a tap, and little bits of  colored glass form a new pattern.” From “The Play of  the 
Kaleidoscope,” in The Grain of  the Voice: Interviews 1962-1980, trans. Linda Coverdale (Berkeley: The University 
of  California Press, 1991), 204.
 Barthes, Pleasure, 50 (Barthes’ parentheses).11
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representation; the issue is instead a grander aesthetic posturing, and a sort of  relationality 
among writers, writing, and content. 
 Now is a good time to recall that the status, nature, and goals of  Barthes’ work as 
scholarship have long been a subject of  critical controversy. As Steven Ungar remarks,  
[t]he obvious difficulty with writings since The Pleasure of  the Text lies in the impossibility of  
determining whether they are to be read as texts of  pleasure or bliss. To the extent that they 
succeed in transmitting a set of  messages to a public of  readers, they function within the 
mode of  articulate pleasure and rely on determinable norms such as those of  verbal 
meaning and implicit genre.  12
Tough to shake those! But as Ungar goes on to explain, the desired effect is not so much to 
complete departure from transmission so much as qualitative augmentation or enhancement 
of   transmission. Read literally, it is true that in some places Barthes sounds an either/or 
absolutist. Passages in Writing Degree Zero, for instance, seem wholly uninterested in 
communication itself  when he dreams of  a poetics that is “without foresight or stability of  
intention, and thereby so opposed to the social function of  language.”  But this apparently 13
noncommunicative writing is only so if  we approach it with a posture that expects clarity, the 
lucid disclosure of  content, and the alignment of  the reader’s intentions with those of  the 
writer. This is all good and well (we always remain within), however, Barthes asks us look not 
only at and through language, as Richard Lanham would have us do, but also beyond, to its 
horizon of  potentiality: “[e]ach poetic word is thus an unexpected object, a Pandora’s box 
from which fly out all the potentialities of  language; it is therefore produced and consumed 
 Stephen Ungar, “RB: The Third Degree,” review of  Roland Barthes, by Roland Barthes, Diacritics 7, 12
no. 1 (1977): 76.
 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 48.13
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with a peculiar curiosity, a kind of  sacred relish.”  Gravy poetics. If  asocial, this kind of  14
writing is so only under a particular rubric of  logic and representation that have historically 
arbitrated scholastic writing. But as Paul de Man points out in a posthumously released essay 
he originally drafted in 1972, Barthes work is to be “read and understood as an intellectual 
adventure rather than as a scientifically motivated development of  methodology.”  Texts 15
like Pleasure and Degree Zero offer neither transparent content nor method but a hybrid of  the 
two, each being stretched into the other. 
 Reading and writing in Barthes is associated less with calculated direction than 
impulse, contingency, and latencies. Best, he says, if  while reading one “need[s] to look up 
often, to listen to something else. I am not necessarily captivated by the text of  pleasure; it can 
be an act that is slight, complex, tenuous, almost scatterbrained: a sudden movement of  the 
head like a bird who understands nothing of  what we hear, who hears what we do not 
understand.”  Again we see Barthes stretching the relationship between reader and critical 16
text, though now in a different way. Here we have what feels like a hopeful glimpsing, if  you 
like, a curious register of  distant sounds in the woods at dark—the ripple of  some remote 
tremor quietly rippling over some faint ledge in the topography of  the cortex. It is a strange 
listening that seems to fuse active and passive states. An aestheticism for Jay Gatsby, maybe, 
who held “some heightened sensitivity to the promises of  life, as if  he were related to one 
of  those intricate machines that register earthquakes ten thousand miles away.”  An 17
aesthetic of  subtly and gradience as an alternative the force of  direct broadcast. 
 Ibid. Cf. Richard Lanham, The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (Chicago: The 14
University of  Chicago Press, 1993), 5-6; 80-82. Additionally, this is why Gregory L. Ulmer makes much of  
Barthes in “The Object of  Post-Criticism,” which posits a new kind of  academic writing inspired by and 
predicated on the associational linkages of  collage and montage. See the essay in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (New York: The New Press, 1983), 83-110. This essay was discussed at length 
in Chapter 3, “Drop,” above.
 Paul de Man, “Roland Barthes and Limits of  Structuralism,” Yale French Studies 77 (1900): 179.15
 Barthes, Pleasure, 24-25 (original emphasis).16
 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Scribner, 1995), 6.17
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 In his curious third-person autobiography Roland Barthes, he describes himself  thusly: 
“[l]iking to find, to write beginnings, he tends to multiply this pleasure: that is why he writes in 
fragments . . . (but he doesn’t like the ends: the risk of  the rhetorical clausule is too great).”  18
From Dutch, “clausule” refers to a governing stipulation or law, and is often associated with 
contracts. The autobiographer seems fear the proposition itself. One immediately notices the 
extensive use of  parentheses in his texts that serve as literal and figurative meanderings, 
driftings, cruisings away at the both the sentence and, effectively, the global levels of  his 
writings that would otherwise be a series of  “regular” propositions, all contributory to some 
great finality. Colons, often several in single “sentence,” also appear in Barthes and effect a 
series of  extensions—leaps without proper bridges—or perhaps a series of  anticipations 
strung one after another. What interests me here is not what Barthes is discussing, but how he 
is doing it—and yet, in such composition he complicates the distinction between those two 
levels of  analysis, implying that the activity is itself  the message. 
 It is a tricky tightrope walk, and neither difficulty nor irony is lost on Barthes. The 
point I want to stress is that he does not just exit out some magical trapdoor or aesthetic 
rabbit hole of  delights. Instead, he remains very much situated within while nevertheless 
desirous of  being without discipline, culture, and formality. I imagine Barthes as a yogi rather 
than sublimating into thin air.  After all, “how can a text,” he asks, “which consists of  19
language, be outside languages? . . . . How can the text ‘get itself  out’ out of  the war of  
fictions, of  sociolects?” Answer: “by a gradual labor of  extenuation,”  a peeling away at the 20
text to subject it to a liminal state in which its ontological status wavers. 
 RolandBarthes, Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 94 (original 18
emphasis).
 A colleague once remarked that because his ideas seem so fantastical as to bluff  transcendence 19
beyond the formative pressures of  his cultural and historical situation, reading Barthes was like having a gnome 
come out and “dance on the [seminar] table for awhile.”
 Barthes, Pleasure, 30.20
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 The issue is addressed somewhat differently in Writing Degree Zero, although there 
again we see Barthes in a conflicted, dynamic tension over criticism as an apparatus that 
comes with unacknowledged tolls. Yet this apparent inevitability is highlighted only in 
anticipation of  movement beyond it, toward a relatively flexible writing. In one of  the early 
Zero sections, for example, we get another set of  slippery claims on the differences between 
speech and writing: 
All modes of  writing have in common the fact of  being ‘closed’ and thus different from spoken 
language. Writing is in no way an instrument for communication, it is not an open route through 
which there passes only the intention to speak. A whole disorder flows through speech and gives it 
this self-devouring momentum which keeps it in a perpetually suspended state. Conversely, writing is a 
hardened language which is self-contained and is in no way meant to deliver to its own duration a 
mobile series of  approximations.  21
Alongside the passages cited earlier, pronouncements like this one reflect a career-long 
ambivalence in his responses to a plurality “writings” and “communications,” especially 
during his well known transformative period prompted by the limits of  structuralism.  22
Some varieties or perhaps variations on relationships with writing are dysfunctional and 
constricting, some disperse orgasmic delight, and still as yet unimagined others Barthes 
seems to await in hope. This last passage feels more like a lamentation than report, but the 
differences between the several writings and communications become indistinguishable 
when on the very next page he says that “writing, on the contrary [to speech], is always 
rooted in something beyond language, it develops like a seed, not like a line, it manifests an 
essence of  a secret, it is an anti-communication, it is intimidating.”  Although the itinerary 23
in Writing Degree Zero’s table of  contents is designed to respond to several kinds of  writing 
 Ibid., 19.21
 For an illuminating discussion of  this transformation, see Michael Halley, “Argo Sum,” Diacritics 12, 22
no. 4 (1982): 69-79. “What Barthes attends to is [the text’s] coming into meaning, the dynamics of  signification 
it effects as he reads it, and he is thus liberated from the domineering and didactic presence of  the classically 
conceived text too full with an already elaborated and rigidified meaning meant to be thoroughly understood as 
such.” Ibid., 74. Such accords with Barthes’ emphasis on the primacy of  the experience of  reading.
 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 20.23
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(“Political”; “Novel”; “Poetic”; “Revolutionary”; “Bourgeois,” and so on), the weavings and 
contradictions within even individual chapters coupled with what seem like rather sweeping 
claims testify to the fact writing is contradictory and more so multiple—within and without the 
grammar and stability ascribed to disciplinarily sanctioned texts.  24
 As critic, Barthes wants to recall an forgotten epistemological leap taken by writing 
when it operates in this “hardened” capacity.  He observes that “power, or the shadow cast 
by power, always ends in creating an axiological writing, in which the distance which usually 
separates fact from value disappears within the very space of  the word, which is given at 
once as description and as judgement.”  A eufunctional and formulaic writing’s rhetorical 25
inner workings that make possible the very constitution of  value are barely perceptible, 
unnecessary; simply execute the program. The cause and effect of  this cyclical and self-
reinforcing composition is, in a certain sense, a totalitarian discourse “in which definition . . . 
becomes the sole content of  all language, [and] there are no more words without values 
attached to them, so that finally the function of  writing is to cut out one stage of  a process: 
there is no more lapse of  time between naming and judging, and the closed character of  
language is perfected.”  We have come a long way from writing as an activity of  dispersion, 26
but as Barthes makes (un)clear, there are multiple degrees of  writing distinguished by the 
relative interpretive force they command and demand. 
 Back in Pleasure, Barthes writes that text of  bliss “imposes a state of  loss,” and 
“unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of  his 
tastes, values, memories, [and] brings to a crisis his relation with language.”  Here we have a 27
relatively open composition, yet one that can hardly be described as a cozy alternative to the 
 In her preface to the text, Susan Sontag notes Barthes’ ambivalence apropos of  such generic 24





rigid stoppage we saw in Writing Degree Zero. Here we come upon another violence, one for 
which Barthes becomes a glutton. This alternative violence is vulnerable—an engagement 
with a text that reaches out and touches the supposed subject in an uncanny fashion.  28
Interpretive machinery stalls and the pathos of  the textual encounter widens, not displacing 
so much as augmenting or exceeding its logos in such a way as to release a sequestered 
dynamism. 
 Before closing this section, I want to return to Writing Degree Zero and its essay “Is 
there any Poetic Writing?” to emphasize the meta/physical weight of  this second violence. 
Under the heavy handedness of  closure and the name, referents are supposed to be recalled 
and served up for the purposes discoursing. “For what does the rational economy of  
language mean,” asks Barthes, “if  not that Nature is a plenum, that it can be possessed, that 
it does not shy away or cover itself  in shadows, but is in its entirety subjected to the toils of  
language?”  Setting up a distinction between a linguistic “prose” and “poetry,” Barthes flips 29
the script with this second violence: “classical conceits involve relations, not words: they 
belong to an art of  expression, not of  invention. The words, here, do not, as they later do [in 
what Barthes calls a “modern,” preferable poetics], thanks to a kind of  violent and 
unexpected abruptness, reproduce the depth and singularity of  an individual experience.”  30
When poetics departs from the differential network of  language as a system of  differences, 
referentiality is necessarily decentered; in fact, “this implies a reversal in our knowledge of  
Nature” and our will to seize and represent it.  A tidal wave looms and crests: Barthes 31
describes “the bursting upon us of  the poetic word”—“words adorned with all the violence of  
their irruption”; “this erect discourse is full of  terror.”  Here we have a poetics wherein a 32
 Recall that punctum inflicts a “wound.” Barthes, Camera, 26.28
 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 49.29
 Ibid., 45.30
 Ibid., 49.31
 Ibid., 50 (emphasis added).32
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violence is done independent of  and perhaps unto the reading subject, which rephrases that 
second violence as a relatively affective enterprise. Displacing the ego that would systematize 
the text, this violence induces a state of  astonishment—a surprise: awe at the power of  
poetics to create a multilateral intimacy between world and reader. It is for such a relation in 
journals and classrooms that I advocate. 
 Importantly, the mood of  this encounter is liminal: the will of  the subject to locate 
and verify intelligibilities, and sense gives way to sensation. We have here an “erotics of  
reading,” perhaps, “a critical practice, a perspective, an attitude, not a critical methodology or 
technique.”  While the reader would be engaged, she would be so without paradigmatic 33
directive—not because transcendental, but because surprised at inadequacy of  familiar 
narratives and the necessity of  a constitutive improvisation to make the text new, different, 
singular. In the eponymous “autobiography,” Barthes associates an active erotization with a 
curious process of  making distinct from identification: 
It is not the erotic, but erotization that has a positive value. Erotization is a production of  the erotic: 
light, diffuse, mercurial; which circulates without coagulating, a multiple and mobile flirtation links the 
subject to what passes, pretends to cling, then lets go for something else (and then, sometimes, this 
variable landscape is severed, sliced through by a sudden immobility: love).  34
This sense of  astonishment as baffling “love” is especially interesting since it characterizes a 
desired attitude or posture to safeguard against the violence of  intelligibility so as to unleash 
that second violence lurking in the latent, productive capacities of  the subject. Similarly, 
Barthes concludes but more so rebegins his study of  images in Camera Lucida with a relatedly 
ironic embrace, sensing “a sort of  link (or knot) between Photography, madness, and 
something whose name I did not know. I began by calling it: the pangs of  love.”  Love, 35
 Brian Ott, “(Re)Locating Pleasure in Media Studies: Toward an Erotics of  Reading,” Communication 33
and Critical/Cultural Studies 1, no. 2 (2004): 202 (original emphasis).
 Barthes, Roland Barthes, 62 (original emphasis).34
 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 116.35
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perhaps, for that which is necessarily cut in the violence of  declaration: alternative, 
idiosyncrasy, supplement, enhancement, juxtaposition, surprise, and so on. Such a posture 
would embrace a sort of  interpretive vulnerability for the sake of  an epistemic ethics, given 
that “[o]bliging the loving and terrified consciousness” is prerequisite “to confront . . . the 
wakening of  intractable reality.”  Stated thusly, Barthes’ project fuses aesthetics, ethics, and 36
epistemology as he stretches one violence into another. He blurs not only the status of  texts, 
but also his own as critic. 
Impostors 
 A curious fragment in Pleasure of  the Text with the heading “Nihilism” explains that, 
for Barthes, such an orientation is not a passive or careless attitude, but rather a sort of  
active unraveling or exposure of  vulnerabilities during which “‘superior goals depreciate.’” 
Yet he distinguishes this processual nihilism from antagonism: “[h]ow [to] install the 
deficiency of  any superior value? Irony? It always proceeds from a sure site. Violence? 
Violence too is a superior value, and among the best coded.”  If  this nihilism peels away at 37
standardized knowings, doings, and makings, such an affront is not itself  violent, nor should 
it be construed as contrarian or even oppositional. Conflict cannot help, after all, since it 
only institutes a new paradigm, valuation, or code.  Barthes is not so much interested in a 38
refuting or replacing so much as spinning and stretching so as to reveal an original violence 
of  undecidability. For me, the most interesting thing about this fragment is where he goes 
next in search of  a tactical bliss: “the most consistent nihilism is perhaps masked: in some 
  Ibid., 119.36
 Barthes, Pleasure, 44 (original emphasis).37
 I am reminded here of  Barthes’ maxim, “[d]ifference is not conflict,” which poses a relative and/or 38
pluralist reading. “To the Seminar,” in The Rustle of  Language, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Want, 
1986), 334.
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way interior to institutions, to conformist discourse, to apparent finalities.”  Active “nihilism” 39
in hopes of  bliss here takes on the role of  smuggled contagion or a sneaky insider job. 
 With this in mind, I observe this sort of  limit-work from the inside-out underway in 
rhetoric, composition, and feminist studies in the innovative work of  Lynn Worsham, 
Cynthia Haynes, and Gayatri Spivak. I read each of  these thinkers as enabled but also 
disabled by their disciplinary apparatuses, and therefore consciously seeking a way to live 
within but to minimize epistemic violence. In short, impostors I admire. These three women 
practice an attitude or desire to augment prevailing methodological assumptions as a 
response to perceived violences in disciplinary procedures. Impostor posture. 
 Worsham addresses the phallogocentric quality of  hermeneutics itself  and the 
problems that situation creates for philosophers who would be feminists. Noticing that 
traditional philosophy pretends to be “the regulative discourse on discourse” and “launders 
the practices that wash the body in a sense of  its own positivity,”  Worsham asks how 40
women oppressed by a historically masculinist tradition can rely on its assumptions for 
feminist progress. Epistemologically, she doubts “the discourse of  hermeneutics and its 
promise to unlock the secrets of  the human spirit across temporal and cultural distance or to 
excavate a truth hidden deep within the individual” from an apparently transcendent 
position.  Insofar as hermeneutics create “understanding in terms of  the code of  41
domination and submission,”  the resultant knowledge is pornographic in the sense of  42
 Barthes, Pleasure 44 (original emphasis).39
 Ibid., 41.40
 Lynn Worsham, “Reading Wild, Seriously: Confessions of  an Epistemophiliac,” Rhetoric Society 41
Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1992): 45.
 Ibid., 55.42
116
emphasizing the “penetrability and accessibility” of  the truth.  In a naive extreme, 43
hermeneutics becomes a kind of  epistemological “rape.”  44
 Like Barthes, Worsham favors an eroticized reading that acknowledges the 
interpretive energy within the realm of  the subject instead of  an exterior hermeneutics that 
domineers its subject into doing its service. Here a crucial distinction is necessary between 
the erotic and the pornographic: “Simone de Beauvoir defines eroticism as ‘a movement 
toward the Other.’ The pornographic, which is often mistakenly defined as the erotic, 
actually aborts that movement and instead eroticizes a hierarchical relation of  dominance,” 
and usually the subjugation of  women . I recall here Barthes’ aversion to another sexualized 45
violence. His suggestion was that the ultimate pleasure is not in seizure but rather its 
possibility: “is not the most erotic portion of  the body where the garment gapes?”  His aesthetic 46
is one of  “intermittence,” “flashing,” and “appearance-as-disappearance” —erotization 47
precisely in not exposing, not penetrating; rather, a flirtation with virtuality. 
 Critically, Worsham knows her move in the very structure she “confesses” to 
professionally reside within cannot be a simple counterpoint against it.  She seeks, instead, a 48
confession from hermeneutics itself. In asking hermeneutics what its logical apparatus thinks 
about its own claim that the supposed space of  its epistemic activity occurs in-between subject 
and object and therefore exterior to each produces an interesting result: “though 
hermeneutics claims the in-between as its rightful place—mediating between subject the 
Self/Same and the Other, or more originally, between gods and mortals—the Self/Same is 




 Barthes, Pleasure, 8 (original emphasis).46
 Ibid., 10.47
 Worhsam, “Wild, Seriously,” 43.48
117
must pass through, and submit to, this discourse to achieve intelligibility.”  Worsham helps 49
us understand just how removed the epistemology of  hermeneutics is from something like 
Barthes’ “variable landscape” of  transient associations and what now seems like the flux of  
nature. Heavy handed violence can only produce understandings that flatter the ego, and 
Worsham therefore concludes brilliantly in a way that Barthes would have liked: “intimacy is 
not identity. One respects difference; the other annihilates it.”  50
 “Offshore,” Cynthia Haynes is struggling with the overvaluation of  our “exhaustive 
search for the explicable in the inexplicable—the why, the reason, the rationale” in 
composition pedagogies,  the bread and butter of  English departments widely understood 51
as the university’s means of  establishing argumentation skills featuring logical proofs and 
demonstrations. Writing in the Journal of  Advanced Composition, Haynes intends to “draw us 
away from the shoreline of  philosophical reason and its alluring beacon of  argumentation” 
and point our sterns toward “abstraction. In casting off  from ground metaphysics (a difficult 
and dissuasive move), we occupy a paradoxical position; we must stand with one foot on 
land and one foot on our vessel. The release—the letting go (gelassenheit)—shifts our stance 
in relation to footing in general.”  Haynes is within and without when pursuing the 52
Heideggarian suggestion that “philosophy, as a thing of  reason, is the result of  an oblivion 
of  the fact that things do not depend on human justification, that they emerge before us on 
their own.”  Her suggestion is that the result of  such ignorance and arrogance is writing 53
curriculums emphasizing logic—always already ideological—belie the capacity for thought.  54
 Ibid., 54.49
 Ibid., 60.50
 Cynthia Haynes, “Writing Offshore: The Disappearing Coastline of  Composition Theory,” Journal 51





Such a structure, of  course, requires a structurality or scaffolding with which reason can 
simultaneously support and reaffirm itself  as a governing epistemological principle. Inspired 
by the conceptual work of  architect Lebbeus Woods—much of  it never actually constructed
—however, Haynes would have us “step back and view the unground (der Abgrund—abyss) 
beneath the structures, and to sketch a rhetoric of  the unbuilt,”  or as yet unimagined 55
structuralities. 
 The strength of  this approach is that it gives instructors and their students a post-
philosophical license to experiment with alternative modalities of  thinking that are not 
beholden to rubrics of  reason or logical proof  and act instead on the basis of  sensation. A 
rhetoric of  the unbuilt therefore “suggests a mode of  transgressing threshold that is between 
inside and outside” —which I take to emblematic of  the way in which Haynes herself  is 56
stretching what composition is or could be. Her essay as an impostor text might callback 
Barthes’ involuntary “amassing of  minor voices coming to me from the outside: I myself  
was a public square, a sook; through me passed words, tiny syntagms, bits of  formulae, and no 
sentence formed, as though that were the law of  such a language.”  In this strange metaphor 57
Barthes becomes a hypothetical blueprint for an unbuilt bricolage structure, or perhaps more 
precisely a structure that promotes the authoring of  unbuilt bricolage assemblages. The 
experience (encounter?) is less a writing in the traditional authorial sense than a channeling, 
less dictation than cataclysm. It would be a radical receptivity—an open door policy for 
thinking or, better, ways of  thinking. 
 Ibid., 667-668 (original emphasis).55
 Ibid., 688. Haynes continues: “Let me wear the moniker of  irresponsibility if  it means divesting 56
oneself  of  responsibility in order to probe the depths of  a more responsive relation to students, to each other, 
and to each Other. It is time to put off  the mantle of  autochthonous authority, to disavow our discourse of  desired 
roots from which we erroneously believe we are giving our students the gift of  ground” (ibid., 674).
 Barthes, Pleasure, 49.57
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 Like Barthes and Worsham, Haynes is quick to point out that this movement “is not 
as simple as countering the ground with air or water,”  but instead involves working within while 58
pushing, stretching, striving to be without. She therefore proposes “(t)reason,” an 
compositional exercise that involves “putting legitimacy under quarantine (as we saw in 
Heidegger) in order to pressurize the realm of  decidability so cleanly ruled by the lockstep 
‘jackboots’ of  reason.”  Under such a heading, the emphasis on reason and proof  in 59
mainstream composition pedagogies and curriculums is not negatively deconstructed, but 
perpetually troped: “displacing argument is rhetoric’s supreme task; disinventing logos is 
rhetoric’s sacred duty.”  60
 Gayatri Spivak in her work on feminism and deconstruction, more than any other 
writer, has helped me understand how the movement of  poststructuralism can be understood 
as a useful tactic for those like Barthes. She offers a hugely important corrective or 
refocusing on that which is accomplished by the processual unfolding of  deconstructive 
reading in pointing out that “when it is understood only as a narrative, deconstruction is only 
the picture of  an impossibility” and not the activity which brings it about.  I associate this 61
activity—which is the opposite of  destructive—with the emphasis on the kinds of  
productive reading practices and postures Barthes advocated. As Spivak makes clear, it is not 
a question of  simply declaring oneself  free from strictures or structures, but a labor struggle 
with the regime of  intelligibility: “if  one looks at the deconstructive morphology (rather than 
simply reading it as the narrative of  the decentered subject), then one is obliged to notice 
that deconstruction has always been about the limits of  epistemology”  as opposed to 62
 Haynes, “Offshore,” 694 (original emphasis).58
 Ibid., 704 (original emphasis).59
 Ibid., 707 (original emphasis).60
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Feminism and Deconstruction, Again: Negotiating with 61
Unacknowledged Masculinism,” in Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis, ed. Teresa Brennan (London: Routledge, 
1989), 208.
 Ibid., 209 (original emphasis).62
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simply jumping over the fence. Again: “it is not a matter of  going to the outside, but being 
an outsider while inside.”  63
 This association of  deconstruction with epistemic thresholds calls to mind Barthes’ 
movement in his essay “From Work to Text.” In it, he describes a reading  wherein, first of  
all, “the Text is not to be thought of  as an object that can be computed,” but instead an 
object with which to commence relation: “the Text is experienced only in an activity of  
production.”  Compositions that deliberately set out to provoke these kinds of  experiences 64
might be a sort of  “limit-work,” which for Barthes involves an irrational and strange 
aesthetic that “goes to the limit of  the rules of  enunciation (rationality, readability, etc.)”  to 65
produce not gobbledegook for its own sake, but a kind of  un/intelligible stretching of  effect 
and affect. Hence, such an activity might, as Spivak phrases it, “open up a text towards an as 
yet unknown horizon so that it can be of  use without excuse. Let us now call this: 
negotiating with structures of  violence” —rather than simply opting out in fantasy or 66
mirroring the terror of  the structure in a contrarian assault. Not despite but precisely 
because of  the political significance, Spivak’s posture takes on an empathetic tone in this 
“giving of  assent without excuse, so much that one inhabits its [hegemonic] discourse—a 
short word for this might be ‘love.’”  67
 Victor J. Vitanza, Negation, Subjectivity, and The History of  Rhetoric (Albany: The State University of  63
New York Press, 1997), 19.
 Barthes, “From Work to Text,” in Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 64
1997), 156; 157 (original emphasis).
 Ibid., 157.65




 Is the present text complicit in the exact violence it hopes to exceed? Of  course, but 
“is that all?”  As Barthes would, I hope to have attested to the desirability and necessity 68
stretching the manuscript so as to register on both intelligible but also sensible—or, better, 
oscillation between these two poles, each false and naive as absolutes. What opening Barthes 
accomplishes for the aesthetics of  reading and writing, I, along with Worsham, Haynes, 
Spivak would hope for rhetoric and composition. In “closing,” then, I offer the following 
reopening: in response to violence—aesthetic, epistemic, pedagogical, gendered, or 
otherwise—more than reactionary critique and more than paradoxical acknowledgements of  
complicity are required. Instead, we ought to take up an alternative relation to intelligibility 
itself  by ceding and unleashing its aesthetic affordances beyond form, including 
conceptuality and proposition itself. Instead: implosion.
 Barthes, “Third,” 53.68
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BRIDGE TO PEDGAOGY 
[Interviewer:] What is the relationship between culture 
and art? 
[Jean Dubuffet:] I think art is creation . . . . and culture 
is creation done, already done—creation of the past. 
And I’m sure that studying the things already done is a 
danger for artists, because what is wanted from an artist 
is [that] he [sic] invent new things, not to confirm what 
has already been done by others in the past. He has la 
contrevie, he must do something new.  1
  
For me, it is rhetoric’s attention to invention that 
differentiates it from all other practices and fields of 
[English] study. —Sharon Crowley  2
A piece titled “Learning to See Data” in the New York Times from last year describes 
collaboration at Albert Einstein College of Medicine among geneticists and artist Daniel 
Kohn, whose painting and installations explore themes of science and information. For about 
250 words, it sounds like popular media is going to hear what the arts have to say about the 
project of human knowledge in a way that surpasses the superficial, sentimental, and 
ornamental lip services often paid to arts and humanities by even their own universities. Too 
soon, however, readers learn the piece is a missed opportunity of an article, replete with an 
embarrassingly facile replay of warm and fuzzy clichés that ultimately do more harm than 
good for the humanities so often framed as needing defense and justification. 
 The gist of the report is that scientists are drowning in their own massive data sets, 
and Kohn’s role is to propose alternative ways of approaching and visualizing the 
 The Artist’s Studio: Jean Dubuffet, directed by Michael Blackwood (New York: Michael Blackwood 1
Productions, 1973), online video trailer, https://youtu.be/v0HvEJnyRJo.
 Sharon Crowley, “Composition Is Not Rhetoric,” Enculturation 5, no. 1 (Fall 2003), http://2
enculturation.gmu.edu/5_1/crowley.html. The context of  the quotation concerns various emphases of  
instruction in Departments of  English.
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information. The artist as token is brought in for “expert” analysis, watered down and 
dreadfully misrepresentative though it seems—“What if the data were turned sideways? Or 
upside down?” —but only before the heavy lifting. When a visualization strategy seems to 3
make data comprehensible, sensory-perceptual triggers and cues observed during successful 
absorption can be identified and operationalized for instructional purposes, the ultimate goal 
being to “fast-forward a person’s gut instincts both in physical fields, like flying an airplane, 
and more academic ones, like deciphering advanced chemical notation.”  By noticing trends 4
in “gut reactions”  to everything from the instrumental cluster of the cockpit to 5
“aestheticized” visualizations of genetic code, the team is able to adjust the presentation and 
streamline apprehension and accessibility. It is a basically Aristotelian process of accounting 
for means of persuasion.  
 Although researchers hope to stockpile visualization-to-body-to-information transfer 
strategies, “for now it’s a lot easier to invite a visually creative expert over to the lab to see 
what he or she can add.”  But worry not. We won’t have to rely on thinking forever. The 6
popularized version of scientific disclosure will come up with a fix for that too: 
The most important question when dealing with reams of digital data is not whether perceptual skills 
will be centrally important. The question is when, and in what domain, analysts will be able to build a 
reliable catalog of digital patterns that provide meaningful “clues” to the underlying reality, whether it’s 
the effect of a genetic glitch, a low-pressure zone or a drop in the yen.  7
Un/Fortunately, this is not about some sentimental appeal to “the gut” we only need “for 
now.” This is about being existentially involved with the invention and ongoing maintenance 
of information and knowledge itself—nothing less is at stake. The use of the phrase 
 Benedict Carey, “Learning to See Data,” New York Times, March 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/3
2015/03/29/sunday-review/learning-to-see-data.html. What appears here is not a quotation from the artist but 
a hypothetical attribution to the artist by the writer. I encourage the reader to view Kohn’s work at http://
kohnworkshop.com, where anyone can see the relationships with information in, for starters, the metaphors 
and color of  his work are a far cry from simple rotation.
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“underlying reality” reveals ignorance of what Kohn, the arts, and humanities in general offer 
in the writer’s own concluding paragraph, where the artist explicitly states the matter is one 
of “‘frameworks of recognition; how you choose to look, rather than what you’re trying to 
see.’”  Instead, the quotation serves only as a misconstrued soundbyte, a temporary bow on 8
this neat and tidy chapter in a naive chronicle of human progression toward omniscience and 
the elimination of surprise. It is a dangerous simplification of both the arts and the sciences. 
 Ideas and arguments about the function of the humanities, how they constitute or 
enhance education, and their “worth”—economic and otherwise—are typically fraught with 
overaggressions, silent treatments, and/or defensive tonalities that make substantive dialog 
unnecessarily difficult, nostalgic, and, at least to some outsiders, quaint. Reliance on such 
strategies diminishes the rhetorical effectiveness of associated arguments, and besides, 
misrepresent the point: the relationship between the aesthetic and the generalized progression 
of human cultures—both its successes and failures—is perfectly serious business. The view 
that arts and humanities are “creative” while disciplines like engineering and sciences are not 
is, to put it gently, uninformed.  Each has so much to learn from the other(ed) that the 9
factionalization is disgraceful. Tightening economic conditions beget institutional 
compromises, politicizations, and ideological scapegoatingsm, but let us not forget: lines 
drawn between narrative and demonstration (aesthetic/epistemic, feeling/thinking, 
experiencing/knowing, whatever you like) are themselves narratives, and it’s not just a 
theoretical point. False dichotomies such as these make shrinking the arts and humanities 
4-8 Ibid. 
 Students in my courses report and appeal to this distinction-identification semester after semester. 9
What creativity “is” is, of  course, a notoriously difficult question presenting the same difficulties we saw above 
with surprise and the new as referents. But I might posit that one relevant skill or attribute is the ability to relate 
to information in alternative ways, and to generate or invent new relations altogether.
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seem not only expedient, but necessary for social progress. However, such cuts may come at 
the cost of intellectual stagnation, a possibility I explore and attempt to counter throughout 
this final chapter on the teaching of writing. 
 Here, I take composition as a locus and event during which students might not only 
compile and manipulate information, but also begin to investigate their “relationship” with 
paper topics, inquiry in general, discourses, informations, and writing itself—that is, how the 
performance that is the engagement of information reveals, affects, and participates in the 
composition of an otherwise disorderly world, profession, or life. Related emphases are 
sometimes seen in “social-epistemic”  pedagogies and those with civic angles. My attention 10
here is on something even more fundamental and yet relatively broad, prior and/or anterior 
to operations within a given social configuration and its prevailing notions knowledge and 
reality. More simply, I have tried to show that engaging information—phenomenal or 
reflective—from texture to terabyte, is a mutually affecting activity whose constituents do not 
wield essential control or the capacity to determine whether any course is the best way to 
go.  Marvels like antibiotics and the combustion engine give us immunological defense 11
mechanisms and high speed transportation, but they also yield superbugs and oil 
dependencies (to say nothing of geopolitical turmoil). Information may empower only in a 
limited and provisional sense; it can also surprise and instigate anxiety—and we should let it. 
To say as much is not to advocate for a nihilistic spiral of meaninglessness and relativity seen 
 “For social-epistemic rhetoric, the real is located in a relationship that involves the dialectical 10
interaction of  the observer, the discourse community (social group) in which the observer is functioning, and 
the material conditions of  existence. Knowledge is never found in any one of  these but can only be posited as 
a product of  the dialectic in which all three come together.” James Berlin, “Rhetoric and Ideology in the 
Writing Class,” College English 50, no. 5 (1988): 488 (emphasis added). Berlin contrasts social-epistemic rhetoric 
with “cognitive” and “expressionistic” rhetorics, which view the real as situated in material conditions external 
to the subject or within the subjectivity of  the self, respectively. Ibid., 474-494.
 Victor J. Vitanza, “Three Counter-Theses: Or, A Critical Inter(ven)tion into Composition Theories 11
and Pedagogies,” in Contending with Words, eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb (New York: Modern Language 
Association, 1991), 142.
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in caricatured postmodernism. The point is simply that when and where pressing decisions 
on the most troubling problems we face are required, we need better relationships with 
information characterized neither by relativistic paralysis nor naive faith in the ultimate 
power of reason. Greater epistemological nuance is necessary—yes, at the undergraduate 
level.  Such issues seem well suited to rhetoric and writing instruction, where engagement, 12
invention, and relation with information is the featured “content.” 
 The argument here does not define (i.e., limit) the value of arts or humanities as 
being equal to x, y, or z, but it does suggest that an invaluable relational quality is perceptible 
in research from biochemistry to civil engineering—all of which, not incidentally, must 
exceed protocol when presented with novel circumstances or pressures. Craft, improvisation, 
and contingency are necessary when experts in these fields approach, engage, and relate to 
their professional worlds—on both good and bad days—eureka moments and meltdowns 
included. Given their magnificent flexibility and frequent status as general education 
requirements, rhetorics and writing instruction do seem uniquely positioned to help students 
see and feel this point as well as possible ways of meaningfully integrating such relationality 
into their studies, professions, and lives beyond the writing classroom. In particular, then, I 
am after a pedagogy capable of instigating and engaging surprises by means of aesthetic or 
relational treatments of so called “objects” in critical research papers that are the cornerstone 
of most composition textbooks—and for good reason. Again, even the critical manuscript is 
itself an aestheticized relation with its supposed “content,” formal and formatted appearance 
notwithstanding. Teachers, students, and professionals alike need viable ways of bringing 
forth phenomena into the domain of legibility in such a way that preserves meaningful 
 I find the watering down of  instruction, particularly at the freshmen level, abhorrent and 12
irresponsible. There may well be a line of  diminishing returns, but the assumption undergraduates will not 
understand challenging ideas is a shameful bet against one’s own students.
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intellectual growth. Based on the foregoing chapters, I submit aesthetics of information itself 
is one possible avenue for developing awareness of the sensibility of intelligibility. Again, 
what is meant here is not beauty or taste per se, but rather the conceptual blur between the 
phenomenal experiences of reading or writing and reflective knowledge making. Toward 
pursuit of meaningful acknowledgement and performance of such conditions during writing 
instruction, the discussion offered below attempts to formulate and design a pedagogy 
promoting healthy, flexible, and resilient relationships with information. 
How do you do? 
 This chapter is written in response to disaffected relations among students, their 
writing, teachers, textbooks, and institutions. I perceive a tendency—on the part of both 
students and instructors—to relate with “the material” or subject as mere data to be 
manipulated, mere content to be arranged advantageously for the sake of winning arguments. 
University becomes a content delivery mechanism, content becomes trivia, and written work 
includes identifications without relation; A+ student as Watson, the Jeopardy! supercomputer. 
Indeed, machines help use with storage, counting, and other repeatable tasks (why would we 
bother with these in the classroom?), yet students reaffirm such preconceptions when they 
arrive to class expecting to learn “how to write” in a single semester. But higher education 
ought to—and does—exceed content delivery. It’s worth noting some of the most prestigious 
and richest institutions in the country including MIT, Yale, Harvard, and The University of 
Texas system, and more have simply made available introductory content online for free, 
and, increasingly, low cost certification options as well.  The in-residence university degree 13
 See, for example, content from several institutions at edX (https://www.edx.org), Open Yale 13
Courses (http://oyc.yale.edu), or Harvard’s Online Learning Initiative (http://online-learning.harvard.edu).
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as proof of lecture attendance and download access to notes will not and cannot endure. 
Relatedly, metrics and “measurable” assessments including “student learning outcomes” are 
generally, though not necessarily, content-oriented and, I would therefore argue, are poor 
longterm strategies. I am in agreement with Gregory L. Ulmer when he says “learning is 
much closer to invention than to verification,” although a survey of prevailing instructional 
methods hardly reflects it: “the modes of academic writing now taught in school tend to be 
positioned on the side of the already known rather than on the side of wanting to find out 
(of theoretical curiosity) and hence discourage learning how to learn.”  This twenty year old 14
statement is still too true. As more content goes online and the rise of tuition skyrockets, I 
suspect the university will need to adopt relatively inventional, generative, and yes, 
experimental pedagogies and learning experiences for students.  15
 In terms of interacting with research, arguments, and writing situation are sometimes 
framed as a double-bind. The conflicting impulses involve, on one hand, the necessary task of 
outfitting students with skills, habits, and practices for engaging information an composing 
arguments for contexts beyond any given writing course. On the other hand, the aesthetic 
and affective dimensions of reading and writing that reveal even the most bland and prosaic 
 Gregory L. Ulmer, Heuretics: The Logic of  Invention (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 14
1994), xii.
 Needless to say, free content or non-degree earning certifications are no substitutes for the 15
immersive enculturation of  attending college (at least not yet). While apocalyptic and utopian forecasts for 
higher education abound, it’s simply too soon to know the full scope and consequence of  free content 
composed specifically for instructional purposes. Democratic implications notwithstanding, drawbacks that 
come to mind include reliance on self-direction, universal design and accessibility issues, impersonality, and 
assessment at scale, to name a few. Of  course, a range of  voices on all sides of  the conversation would swoop 
in here to console and corroborate this cursory list of  concerns. Moreover, just what exactly a Massively Open 
Online Course (MOOC) is, could, or should be for composition remains a question even those in the field are 
still working out. See James E. Porter, “Framing Questions about MOOCs and Writing Courses,” in Invasion of  
the MOOCs: The Promises and Perils of  Massive Open Online Courses, eds. Steven D. Krause and Charles Lowe 
(Anderson: Parlor Press, 2014), 14-28. “[W]e have to identify and challenge a number of  related some-for-all 
substitutions that synecdochically threaten to diminish what a university education is supposed to mean: Course 
= course materials. Course = lectures. Course = content. A university education = a collection of  courses.” 
Ibid., 19.
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information as something with which student writers can have a relationship characterized by 
something grander than disaffected, managerial tasks of processing, compilation, and 
synthesis. This chapter does not propose to resolve the double-bind, but it does suggest that 
these tensions are not always mutually exclusive. Much has to do with the relational frame 
with which these necessary research tasks are presented to students.  The problem is not 
procedure and program as such, but that these vocationalist orientation tend—not always, 
and certainly not necessarily, but tend—to promote and reward careers, lifestyles, thinking, 
and relationships within already existing structures of composing and interacting with 
information. No surprises. A concomitant approach to teaching writing is perhaps too bound 
up in efficiency, expectations of presumed audiences, and prevailing parameters of valuation 
and assessment. I agree with Steven B. Katz that related instructional emphases, in overdoses, 
make for a pedagogy prey to a potentially disastrous “ethic of expediency” that too easily 
infects deliberative rhetorics such as the argumentative manuscript. He argues that which is 
expedient, cost-effective, and (too) narrowly focused on a decontextualized set of particulars 
“gives impulse” or directs nearly automatic relations with information as they appear in 
workplace communications like technical writing, which of course reflects broader, cultural 
sensibilities and intelligibilities.  Ironically, the emphasis on information command and 16
rhetorical opportunism disempowers students because it promotes the notion of humans as 
rational, autonomous agents while at the same time remaining conformist in the patterns of 
its thought all along.   I think of Antonio Gramsci’s hierarchy of intellectuals: “at the highest 17
level would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., [and] at the lowest 
the most humble ‘administrators’ and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated 
 Steven B. Katz, “The Ethic of  Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the Holocaust,” 16
College English 54, no. 3 (1992): 257.
 Victor J. Vitanza, “Three Counter-Theses,” 156-157.17
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intellectual wealth.”  As I have tried to demonstrate in the previous chapters, such a relation 18
with information, i.e., deaestheticization, is untenable even as widespread belief in this myth 
corrodes knowledge making practices (ironically, this is nowhere more evident than the 
humanities). Regulation and arrangement of information and research in strategic 
configurations presumes, even in novel syntheses, that what is available to be known is 
already done, over, open to revision by means of deconstructive latency, but de facto the 
given. However, as Thomas Rickert says of rhetorical studies in general, “there is too much 
emphasis on a rhetor’s powers for leveraging kairos and not enough sensitivity to what the 
situation itself affords” in its “ambient” dimensions.  That salience can operate as a blind 19
spot is crucial because it creates the possibility of surprise, not knowing, and knowing that 
we don’t know—at least not by means of heavy handed coercion of content represented by 
the critical manuscript. Another relationship with information is prerequisite. 
Engagements  
 Several composition scholars have addressed the merits of affective, emotional, or 
otherwise engaging pedagogies to cultivate meaningful and enlivening student relationships 
with writing. Several articles from Journal of Advanced Composition in particular have already 
taken up these questions about affective pedagogies in ways that are resonate with my 
figuration of “aesthetic” as a relational and mutually affecting engagement with text, object, 
or idea. Christa Albrecht-Crane, for example, seeks a pedagogy of desire in the Deleuzian-
 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of  Antonio Gramsci, trans. and eds. Quintin Hoare 18
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 13.
 Thomas Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of  Rhetorical Being (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 19
University Press, 2013), 76.
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Guattarian and Lyotardian senses, in which desire is figured as production rather than lack. 
The position is one that runs counter to the necessarily regulatory nature of higher education. 
We know that, as a disciplinary mechanism, school enacts and maintains systematic repression and 
domination . . . . However, this normed and norming system is never leak-proof, sealed. It is porous. 
What escapes, then, is desire that manifests itself, for instance, in . . . intensive/affective moments of 
writing . . . . This sort of desire comes from within the system, within the school, is immanent to it.  20
The image here suggests the authentic as embedded within the inauthentic, the institutional, 
and the procedural; the direction is from inside to outside—emissions and catharses. 
Surprises in this pop-up figuration, here and there as infrequent but inevitable occurrences, 
might seem to jive with the discussion of “impostors” in the previous chapter. However, I am 
inclined to agree with Thomas Rickert when he freely admits “teaching writing is fully 
complicitous with dominant social practices,” and hence the idea of teaching anomaly is not 
only ironic, but harmful.  Albrecht-Crane and Rickert are not exactly at odds, then, though 21
their relationships with the challenge of engaging students are quite different. Both, however, 
unambiguously associate schools as sites of conflict capable of producing, on the one hand, 
students “prone to disaffected attitudes and behavior, including cynicism, apathy, disregard, 
and violence,”  and, the other hand, a naive and ultimately circular attempt to create 22
“empowered and liberated students and teachers”  through pedagogies of resistance. 23
 Another prominent voice in composition on affect and engagement is none other 
than Geoffrey Sirc. His arguments on behalf of experimental compositions inspired by 
 Christa Albrecht-Crane, “An Affirmative Theory of  Desire,” Journal of  Advanced Composition 23, no. 3 20
(2003): 581-582 (original italics; emboldening added).
  Thomas Rickert, “‘Hands Up, You’re Free’: Composition in a Post-Oedipal World,” Journal of  21
Advanced Composition 21, no. 2 (2001): 290; 314. Cf. Albrecht-Crane’s article, which “argues that affect, and what 
makes affect possible—namely desire—form the conceptual turning points through which individuals 
experience and in fact struggle with and against places of  learning.” Albrecht-Crane, “An Affirmative Theory 
of  Desire,” 564.
 Rickert, “‘Hands Up, You’re Free,’” 291.22
 Albrecht-Crane, “An Affirmative Theory of  Desire,” 587.23
132
Situationist and Happenings arts movements as inspiration for writing curriculums 
necessitates a new understanding of the notion of curriculum (more on these as they appear 
in Sirc below). In his article “Godless Composition, Tormented Writing,” Sirc indicts the 
entire field: “composition, as I read it, is ascetic” to an extent that students are done a 
disservice and cannot relate to their own work.  Specifically, Sirc identifies the formal 24
rigidity as the problem in writing instruction, whose “measured style is debased, slavish; to 
give students a space to develop as sensitive people, able to communicate, we need more.”  25
For Sirc, “more” is that which experiments stylistically or gives students license to partake in 
their alternative forms for credit. As we will see below, such impulse is driven at least in this 
case by a nostalgic quest for the genuine, the sublime, and an emancipated subject. Though 
he rightly rails against the empowerment narratives of all too narrowly defined writing 
instruction, he too posits another empowerment  predicated on mystique of the arts 26
practices and revolutionary pathos. 
 Affective classrooms, however, may need massage and repair. Lynn Worsham 
approaches the engagement question at the level of paideia, by which she means today’s 
generalized cultural sensibility that constitutes an “affective relation to the world” whose 
trained incapacities are the erasure or marginalization of emotion.  Her insightful article on 27
“Pedagogic Violence” observes that schools have historically set up false and 
 Geoffrey Sirc, “Godless Composition, Tormented Writing,” Journal of  Advanced Composition 15, no. 3 24
(1995): 556.
 Ibid., 553.25
 “What would empower students more—teaching them how to accommodate to the rules of  26
academic discourse; or teaching them that if  they organized they could demand that they be allowed to write 
any way they wanted, that they would not have to waste so much time learning to speak like us (their own 
language being almost all right)?” Geoffrey Sirc, English Composition as a Happening (Logan, UT: Utah State 
University Press, 2002), 222. Analysis of  key essays in this book is developed below.
 Lynn Worsham, “Going Postal: Pedagogic Violence and the Schooling of  Emotion,” Journal of  27
Advanced Composition 18, no. 2 (1998): 216; 221. 
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counterproductive relegations of emotion to the feminine, the irrational, or the personal and 
hence illegitimate—a violence she argues may backfire, erupting in the form of workplace 
violence, school shootings, sexual violence, and misplaced hate crimes.  Though these 28
incidents are often framed by news media as isolated and anomalous, the frequency of such 
terror  complicates the narrative of the troubled individual, divorced and detached from 29
some pleasant normal and everyday. For Worsham, such tragedies are devastating and 
unbearable, but they are not surprising; in a specific sense, they are predictable—read: 
neither individually foreseeable nor immediately causal, but ambient consequents of a social 
order embodied by school and which denies students their own emotions and subjectivities 
through inscription of social positions and prescribed “patterns of feeling” deemed 
appropriate for race, class, and gender roles.  Her work shows how the ideology of 30
intelligibility and concomitant interrelations among knowledge, culture, writing, school, and 
self might afford useful insight into otherwise paralyzing social conditions.  
 Most of the work cited here is fifteen or more years old. I revisit the conversation to 
ground my own thought in work on relationships with information and writing, but also to 
 Ibid., 223.28
 When mass shootings are defined as incidents during which four or more victims “generally . . . 29
unrelated and unknown” to the murderer(s) perish, the average number of  days between such shootings from 
late 2011 to late 2014 had dropped to 64; from 1982 to 2011, the average hovered consistently around 200. 
Amy P. Cohen, Deborah Azrael, and Matthew Miller, “Rate of  Mass Shootings Has Tripled Since 2011, 
Harvard Research Shows,” Mother Jones, October 15, 2014, http://motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/mass-
shootings-increasing-harvard-research. Violence wounding victims or ending the lives of  any four or more 
people, regardless of  their relationship with the murderer(s), of  course, is even more frequent; see the rationale 
for the methodology of  the analysis cited here. The authors are academics at Harvard and Northeastern. No 
peer-reviewed publication from these authors with a primary focus on this data is available at the time of  this 
writing. All this does not even begin to address the separate and yet related atrocity of  rape, which is also taken 
up in Worsham’s article.
 Worsham, “Going Postal,” 223. The article offers more nuance and greater explication of  complex 30
linkages than I present here. Crucially, Worhsam warns that typically adversarial, so called “critical pedagogies” 
often carry precisely the  same authoritarian pitfalls as the “traditional” teaching they purport to undo; 
“postmodern” pedagogy demonstrating the arbitrariness of  everything cultural also fails students in its reliance 
on primarily “intellectual” process of  “demystification” where affect is absent. Worsham, “Going Postal,” 
235-236.
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extend the conversation with aesthetic emphases that have been the focus of this dissertation. 
As the review shows, the conversation has primarily focused on the politics of affect and 
aesthetics in classroom. When I suggest supplanting this discourse with an aesthetic or 
relational tonality, I hardly intend to suggest aesthetics are somehow disassociable with 
politics or vice versa. In fact, the manner in which these simultaneities characterize and 
contribute to the building and maintenance of intelligibility is precisely the point. My feeling 
is that the aesthetic dimension, defined here in the Nietzschean, relational sense, was and is 
like the political always present in composition, but that it was perhaps obscured in 
conversations wherein the focus was on alienation, subjectivity, and reform. However, 
aesthetics is not presented here as a hero that can exhaustively dash the whole range of 
epistemic and political problems reviewed above in every situation. But aesthetics are 
advanced as a crucial inroad to developing a healthy relationship with information generated 
and “consumed,” if you like, in academic contexts like the writing classroom. 
This, That. 
 In order to propose such a composition, I bring to bear key inspirations I will refer to 
as “aesthetic” and “electrate” pedagogies, which I figure below primarily under the guidance 
of work by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Gregory L. Ulmer, respectively. The primary 
advantages of such pedagogies are their abilities to withstand in meaningful ways “new” 
phenomena, even in traditional forms, while retaining affective and epiphanic engagements 
with information in student learning. “New” here includes the familiar seen and felt anew 
upon revisitation, as well as the capacity of information to reveal itself as an artistic invention 
in the sense of reserving the capacity to affect even the enlightened subject. 
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Aesthetic? 
 As we saw above, Friedrich Schiller asserts that the very awareness of an ambiguous 
“middle disposition” between physical sensation and rational thought creates the possibility 
for “the aesthetic” in the first place. Not despite but because of this epistemic slippage, he 
designates for the aesthetic a political or civic function wherein this “middle” is utilized so 
that art and letters function as a discursive tools. This arrangement may very well describe the 
reality of textual and aesthetic engagement, though in the practice of budget allocation and 
(core) curriculum designs, it is a foolish bet, a blank and rubber check for the beautiful. In 
her book An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization, Spivak takes issue with this hope, 
“productively undoing” Schiller as the patron saint of the politicized aesthetic. The aesthete 
fueled by grant money and the “gracious permission” of a Prince,  according to Spivak, 31
shows too great of faith and not enough commitment to the challenging work of navigating 
between the aesthetic and practical.  Spivak’s attempt is rather to “double bind” herself into 32
the challenge of meaningfully implementing Schiller’s gulf into today’s increasingly careerist 
and econometricized university—to live rather than wiggle out and “resolve” this double 
bind in an age of information command and the regime of the intelligible. Hence it is a 
pedagogy that acknowledges its situation within the prevailing assumption that sensibility 
and intelligibility can be disentangled, managed, or perhaps just ignored—that is to say, 
Spivak acknowledges this pervasive orientation without succumbing to it. Her aesthetic 
education is “training the imagination for epistemological performance,” a vaguely defined 
notion in her text, but perhaps performance maintains humility and tolerance during the 
 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of  Man: In a Series of  Letters, trans. Elizabeth M. 31
Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 3.
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, An Aesthetic Education in the Era of  Globalization (Cambridge, MA: 32
Harvard University Press, 2012), 514 n. 42.
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traumatic condition of there being “no adequate analogical fit between the mind and the 
sense-perceptible world.”  It sounds like a mind/body division, however, it is “no mystical 33
exercise this, but an effortful suspension,”  one I would associate with the anxiety of the a/34
new explored above. 
 Let’s double back to Sirc and demonstrate how his approach differs in terms of its 
figuration of arts practices and their relevance to pedagogy. In short, he positions alternative 
forms (particularly those of his choice-idiosyncratic tastes) as beyond and other than 
“traditional” writing pedagogies. Again, for Sirc composition always demands adherence to 
“the codified scripts of academia . . . . The search for intelligible structures is over; the goods 
have been found and now they need only be routinely delivered.”  Instead, Sirc suggests 35
writing instructors embrace and allow alternative forms with whatever is at hand—“the 
operative grammar [of ] the sound bite, the tee-shirt/bumper-sticker slogan, ad copy, graffiti, 
stadium bannerspeak”—suggesting that instructors position even “online chats as glitzy 
funhouse in the arid Mojave of university writing.”  He recalls and praises, for example, a 36
collaboration of four students who dropped “a 20-line rap song on the subject of Mother 
Teresa,” a particularly impressive showing in Sirc’s judgement—“true Composition as a 
Happening.”  Indeed, Sirc’s text often resembles manifestos from the Happenings and 37
Situationists movements quoted throughout the book: “we must pursue the world beyond 
disciplinary tradition.”  38
 Ibid., 197; 25.33
 Ibid., 202.34
 Sirc, Happening, 243.35




 Clarification. While alternative forms of inquiry and production are most welcome in 
a pedagogy that wants to cultivate aesthetic relationships with research, framing these 
activities as portals to special or exclusive access to liberation is problematic. Again: because 
intelligibility is sensible, such an aesthetic relation is always already the case in all 
composition events, whether arid or juicy. Sirc’s emphasis on formal experimentation 
positions the “Writing Classroom as Factory,” an inspiration he takes from  Andy Warhol’s 
1960s studio-hangout bursting with all sorts of experiments and innovative in production 
techniques. “The Factory,” they called it, and “[w]hatever it was, it was the absolute opposite 
of the Academy.”  As a model for composition instruction, Sirc’s composition as not-39
Academy is a remarkable claim, for it posits the academy may not be the academy. While the 
contradiction is not an issue for the present writing, the use of the factory as a rhetorical 
frame for revolutionary purposes in the context of first world writing instruction is troubling. 
I have in mind Claire Bishop’s undeniable critique of “relational aesthetics” movements of the 
late 1990s, which were typically installation and/or performance pieces with some 
participatory dimension within the institutional or gallery space. The textbook example is the 
work of Rirkrit Tiravanija, who cooked and served Thai food dinner party as an art show; 
participants were meant, by the artist’s own account, to consider not the food but the 
relations and interactions among those attending the event.  As Bishop makes clear, such 40
exhibitions deploy “metaphors like ‘laboratory,’ ‘construction site,’ and ‘art factory’ to 
differentiate themselves from bureaucracy-encumbered collection-based museums,” but can 
only remain artificial, “feel good” environs conditioning the possibility of a “cozy situation 
[wherein] art does not feel the need to defend itself, and . . . collapses into compensatory 
 Geoffrey Sirc, “Writing Classroom as Factory,” Composition Studies 36, no. 1 (2008): 35.39
 See Claire Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” October 110 (Fall 2004): 55-58.40
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(and self-congratulatory) entertainment”  indistinguishable from spectacle and cultural-41
industrial product, the very bane of the Situationists’ plight. Therefore, the notion that 
“legitimizing other forms and functions (and teaching them), even ‘frivolous’ ones like those 
of an e-chat transcript, might make the landscape less alienating,”  is difficult to accept. In 42
any case, things are a lot scarier than this traditional/experience appearance of choice let on. 
The IMRAD form itself, as I demonstrated above, is performative, relational, and aesthetic. 
Electrate. 
 At least two decades ahead of his time, Gregory L. Ulmer foresaw the blooming of 
what he describes as the “apparatus” of “electracy,” something he describes as that which “is 
to digital media what literacy is to alphabetic writing.”  Importantly, however, the apparatus 43
includes not only the technologies of orality and literacy, but also their assumptions, 
epistemologies, metaphors, institutions, and so on. Hence electracy refers not simply to 
computers or digital compositions, but moods and modes of (thinking about) knowledge 
production, with no apparatus winning out over the others. The key insight is that 
conceptual processes in digital composition necessitate a dramatic shift from the habits of 
 Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” 52; 79. Another, informal, and/but equally and 41
perhaps therefore valid, comes from Hennessy Youngman, alter ego of  artist Jayson Musson: 
[S]omehow congregating in a gallery to take part in the same activities [that people do regularly out in the 
real world] is a socially autonomous refusal of  capitalism, because we all know that a gallery is an 
ideologically-neutral environment that has nothing to do with the accumulation of  wealth, or the 
advancement of  global capitalism, or any of  its sordid subpractices. And that’s, you know, why the walls 
are white in the gallery. Because white’s neutral, it’s good, it’s neutral—white: I can think, I can think—
that’s why I’m here. 
Hennessy Youngman, “Relational Aesthetics,” ART THOUGHTZ (vlog), March 15, 2011, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yea4qSJMx4.
 Sirc, Happening, 207.42
 Gregory L. Ulmer, Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy (New York: Longman, 2003), xvii.43
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thinking associated with alphabetic text technologies of literacy.  Of course, multimedia 44
have an ability to streamline linear, propositional thinking and communication as we have 
understood it in literacy, but taking advantage of electrate opportunities involve thinking in 
and through and during with media—images, sounds, and combinations of modalities for 
affective and temporal ends.  My task here is to address how electracy cultivates aesthetic 45
relationships with information in which a mutually-affective capacity between writing and 
“content” is sustained for the (a)new. 
 Coming out of Eric Havelock’s work on orality and literacy, Ulmer reminds us these 
technologies were invented and bear no essential relationship to knowledge as such. Although 
once dominant, neither necessarily constitutes the pinnacle of knowledge making practices. 
Crucially, Ulmer’s electracy proposes something quite different from the algorithmicism and 
mathematization associated in common parlance with technology—nor does it pursue 
enhanced communication in the sense of transmitting idea from writer to audience. With its 
focus on aesthetics, “electracy makes possible some new learning behaviors that do not have 
exact equivalents within literacy,”  namely an emphasis on interpretive idiosyncrasy. 46
Although Ulmer uses different neologisms in different texts as he develops the notion across 
nearly thirty years of scholarship (electracy, videocy, teletheory, etc.), one sustained theme has 
been the student-scholar’s relationship with image and other rich media. As many have 
 I hasten to add that the fashionable distinction between an allegedly static print text and the 44
supposed dynamism of  the digital is overblown; neither is entirely stable, and neither is wholly fluid. For me, it 
is crucial to harness the potential of  media and multimodality while at the same time nourishing a critical 
consciousness attuned to abuses of  computationalism, cloud feudalism, big data profiling, and a new politics of  
accessibility brought on by industry standard software you cannot own—only rent. To name just a few. Still, my 
feeling is that digital natives on our rosters are behooved by an approach to electracy characterized both by 
progressivism and caution.
 Hence the common critique of  text-heavy PowerPoint presentations without design.45
 Gregory L. Ulmer, “Electracy and Pedagogy,” Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy, http://46
users.clas.ufl.edu/glue/longman/pedagogy (supplementary online material on the author’s university 
webspace).
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already argued, image and video in scholastic contexts figures learning as an enterprise that 
exceeds referentiality and explication with its affective, visual, sonic, and even tactile 
dimensions. The relationality of electracy, however, suggests the apparatus be exploited not 
for enhanced transmission, but for a relatively open-ended pursuit of epistemic surprise. Like 
Sirc, Ulmer also acknowledges “the projection of . . . forms onto writing itself,”  which is 47
neither limited to the critical nor alphabetic manuscript. The difference between the two 
scholars, however, is that Sirc’s eyes are on a particular prize: the liberated student subject.  
 Speaking of eyes, Ulmer embraces a flip of the traditional frame of camera as a visual-
prosthetic whose primary function is reproduction. Assignment of the device to this archival 
role is consistent with the truism that “knowing in the modern paradigm is scopophilic” 
deals a pleasure not unlike that of the “voyeur.”  (It also prioritizes visual and ocularcentric 48
knowledges, a sonic complement for which was the focus of an earlier chapter in this 
dissertation). Metaphors like “capturing,” “taking,” and “getting” the photos reveals the 
camera’s alliance with the lack-based wisdom of acquisition seen in earlier chapters, but its 
rhetorics of display and reproduction are consistent with what we might call an “ideology of 
the visible” and an attendant “analytico-referential discourse.”  Inspired by experimental film 49
that flouts logics of bread crumb narratives and overt mise-en-scène, Ulmer attempts “to use 
the machine of realism operating in our [academic] discourse to say something else, 
something more and other.”  Hence the literacy of scholarship is not abandoned or burned 50
downs, but augmented and reinvented anew. 





 Perhaps surprisingly, Ulmer makes much of installation and performance artist 
Joseph Beuys, figuring him as a tutor for invention in academic inquiry. An extended 
discussion of Beuys’ Fat Corner figures the work as parallel or synergistic with the work of 
Jacques Derrida. Margarine or some alternative is spread where two walls of a room meet, 
erecting a small sort of triangular pyramid on the floor, crawling up the corner. The work 
appears utterly meaningless and foolish: “[t]he elements of the piece are the fat; the action of 
putting the fat into the corner; the corner itself, a geometric form; time and the process of 
putrefaction; and the viewer’s response.”  But according to Ulmer, the piece calls our 51
attention to the spread and sculpted mold of the material itself, which eventually turns limp 
and becomes contaminated by dust in the air. Ulmer also notes the foregrounding of corner’s 
uncompromising right-angle limit, peripheral and yet ubiquitous in architecture. As glob and 
edge meet in this apparently ridiculous installation, “Beuys interrogates materials the way 
Derrida interrogates terminology.”  Curiously and in a particular sense, “there is no need to 52
translate what Beuys is doing from art into pedagogy, since he is already engaging in 
pedagogy”  by performing how givens might be other and anew. Metaphors cycle in. One’s 53
relationships with fat and corner—cholesterol and the built environment in which they sleep 
each night—are renewed. Prior connotations and charges reveal themselves as provisional. 
 Such renewals in Beuys, while certainly different, are not unlike the renewal of the 
image for education discussed above. In both cases, commonplace understandings are 
surprised and challenged as orientations with these informations are overhauled during a 
statelessness that is surprise. Ulmer’s electracy informs the dissertation less as a guide for 
 Gregory L. Ulmer, Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys (Baltimore: 51




digital media than the shock of its apparatus relativity. While things like television or the 
internet catalyze and motivate his writing, his own account refuses to hold any one media or 
discursive apparatus above another. Most important for his work is the liminality instigated 
by the shift from one to another. 
Innovation 
 Transposed for writing instruction, my sense is introducing the idea that information 
is something with which one can relate will begin to respond and attenuate some of the 
dysfunctional engagements with discussed above. Specifically, the issue is a surprise-adverse 
discourse that too quickly chokes the new before rendering it trivia, data. The cumulative 
suggestion I take from the this interdisciplinary discourse above is that it is necessary to show 
how information work can and does involve more than the advantageous manipulation of 
identifications; relation is necessary for holistic, ethical, reflective thought and action. In the 
remaining section below, I begin to sketch ways of integrating contemporary art works into 
the writing classroom by drawing connections between their apparent energies and typical 
themes in composition courses and textbooks. 
 I also suspect that such features of a writing classroom are capable of responding to 
the zeitgeist of “innovation” currently permeating higher education—and do so in both 
“useful” and healthy ways to boot. I suspect the innovation discourse is a desperate response 
to the shrinking “failure loop” in business, the instability of longterm investments brought 
on by the shift from agricultural and manufacturing economies to volatile idea and service 
industries, dorm room startups, increasing frequency of career changes, and so on.  The 54
 See Adam Davidson, “Welcome to the Failure Age!,” New York Times, November 12, 2014, http://54
nyti.ms/1yyqlVn.
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increasing prevalence of surprises, perhaps. While such conditions reflect the precarious 
neoliberal conditions in which we live, the issue is also beginning to show in composition. 
The subject will be the focus of Joyce Locke Carter’s Chair’s Address at the Conference on 
College Composition and Communication in 2016. In a teaser for the talk, Carter reveals 
her conflicted relationship with the concept: “while [innovation] sometimes evokes a 
mindless (and needless) overthrow of conventions, it also serves as an encouraging nudge for 
innovators upon whose inventions such disruption depends.”  Saying “when” is tricky.  55
 Jean Dubuffet’s mythological fetish for the new notwithstanding, his epigraph above 
is nevertheless a helpful reminder that framework, if left unchecked and unvisited, can 
function as a blinder.  Even technical communication knows this well. A field unjustly 56
caricatured for its alleged keep calm and carry on writing memos proceduralism, technical 
writing is in fact a creative sort of existential “conduct” that structures and builds 
communities in the broadest sense.  Figuring the field in this matter means “we can no 57
longer view [technical communication] as merely the skill or art of information transfer,” 
when indeed it is nothing less than the construction of communities, professions, and lives.  58
The plain and economic stylistics, the bulleted list, the deliberate reduction of excess—all 
these simultaneously belie and betray the constructed order of such documentation. I suggest 
we teach these implicit relationships with information here as a way to callback and recollect 
the sensibility of intelligibility.  
 Joyce Locke Carter, “Making, Disrupting, Innovating,” Sailing the Four Cs (blog), January 17, 2016, 55
http://joycelockecarter.com/CCCC/making-disrupting-innovating.
 For a related discussion of  Dubuffet’s aesthetic sensibilities and motives, see Lucienne Peiry, Art 56
Brut: The Origins of  Outsider Art, trans. James Frank (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), 35-38.
 Carolyn R. Miller, “What’s Practical about Technical Writing?,” in Technical Writing: Theory and Practice, 57
eds. Bertie E. Fearing and W. Keats Sparrow (New York; The Modern Language Association of  America, 
1989), 22-23.
 Stephen Doheny-Farina, Rhetoric, Innovation, Technology: Case Studies of  Technical Communication in 58
Technology Transfers (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts Institute of  Technology Press, 1992), 220.
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Information Aesthetics for Composition 
 The discourse of “participatory art,” wherein some degree of agency is allotted to the 
spectator, is sometimes motivated by a “desire to invest art with nonart social or political 
intent.”  Entertaining briefly the faulty art/nonart division, I would turn it right around by 59
trying to learn from artistic practices modes of engagement for writing. Rather than see art as 
an escape or escapism from composition, I would suggest we note the similarities between 
these two separate practices while letting each remain different. Stated thusly, “open spaces 
for undefined interactions could radically change our general perception of the institution as 
an inflexible, deadening container.”  While participatory utopianism has been critiqued by 60
Bishop and others, the formulation here is interesting in that it specifies alteration of 
perception and relation rather than a revision of the institution’s material or ontological 
configurations. 
 My point would not be to position art works as alternatives to so called “traditional” 
forms like the dreaded five paragraph essay, but to help demonstrate that “even . . . the most 
chaste discursive prose” cannot shed its metaphorical or tropological qualities—that is, its 
relation unto its “putative subject matter.”  Needless to say, the forms, functions, 61
institutions, contexts, audiences, and other rhetorical variables of works typically considered 
“art”—e.g., those painted, photographic, plastic, cinematic, sonic, participatory, installed, 
and so on—are understood, engaged, and interpreted in different contexts, with different 
(though overlapping) audiences, and for different purposes. Erasing all difference between 
 Rudolf  Frieling, “Toward Participation in Art,” in The Art of  Participation: 1950 to now, ed. Rudolf  59
Frieling (London: Thames & Hudson, 2008), 34.
 Ibid., 47 (emphasis added).60
 Hayden White, Tropics of  Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 61
University Press, 1978), 3; 4.
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the two would be irresponsible. But the material and affective capacities of art do seem to me 
crucial affordances for writing instruction. Specifically, they make the aesthetic encounter we 
have with any object or “text” more palpable and apparent. The word and the letter, the pH 
test, and the chi-squared analysis—not unlike pigment or pixel—are media constituting a 
relation with “content,” be it concrete or abstract, “known,” intuited, or invented during the 
creative act. I would like now to present some examples of art works I have recently brought 
into the classroom with surprising success.  
 Specifically, I look for conceptual works that don’t look like art works to those 
unfamiliar with contemporary art. Try sharing, for instance, Damien Hirst’s The Physical 
Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living and asking students whether the work is 
art or a museum exhibit. Squints, smirks, raised eyebrows. The piece is a nearly eighteen foot 
long “tank” and consists of an actual shark suspended in formaldehyde, poised to chomp a 
nearby victim. As the cheeky title alludes, this work permits one to safely engage danger, fear, 
threat, and the relative vulnerability of otherwise comfortable humans in the food chain. In 
one more turn, however, the shark is not any of these things because it is not real, which 
makes the joke less on the shark than the unreflective spectator. This vicarious threat is 
secured for indefinite contemplation, access, and retrieval; it is hyperbolic preservation also 
seen in the critical manuscript, which affords control found through acquisition and catalog. 
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Figure 5.1: Spectator with Damien Hirst’s The Physical 
Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone 
Living. “capturing the art shark” by Art Siegel is 
licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0. 
Other Hirst pieces with medicinal themes such as Pharmacy or his “Pill Cabinet” series also 
make good provocations. These pieces work with rhetorics of display, sterility, and, along 
with the shark, archive. 
  
Figure 5.2: Detail photograph of  a Hirst “Pill 
Cabinets” aestheticizing pharmacology. 
“Damien Hirst” by Johnny Vulkan is licensed 
under CC BY 2.0. 
Behold: the creation of industry, of proprietary research, of chemical synthesis—
advantageous configuration of worldly materials. Students typically note the cleanliness of 
the piece and the almost “too perfect” configuration of materials. In fact, it does not resemble 
a lab or a pharmacy, which is almost assuredly messier. Something about it seems plastic and 
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artificial—airless. Is this our library, our database? Is information just sitting on a shelf, 
waiting to be plucked and popped? 
 Next, try displaying Minimalist works and asking the biologists and chemists in the 
room for help making connections among the elementary geometric shapes, the apparent 
minimization of the artist’s hand, or the machinic repetition. The flat grids of Agnes Martin 
or Frank Stella’s early work, for examples, have worked wonderfully for my courses. Typically 
students are off and running, noting the imperfect precision (look closely, divisions are not 
quite equilateral) whose symmetry I suggest might come to inform our discussion of 
methodology in a Science Writing course. Grids function in these conversations as 
quantization cookie cutters for the otherwise inchoate constant of material reactions and the 
qualitative decisions that transpose observation into replicable quantity. Not quite perfect, 
but pretty darn close. Invariably, a group of students forms and rallies for the interpretation 
that the grids are somehow “pleasing” or “comforting.” Almost like a method. 
                
Finally, share Hans Haacke’s MoMA Poll, a pioneer work of institutional critique that 
Figure 5.3: Detail Photograph of  “Frank Stella, The 
Marriage of  Reason and Squalor, II, 1959, 
Whitney.” Image by Sharon Mollerus is licensed 
under CC BY 2.0.
Figure 5.4: Detail photograph of  
“Agnes Martin, Untitled #12, 
1977.” Image by Sharon Mollerus 
is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
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aestheticizes the survey instrument. This piece is simply two voting boxes appearing beneath 
a sign that prompts visitors to cast their responses right into the work: 
Question: 
Would the fact that Governor Rockefeller has not denounced President Nixon’s Indochina policy be a 
reason for you not to vote for him in November? 
Answer: 
If ‘yes’ 
please cast your ballot into the left box 
if ‘no’ 
into the right box. 
  
Figure 5.5: Photograph of  “MoMA Poll by 
Hans Haacke in the Museum of  Modern 
Art.” Image has been released to the 
Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
The piece is a jab at Nelson Rockefeller, a Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) trustee at the 
time, but it also creates an aesthetic relationship with polling as such. It makes the process of 
collecting and counting a creative effort to engage and come to relate with the political 
attitudes of a sample population. The work actually performs and temporalizes the social 
scientific effort of the survey probe. What are they thinking out there, and why? Not unlike 
the shark, an indirect worldview is here operationalized, contained, measured, and tallied in 
real time. The theatrical frame of it all helps students understand the relationship with 
information constituted by the survey instrument: a controlled but wide netted scoop of 
preference and disposition. 
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Relations 
 My intent has been to develop ways for students to cultivate nuanced and subtle 
relationships with research capable of instigating and sustaining the surprise of new and 
aestheticized understandings of information itself. The ideal writer is sometimes caricatured 
as a hyper-practical synthesizer of source material, but arranging the already known in 
advantageous configurations is an apolitical proceduralism that erases or, at best, downplays 
the aesthetic and inventional qualities of composing. If we construe the educator’s task as 
something grander than mere certification for the immediate, contingent, and, (let’s face it) 
temporary, then the tension between satisfaction and invention ought to occupy a sustained 
role in courses setting out out to help students process, relate, and compose information. 
What is at stake is nothing less than an existential effort to get along in the world—to 
variously secure, enhance, entertain, or conserve professions and lives. It is not a grandiosity 
to say that students are tomorrow’s knowledge builders and decision makers. They need and 
deserve the chance to examine the formative pressures and aesthetic assumptions governing 
their intellectual work in school and beyond, and learning from the arts is one way to 






Notes on the fair use of  copyrighted materials  
organized by the criteria of  judgment stated in Title 14 Chapter 1 §107 of  the U.S. Code. 
1. The purpose and character of  the use of  copyrighted works: The works are 
sampled in the chapter for the purpose of  citation in a scholarly analysis and for the 
sake of  exalting the aesthetic achievements of  the artists. The samples are explicitly 
discussed as the works of  others and should not be construed as writer’s own 
inventions. 
2. The nature of  the copyrighted work: While the partially reproduced works are 
creative in nature, the present writing and its scholarly audience is qualitatively 
different such that the creativity of  the present author is manifest in an altogether 
separate medium: alphabetic writing. 
3. The amount and substantiality of  the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole: Samples of  the copyrighted works are typically 20-30 
seconds in duration. The sole exception (Clip 3.6) itself  remixes another copyrighted 
work. The full range and development of  the copyrighted works cannot be heard in 
the chapter. 
4. The effect of  the use upon the potential market for or value of  the copyrighted 
works: The brief  clips in this essay would make poor substitutes for the original 
works, even in spite of  electronic music culture’s association with sampling and 
remixing. The samples are so brief  as to be useless for DJ sets. Further, the present 
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writing and the original works have different audiences, although overlap is 
conceivable. I encourage readers to explore electronic music, including but not 
limited to artists cited here, and to pay for creative works at one of  many digital 
outlets such as Beatport or iTunes.  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